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Counterfactuals, or unrealized scenarios, have been a focus of research in an array 
of disciplines, though their rhetorical implications have gone largely unexplored.  This 
interdisciplinary study uses a cognitive methodology in taking a fresh look at 
counterfactual scenarios in discourse. The study argues that when counterfactual 
scenarios are introduced into discourse and paired with an evaluative stance, the result is 
a creative and persuasive scenario that allows a speaker to communicate a perspective 
that a listener may reinforce, revise, or reject.  Counterfactuals thus have the ability to 
convey an evaluation, to convey emotion, to provide a window for disagreement, or to 
foster solidarity.  In literature, counterfactual scenarios additionally serve as an embedded 
element of discourse that may convey the perspective of characters and/or the implied 
author. The reader juggles the counterfactual scenarios, and the perspectives they convey, 
with other textual elements to grasp the meaning of the story.
 This study furthers previous research on counterfactuality by considering the 
phenomenon from a cognitive rhetorical perspective. Rather than focusing on 
counterfactual thinking, as psychologists have done, or on linguistic forms, as linguists 
have done, this study considers both the cognitive and discursive dimensions of 
counterfactuals in a fully integrated analysis.  Furthermore, this study places 
counterfactuals within a communicative paradigm that considers the role of both speaker 
and listener, or author and reader, in developing and interpreting counterfactual scenarios. 
This study thus demonstrates the largely unrecognized rhetorical dimensions of 
counterfactual scenarios in both ordinary and literary discourse.  
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Introduction: Counterfactuals and the Dialogic Mind
In December of 2002, former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi 
gave a speech in honor of Senator Strom Thurmond’s 100th birthday.  It was during 
this speech that he made a statement which had a significant impact on his career. In 
praising Thurmond, Lott noted that when Thurmond ran for the Presidency in 1948, 
one of the four states he carried was Mississippi. Lott went on to say: "We're proud of 
it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these 
problems over all these years, either”  (qtd. in Halbfinger). Thurmond had run for the 
Presidency in 1948 on a platform that promoted racial segregation, and critics accused 
Lott of being racially insensitive in what many took as an implicit endorsement of 
Thurmond’s segregationist candidacy. 
In one sense, the outcry over this statement is puzzling – many people were 
extremely angry even though Trent Lott had described an event that never took place.  
Strom Thurmond did not win the Presidency in 1948 – Lott only imagined a scenario 
in which Thurmond won.  Trent Lott was imagining “what might have been” when he 
introduced the idea that Thurmond could have won the election, as if he were asking, 
“what if Strom Thurmond had been elected President in 1948?”  His answer to the 
question was implied by his statement “we wouldn’t have had all these problems over 
all these years.”  
This example demonstrates the fact that a speaker’s attitude toward an 
imagined scenario may be one of the most significant aspects of meaning conveyed to 
a listener.  It didn’t matter that the scenario Lott described was a fictitious, “what 
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might have been” example.  What mattered was the way Lott felt aboutthe example –
the perspective on past events that was conveyed by his words.  Clearly, his 
subsequent statements of regret showed that he understood that the representation of 
his own attitude was the problem.  He issued a statement noting that  "A poor choice 
of words conveyed to some that I embraced the discarded policies of the past” (qtd. in 
Stolberg).  But the attitude he had conveyed proved difficult to retract, and he was 
eventually forced to resign as Senate Republican leader.
How did his listeners infer Lott’s attitude from the statement that he gave?  
Lott’s words conveyed not only an imagined scenario in which Thurmond won the 
Presidency, but also an implied evaluation of this scenario.  Lott’s evaluation was 
conveyed by the positive depiction of the imagined scenario, which implied a 
corresponding negative depiction of the actual scenario. Specifically, Lott’s statement 
implicitly associated the actual situation, in which Thurmond didn’t win, with “all 
these problems over all these years.”  In cotrast, in the imagined situation he 
described in which the rest of the country had followed Mississippi’s lead and 
Thurmond had won, “these problems” would have been avoided. The imagined 
Thurmond presidency seemed more favorable, as Lott described it, than he actual 
outcome of the election and the historical path that followed.
We can pair Lott’s statement with another example that seems far removed in 
both time and purpose – an excerpt from Virginia Woolf’s 1925 novel Mrs. Dalloway. 
In the novel, the main character Mrs. Dalloway thinks about her life as she walks 
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along the street in London.  She thinks about her current husband, Richard, as well as 
her friend and former suitor, Peter Walsh.  About Peter, she concludes, 
...she had been right – and she had too – not  to marry him. For in 
marriage a little license, a little independence there must be between 
people living together day in day out in the same house; which Richard 
gave her, and she him. (Where was he this morning for instance? Some 
committee, she never asked what). But with Peter, everything had to be 
shared; everything gone into. And it was intolerable…. (7-8)
 In Mrs. Dalloway’s statement, it is the decision to reject a former suitor that is 
at issue.  Unlike Lott, who implied that the country made a mistake in not electing 
Thurmond, Mrs. Dalloway assures herself that she made the right choice.  At least, she 
takes pains to reassure herself that “she had been right – and she had too – not to 
marry him.”  She implies a contrast between what mrriage might have been like with 
Peter – emotional, dependent – and her refreshingly independent marriage with her 
actual husband, Richard. In the comparison, Richard seems the more fitting husband, 
while Peter would have been a husband with “intolerable” needs, thus reinforcing Mrs. 
Dalloway’s conclusion that she had been right to reject him. While Trent Lott’s 
evaluation implied a preference for the imagined scenario, Mrs. Dalloway prefers her 
actual marriage to the imagined alternative.
It may seem whimsical to yoke together Trent Lott and Mrs. Dalloway, a 
politically-charged birthday speech and a modernist novel.  And yet, they have an 
uncanny similarity in their representation of a common activity.  We recognize the 
type of thinking that is represented because we too engage in it.  Who has not 
considered, at one point or another, the possibilities for what might have been?  We 
often think about the events in our lives that did not occur but might have: the 
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invitation that was refused, the position that w s declined, or the accident that was 
narrowly escaped.   Psychologists call this phenomenon counterfactual thinking, and 
have shown that it is a normal part of our cognition. As Neal Roese and James Olson 
have written, “Counterfactual thinking is something familiar to nearly everyone.  Even 
if they have not previously heard the term ‘counterfactual,’ people instantly recognize 
it, once it has been defined for them, as something with which they are intimately 
acquainted” (“What Is?”).
Counterfactual thinking may seem so normal and familiar that we fail to see 
the complexity involved in communicating counterfactual scenarios to each other. In 
fact, we are so adept at presenting and interpreting counter-to-fact scenarios that they 
may seem to require no special attention at all. Speakers easily introduce 
counterfactual scenarios with simple statements like “if the rest of the country had 
followed our lead” or “I was right not to marry him.” But clearly, at the very least, 
counterfactual scenarios must be distinguished from factual discourse.  Note that for 
all the debate inspired by Trent Lott’s counterfactual scenario, no one was confused 
about whether Strom Thurmond actually won the election.  Similarly, there is no 
confusion on the part of either the reader or Mrs. Dalloway about whether she actually 
married Peter Walsh.  We are able to easily partition what might have happened from 
what actually did.  We can discuss these alternative scenarios with an understanding 
that they did not occur.
Language provides the cues that enable speakers and their audiences to 
understand these partitions between fact and counterfact when they are discussing 
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imagined scenarios. For example, “If the rest of the country had followed our lead” 
introduces a situation clearly marked as counterfactual by the markers “if” and “had.” 
The wording of this opening clause clearly distinguishes it from a scenario marked as 
factual, which might begin instead with “since the rest of the country followed our 
lead….” Other linguistic markers, uch as the use of the negative in the example from 
Mrs. Dalloway, also help speakers and their audiences distinguish counterfactual from 
actual scenarios.
It is clear that counterfactual scenarios are not only an aspect of thinking, but 
intimately tied to language and communication.  Psychologists have established a 
connection between counterfactual thinking and normal cognitive development, 
emotions like relief and regret, and causal attribution1. This psychological account 
provides vast insight into the cognitive and emotive dimensions of counterfactuals, 
and yet it is incomplete.  Often focusing on elaborate scenarios imagined by 
individuals, psychologists have paid little attention to the role of counterfactuals in 
communicative settings.  In our everyday lives, we don’t just think about counter- o-
fact scenarios, we describe them to each other. They are included in novels, glorified 
in speeches, and even elaborated by historians.  Counterfactuals are a creative element 
of all types of discourse.
For this reason, language provides a natural starting point for investigations 
into counterfactuals.  And in fact, analysis of specific forms that communicate 
contrary-to-fact information has a long history in the philosophy of language that 
predates psychological work on counterfactual thinking2.  Yet until the more recent 
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explosion of the cognitive sciences, no paradigm existed that related the linguistic 
expressions of counterfactuality to mental representations and cognitive processes.  
Recently, cognitive linguists have worked to fully describe this connection3.  I  their 
most recent work on the subject, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the 
Mind’s Hidden Complexities (2002), Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner enhance the 
cognitive account with a description of the imaginative processes necessary to produce 
and understand counterfactual scenarios.  They demonstrate that elaborate mental 
representations are often generated from minimal linguistic input.  They show that 
incomplete information is brought together to form coherent counterfactual scenarios 
in a process of conceptual integration. 
Fauconnier and Turner’s account takes strides to establish firm connections 
between language, mental representation of counterfactual scenarios, and the cognitive
process of conceptual integration; they acknowledge the almost ubiquitous role that 
counterfactuals play in discourse.  Yet they fail to explain fully the reasons that 
counterfactuals play such a widespread and important role.  In one sense, the 
communication of counterfactual scenarios seems like a waste of time.  The events 
described did not happen.  The discourse participants understand this.  And the 
circumstances surrounding the original event cannot be repeated – th re will never be 
another 1948 Presidential election, and a woman who has married someone else 
cannot accept a marriage proposal from the past.  So why do people bother discussing 
counterfactuals at all? Something is missing from the cognitive linguistic and 
cognitive psychological accounts.  For all that they do reveal, they do not fully explain 
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the purpose that counterfactuals serve in discourse that make them worthwhile topics 
of discussion.
I propose that counterfactuals serve a purpose in discourse because they can 
function rhetorically and allow people to communicate a perspective on the past.  This 
rhetorical role is most obvious in statements that not only present a counterfactual, but 
also include an evaluation of the imagined scenario.  In these examples, the 
counterfactual not only presents a creative scenario, but provides a vehicle for 
expressing an opinion about that scenario, such as Lott’s opinion that the country 
“could have avoided all these problems” or Mrs. Dalloway’s opinion that “she had 
been right – and she had too – not to marry him.”  Because the listener is already 
involved in imagining the counterfactual, the evaluation can be a particularly effective 
way to encourage the listener to adopt the speaker’s perspective.       
We see this rhetorical dimension of counterfactuality in the examples from 
both Trent Lott’s birthday speech and Mrs. Dalloway – the speakers are presenting 
views on the past that represent their own unique perspectives.  Whether it is the 
collective history of the country or personal history that is being evaluated, the 
medium is the same: a counterfactual scenario.  By introducing an evaluation of the 
counterfactual scenario the speakers actively encourage listeners to share their views 
of past events.  
When Mrs. Dalloway notes that “she had been right” and adds “and she had 
too,” she seems to be trying to convince herself that her evaluation of marital options 
is legitimate. Are we convinced that Mrs. Dalloway did the right thing in marrying 
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Richard, a man who, according to her, maintains his privacy and stays emotionally 
detached?   Not necessarily, just as most people who heard Lott’s remarks did not 
agree with him that Thurmond’s election would have been a positive turn for the 
country. When counterfactual scenarios are introduced into discourse, they present the 
perspective of an individual speaker, including that speaker’s evaluations, and while 
the listener must understand the counterfactual in order to understand the statement, he 
is free to disagree with the evaluation. In other words, while t e person who interprets 
the counterfactual must also interpret the speaker’s perspective, he or she need not 
adopt it. As with any rhetorical tactic, there is no guarantee that speaker and listener 
will agree on the interpretation or evaluation of a counterfactual scenario.
The rhetorical nature of counterfactual scenarios – their role in discourse, their 
utility in presenting a speaker’s perspective, and their openness to interpretation by a 
reader or listener – has been neglected in previous studies.   For those of us interested 
in the study of language and literature, the rhetorical nature of counterfactuals is the 
most interesting fact about them.   Counterfactual scenarios give speakers the ability to 
convey a unique perspective through both simple and elaborate imaginative 
statements. When counterfactuals are communicated to listeners, these  “simple 
regrets” may help corroborate perceptions or highlight differences in the way we 
evaluate events.
The examples from Trent Lott and Mrs. Dalloway demonstrate that 
counterfactuals are a recognizable feature of vastly different types of discourse. There 
are other possible differences as well – counterfactual scenarios may take on very 
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different properties in different settings. They may be quite short, like the examples 
above, or as long as an entire novel.  The differences in the scenarios themselves, and 
the contexts in which they occur, may seem to prevent any integrated research on the 
phenomenon.  In part, this assumption may seem born out by the fact that some 
researchers have been interested primarily in the linguistic nature of counterfactual 
expressions, while others have been interested primarily in the cognitive operations 
involved in counterfactual thinking.
I believe this seeming problem can be overcome by considering 
counterfactuals as a coherent phenomenon with both linguistic and cognitive 
dimensions, and by providing a more careful analysis of the properties of specific 
counterfactual scenarios and the contexts in which they appear. These two factors 
make it possible for me to integrate the research from different disciplines and to 
consider counterfactual scenarios from a variety of settings in my own rhetorical 
analysis. Counterfactuals occur across discourse types, and have distinctive rhetorical 
functions, foremost of which is evaluation.  Counterfactuals are a dialogic 
phenomenon, a theme I will use to organize this book. 
In Chapter 1: Counterfactual Scenarios, I propose three parameters to 
distinguish types of counterfactual scenarios: contingency, elaboration, and 
embedding.  Contingency refers to the sense that the counterfactual was once a viable 
possibility. Elaboration refers to the development of the counterfactual in either a 
simple or extended linguistic form.  Embedding refers to the relation of the 
counterfactual to other mental representations; for example, a scenario may be 
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counterfactual with respect to a speaker’s understanding of reality or the “reality” of a 
fictional text.  These parameters are useful not only in distinguishing between different 
instances of counterfactual scenarios, but also help to distinguish research programs 
that have tended to focus on one type of counterfactual or another.  I end the chapter 
by describing the evaluative counterfactual scenario in terms of these parameters; the 
rest of this project will focus on counterfactual scenarios that are paired with 
evaluations.
In Chapter 2: Evaluative Stance, I propose that counterfactual scenarios 
depend on comparison, providing a natural outlet for the expression of evaluation.  I 
examine more closely the role that certain linguistic cues play in indicating that a 
scenario introduced in discourse has a counterfactual status, and then consider the 
range of linguistic expressions that additionally introduce an valuation of a 
counterfactual scenario.  I adopt the term “evaluative stance” to describe a speaker’s 
expressed evaluation of a counterfactual space, and describe the relationships between 
evaluation and emotion in counterfactual expressions.  As a final point, I consider the 
expressions “good thing” and “too bad” as case studies of evaluative stance in 
everyday discourse.
In Chapter 3: Counterfactuals as a Dialogic Phenomenon, I focus on the role 
of the listener in understanding, questioning, and developing evaluative counterfactual 
scenarios that have been introduced in discourse. In placing counterfactuals and 
evaluation within a communicative context, I consider possible responses that a 
listener may make to a counterfactual statement, and how these responses reinforce, 
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revise, or reject the counterfactual scenario or the evaluation.  When the listener reacts 
in a way that reinforces the speaker’s assertions, the counterfactual may act as a means 
of corroborating perceptions; when the listener contests the views, the counterfactual 
becomes a point of negotiation or even discord.  I extend this model to literary 
discourse, which often includes multiple speakers and listeners.
In Chapter 4: He Had Never Written a Word of That, I consider 
counterfactuals developed within the narrative of Ernest Hemingway’s "The Snows of 
Kilimanjaro” (1938). In this story, the main characters, a married couple, are stranded 
while on a safari in Africa.  The wife attempts to convey her distress by imagining a 
better vacation they could have taken.  Analyzing the represented dialogue, I show that 
the husband’s unwillingness to confirm his wife’s evaluation highlights a tension in 
their relationship caused by his own struggles with regret.  I consider this represented 
dialogue in comparison to other counterfactual scenarios that occur in the narrative, 
and show that the theme of regret is sustained by the many types of counterfactuals in 
the story, which unify its disparate elements.   
In Chapter 5: He Should Have Acknowledged Her, I explore the role of a 
counterfactual statement in the dialogue of Charles Chesnutt’s story “The Wife of His 
Youth” (1899).  This statement occurs at a key moment in the text when the main 
character challenges his friends to overcome their racial biases by asking “should he 
have acknowledged her?”  The question refers to a man who has failed to make 
himself known to his darker-skinned former slave wife, and the main character has 
made it clear that he views the counter-to-fact acknowledgement as the morally 
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preferred scenario.  In this case, the listeners adopt the speaker’s point of view and 
confirm that “he should have acknowledged her.” This example demonstrates a 
successful corroboration of attitudes through the use of a counterfactual scenario.  The 
characters’ evaluation of the counterfactual scenario, I argue, encourages the reader to 
adopt a positive stance toward the theme of racial acceptance.    
 There are several important conclusions that may be drawn from this study.  
First, it proves that counterfactual scenarios play a significant role in discourse 
because of their creative and rhetorical potential, particularly the propensity for 
conveying evaluations.  Second, evaluative counterfactuals communicate the attitudes 
of discourse particpants which may in turn be corroborated, challenged, or rejected by 
their interlocutors. Third, ordinary language and narrative discourse both include 
expressions of counterfactuality that may be analyzed with similar techniques and 
assumptions.  The major distinction is that narrative discourse represents a more 
complex form of counterfactual expression because of its inherently embedded form, 
and because of the distribution of evaluative stance between multiple speakers.  
Counterfactual scenarios are not flights of fancy, but integral parts of our conversation 
and narrative that reflect our dialogic minds.
13
Chapter 1: Counterfactual Scenarios
What might have been is an abstraction / Remaining a perpetual possibility / Only in a 
world of speculation.  T.S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton”
In one of his best-known poems, Robert Frost encouraged us to consider the 
wisdom of looking back on “The Road Not Taken.”  The main character of Gustave 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary expressed regret that she did not marry someone else.  A 
Korean ice skater who finished first in an Olympic speed race, but was then 
disqualified, saw the gold medal go to the second place finisher4. Thomas Jefferson 
described the character of James Monroe by stating, “if you turned his soul inside out 
there would not be a spot on it”5.  Do all these examples help illustrate the notion of 
“counterfactuality”? I believe they do, but if that is true, how can the term 
counterfactual be coherently defined?
One of the difficulties that arises in studying counterfactuals is the diffuseness 
of the term itself.  The term is actively in use in a variety of disciplines, each with a 
different set of assumptions and research goals.  Working within their own paradigms, 
researchers have seemed to take a common meaing for granted; they have not 
belabored the process of definition, but dispensed with it quickly. No doubt, when a 
common perspective within a discipline may be assumed, the general diffuseness of 
the term across fields is less problematic. But the rise of cognitive science has brought 
about the need to integrate theories of the mind from cognitive psychology, cognitive 
linguistics, and cognitive rhetoric – not to mention the fact that interesting work on 
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“counterfactuals” has been undertaken in philosophy, literary criticism, history, and 
legal theory. At this time, those of us interested in the study of counterfactuals are 
using the same word for a vast range of phenomena. In order to share insights, we 
must achieve a more precise understanding of our terminology.
A brief sampling of “counterfactuals” taken from major works on the topic 
demonstrates the use of this term in different disciplines.  David Lewis’s classic book 
in the philosophy of language, Counterfactuals (1973), revisits the logic of Nelson 
Goodman’s example, “If New York City were in Georgia, New York City would be in 
the South” (43).  In their edited collection What Might Have Been (1996), Neal Roese 
and James Olson’s essay on the “Functions of Counterfactual Thinking” includes the 
example “what if you had bought the winning million-dollar lottery ticket last week?” 
(169). Niall Ferguson’s collection of “counterfactual histories,” Virtual History
(1997), includes a fifty page essay entitled “What if there had been no American 
Revolution?” (125-175).  Most recently, cognitive scientists Gilles Fauconnier and 
Mark Turner analyze the example “if Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would 
sink” (221) in their book The Way We Think (2002).     
An attempt to provide an exact criterial definition of the term  “counterfactual” 
might seem like the best solution to the problem, but the definition would inevitably 
exclude much of the interesting work that has been done in these various disciplines. 
Instead of attempting to provide such a definition, I will define three parameters –
contingengy, elaboration, and embedding – that are useful in considering how certain 
counterfactuals differ from other counterfactuals.  I will not propose that a single 
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definition of counterfactual is wrong or right, but that counterfactual scenarios can be 
differentiated according to their most important characteristics.   The three parameters 
are also useful in considering the types of counterfactuals that have been the object of 
study within certain disciplines, thus providing a framework for understanding what 
researchers in different disciplines mean by the term “counterfactual.”  Ultimately, 
counterfactuals are a product of creativity, and a creative person could undoubtedly 
find an example to challenge any attempt at an exact, delimited, definition.  
This chapter will attempt to clear the way for a discussion of the subset of 
counterfactuals that I will undertake as my own object of study in this book: 
evaluative counterfactuals.  I consider where this particular type of counterfactual falls 
along the parameters contingency, elaboration, and embedding, and how this type of 
counterfactual scenario relates to the types of counterfactuals that have been 
previously studied in other disciplines.  With this groundwork laid, I will then provide 
a much fuller account of “evaluative stance” in the next chapter, including a 
discussion of the relationship between evaluation and emotions like relief and regret.
The Counterfactual Scenario
In this study, I often use the term “counterfactual” as shorthand for the term 
“counterfactual scenario.”  A note is in order to establish exactly what I mean by the 
term scenario.  When I use the term, I am referring to a coherent mental representation 
that may include actors, agents, events, and relations. A scenario is unified, it may be 
elaborated, it may be the topic of discourse, and it may change as discourse proceeds.  
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Counterfactual scenarios in particular have a special ability to express causal 
relations between events and actions. One of the most common forms that 
counterfactuals take, the conditional expressed as an if/then proposition, often 
develops a causal relationship as part of its meaning.  The causal relationship may be 
based on actual scientific principles, as in “if you had heated the water to 100 degrees, 
it would have boiled,” or on a perceived causal relation, as in “if you had told her you 
needed help, she would have come over to help you.”  Even counterfactuals that do 
not adhere to this conditional form, like those developed in history, may start with an 
antecedent and develop a series of causally related consequences.
While not all counterfactuals express causation6, most counterfactual scenarios 
do seem to develop causal relationships, which is also the primary reason that 
counterfactual scenarios have become a respected mode of inquiry in fields like 
history. Since scientific studies of the past are not possible, a carefully developed 
counterfactual can serve as a means for testing a causal hypothesis between a 
historical event and its proposed outcome (Ferguson 81).  Nelson Goodman originally 
noted that “if we lack the means for interpreting counterfactual conditionals, we can 
hardly claim to have any adequate philosophy of science” (13), a point which Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner extend to the social sciences (218). In other words, 
identifying a causal relationship in both scientific and quasi-scientific settings includes 
the consideration of alternative causes and outcomes. 
Finally, I would like to stress the fact that counterfactuality is a cognitive 
phenomenon, and that counterfactual scenarios, in the view of my project and other 
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cognitive projects, are a form of mental representation. In fact, psychologists typically 
focus on the phenomenon of counterfactu l thinking, not counterfactual scenarios 
themselves, in their consideration of the phenomenon.  Similarly, cognitive scientists 
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner are primarily interested in the cognitive process of 
conceptual integration demonstrated in counterfactual scenarios.  In the remainder of 
the chapter, I discuss counterfactual scenarios with an emphasis on their role in 
discourse, and with an understanding that language and cognition are integrated 
phenomena.
Counterfactual Forms
There are a number of linguistic forms that are linked to counterfactuality; 
these are forms that allow speakers to describe counterfactual scenarios, and that 
prompt listeners to imagine counterfactual scenarios when they are introduced into 
discourse.  Some forms are very strong prompts for counterfactuality, others are 
weaker, and the prompts for counterfactuality may also be strengthened or weakened 
by pragmatic context.  These ideas will be discussed at greater length later in the 
description of mental spaces theory.  At this point, I will present a brief overview of 
the forms in an effort to provide a more precise working definition of the 
counterfactual, such that it is a recognizable occurrence in discourse.  
Counterfactuals are often expressed as conditionals th t contain two clauses, 
the first beginning with “if.”  When the opening clause contains a past tense verb 
form, this indicates that the state of affairs has a dubious status that may be interpreted 
as counterfactual.  For example, a statement beginning with “If I taught this class,” 
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establishes a counterfactual scenario in which it is given that the speaker is not 
teaching the class.  Consistent with the past tense verb form in the opening clause, a 
modal form in the consequent reaffirms the unreal statu  of affairs: “if I taught this 
class, I would not assign that book.”
Modal and negative forms alone can also introduce a counterfactual scenario in 
discourse.  A speaker may introduce an imagined state of affairs by proposing, “I 
could have taught that class last spring.”  Like the conditional form, the modal form 
indicates that the state of affairs was not realized, and is instead being imagined by the 
speaker counterfactually. Negative forms also allow speakers and listeners to discuss 
the unreal.  When a speaker describes a scenario by stating, “I didn’t teach the class 
last spring when I had the chance,” it is also taken for granted that the scenario in 
which the speaker taught the class is counterfactual with respect to what actually 
happened.  
These are the most common ways that counterfactuals are expressed 
linguistically, though it is not meant to provide an exhaustive list.  A counterfactual is 
at once a linguistic form and an imagined alternative: the forms provide speakers with 
linguistic options for introducing scenarios that did not occur.  Ultimately, it is the 
speaker’s representation of the status of the scenario that determines whether it is to be 
understood as a counterfactual.  When the speaker’s linguistic choices indicate that a 
given scenario has not actually occurred, then that scenario is counterfactual.  Beyond 
this basic sense in which the counterfactual is regarded as a non-real alternative, 
counterfactual scenarios vary along many dimensions.    
19
Contingency
 Counterfactuals have the ability to explore an imagined version of “what 
might have been.”  This characteristic of counterfactuals depends on our sense that an 
unrealized event was a former possibility, a sense I will refer to as “contingency,” a 
term borrowed from historian Niall Ferguson.  When I use the term, I refer to the 
perception of the degree of likelihood of the counterfactual. When Trent Lott 
described the means by which Strom Thurmond could have won the 1948 Presidential 
election (“if the rest of the country had followed our lead”), he was developing a 
counterfactual that seemed linked to a past possibility, for Strom Thurmond had 
indeed run for President in 1948 in a major national campaign.  As this example 
demonstrates, contingency in counterfactuals involves vi wing scenarios of the past 
from the point-of-view of the present moment, and recognizing them as possibilities 
that were not actualized.    
In understanding contingency, it is helpful to think about how a possibility is 
considered and discussed both before and after it is known to be actual or 
counterfactual.  Consider parents expecting a baby.  As they wait for the birth, they 
know that the baby will be a boy or a girl.  They may plan for these two alternatives –
picking names for each gender, for example.  Until the birth, both outcomes are 
possibilities.  After the birth of a baby girl, they can now discuss the past from the 
present point-of-view, in which they view the possibility of having a daughter as 
actual and the possibility of having a son as counterfactual.  The parents may now 
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make statements like “if we had had a boy, we would have named him Thomas,” a 
reference to an unrealized possibility for the past.  
The contingency of a counterfactual scenario involves other related 
characteristics, including a sense that the counterfactual scenario “began” at a specific 
point in the past when reality diverged from counterfactuality. The event identified as 
the original point of divergence between factual and counterfactual alternatives is 
typically referred to as the antecedent event7.  From this antecedent, actual and 
counterfactual alternatives are viewed as proceeding along “different paths” that take 
place during the same time frame, and which include at least one key difference, 
identified by the counterfactual outcome.  Although the antecedent event is typically 
in the past relative to the point of speaking, the counterfactual outcome or outcomes 
may be in the present or future relative to the point of speaking.
To illustrate contingency and its related properties, consider an actual example.  
In July of 2002, an airliner carrying Russian school children who were traveling to 
Spain tragically collided with another plane over Switzerland.  The children were 
scheduled to fly three days before their departure on the doomed plane, but were 
driven to the wrong airport and missed their original flight (Finn).  One could imagine 
a person stating, “If the students had been driven to the correct airport, they would 
have lived.” This statement identifies a contingent possibility, the scenario in which 
the children made their original flight and arrived in Spain as scheduled.  This scenario 
is easily perceived as a former possibility because this was the way the trip was 
originally planned.  The antecedent event identified by the statement is the students 
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being driven to the “wrong airport” instead of the right airport.  In the imagined 
counterfactual, the divergent outcome is that the lives of the children were saved.  In 
the actual scenario, the children were instead killed in the plane crash. These two 
scenarios develop along simultaneous chronological paths – in one case, the children 
spent three days stuck in Moscow and then died tragically in a collision. In the 
counterfactual scenario of the same time sequence, the children arrived as scheduled in 
Spain, and lived through the time of the collision without incident.   
Some points in the past, such as important decisions and life-changing events, 
may seem like obvious choices to play the role of antecedent. As many researchers in 
counterfactuality have noted, it is common for people to look back at key choices in 
their lives – the selection of a college, the decision to get married, a change in career 
path – and to imagine a salient possibility that was not realized.  Like Robert Frost, we 
have a sense that at key points in our lives we could have chosen different paths 
leading to different life outcomes. We may imagine what our lives might have been 
like if we had pursued other alternatives.
Nonetheless, not all counterfactuals are coupled to points of human decision.  
While we easily construe ourselves as agents in our own lives, leading us to imagine 
alternatives at key decision points, many events are beyond our control and yet they 
play the role of antecedent in counterfactual alternatives. We often view the past as a 
cloud of possibilities, some of which have been selected, and some of which have not, 
and many forces besides human beings may be perceived as agents of selection.   The 
sense of selection from real or imagined alternatives leads us to suppose that an event 
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became actual when it was selected from the alternatives.  The alternative possibilities 
are counterfactual precisely because they were not selected, regardless of whether an 
agent of sel ction can be clearly identified or whether the agent of selection is a 
human being. As Niall Ferguson points out, the ability or willingness to explore 
unrealized possibilities may be more limited for those individuals who subscribe to a 
deterministic world view, and more open for those individuals who subscribe to 
individualism and who believe in the randomness of events (64-79).  
 Returning to the example of the parents who are expecting a baby but don’t 
know whether it will be a boy or girl, it is clear that the gender of their child is not 
something over which they have direct control.  Whether they identify God, fate, or 
biology as the determiner of their baby’s gender, the counterfactual possibility of 
having a boy is not connected to any decision that hey made.  This situation 
demonstrates that there are any number of forces or conditions that may, through 
counterfactual assertion, be construed as “making a selection” between alternatives. 
They are not always depicted as agents, and yet they are identified as determining 
factors in a selection process.  The point is, human control or decision is not a 
necessary precondition for a specific event to serve as an antecedent event in a 
counterfactual alternative.
Furthermore, antecedent events are always arbitrarily selected from a series of 
related events by the person describing the counterfactual.  While some may seem 
“obvious,” even seemingly obvious points of decision can be unpacked into a 
perceived chain of related events, any one of which may serve as an antecedent.  The 
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person who imagined the Russian children avoiding the crash could have identified the 
decision to take the trip (“if we had cancelled the trip, they would have lived”), the 
decision to work with a particular tour guide (“if we had hired an agent who knew 
what she was doing, they would have lived”), or the instructions from air traffic 
control (“if air traffic control had warned the pilot of the collision, they would have 
lived”) as the antecedent event in a counterfactual scenario. The perceived chain of 
related events can be stretched to a seemingly ridiculous extent, a point Niall Ferguson 
makes by citing an example in which the fate of Rome was traced back to the size of 
Cleopatra’s nose (12). 
In fact, Ferguson establishes guidelin s for historical counterfactual 
alternatives that are useful explorations and not frivolous narratives. According to him, 
good historical counterfactuals must always depend on a specific connection between 
a counterfactual alternative and a former possibility. In other words, every 
counterfactual alternative explored in retrospect by a historian must once have been 
considered by someone (and documented) as a future possibility.  Otherwise, it is 
merely a random speculation and not a useful and historically- nformed counterfactual 
(87).  This assumes that counterfactuals either develop from a contingency or they do 
not.  In my view, the notion of contingency is more fluid: contingency can be seen as a 
characteristic exhibited strongly in some counterfactuls and weakly in others.
In discourse, contingency is determined by the s ared understanding two 
speakers have about the counterfactual scenario; in other words, contingency is 
determined by the speakers’ common ground.  In part, the strength of the contingency 
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depends on the shared understanding that the scenario once had a very real possibility 
of becoming actual, similar to Niall Ferguson’s sense of counterfactual “plausibility” 
(85). A speaker may claim “If I had attended the Smith School of Business, I would 
have been hired for that job”; the statement has a very high contingency if the speaker 
and listener both know that the speaker applied to Smith, was accepted, but chose not 
to attend. This example shows that the counterfactual may exhibit very strong 
contingency in cases in which both the speaker and listener view the unrealized 
scenario as a former possibility, not just as a speculation. 
In cases like these, the strength of the contingency is also affected by the 
speakers’ and listeners’ judgments about the probability that the unrealized possibility 
was likely to occur, similar to what psychologists refer to as the judgment of 
“propensities,” which Roese and Olson define as “the dynamic, preoutcome, actional 
cues that suggest an increasing trend toward the occurrence of a target outcome” (24).  
If the speaker of the above statement made it known to her listener that she never 
seriously considered attending business school, then her statement is not as strongly 
contingent as it would have been in a situation in which both people know that she 
seriously contemplated pursuing an MBA degree.  Or, we might also consider a public 
event like an election.  If a speaker and listener have general knowledge about the 
Presidential election of 2000, they might engage in a conversation about 
counterfactual scenarios in which Al Gore or Bill Bradley won the election in 2000.  
The unrealized scenario in which Al Gore won in 2000 is more highly contingent than 
the unrealized scenario in which Bill Bradley won that same year, since Gore stayed in 
25
the race longer than Bradley. Of course, the election of either Gore or Bradley would 
be judged as more probable than the election of someone who never entered the race at 
all.
 High contingency may also arise when a speaker nd listener both perceive 
that a path of action or development has been interrupted. Psychologists refer to the 
almost automatic likelihood that a person will think about a particular counterfactual 
option as the “closeness” of the counterfactual alternative (Roese and Olson 22- 5). In 
discourse, counterfactuals seem closer when both speaker and listener perceive that a 
progression has been interrupted, creating a natural point of divergence between two 
scenarios, one that was “in progress” and one that represents a shift in the original 
plan.  When a pregnancy has ended prematurely, a marriage has been called off, a 
vacation has been cancelled – all of these prompt strongly for “what might have been,” 
and therefore contribute to the strength of contingency when counterfactuals are part 
of discourse.   
Similarly, when conversational participants perceive that events had a limited 
set of possible outcomes, the counterfactual alternatives seem readily available, and 
highly contingent – elections, contests, and wars, for example, entail a limited set of 
outcomes, and the discourse participants are usually both aware of these potential 
outcomes. This may explain why counterfactual explorations that arise in history and 
in popular culture are often based on antecedent events like wars and elections, and 
why “Monday Morning quarterbacking” has become synonymous with the exploration 
of counterfactual alternatives to the outcomes of football games.
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In summary, the sense of contingency is highest in counterfactuals that explore 
thoughts about “what might have been,” particularly when the antecedent is perceived 
as a former possibility by both speaker and listener, when that outcome is viewed as 
highly likely to have occurred, when a perceived progression has been int rrupted, 
and/or when a limited number of alternatives form the available set of outcomes.  In 
each case, the counterfactual is construed as an unrealized alternative by the discourse 
participants.  For this reason, highly contingent counterfactuals are typically oriented 
toward the past – specifically, the counterfactual alternative begins at an antecedent 
event which is in the past relative to the people discussing it. The point identified by 
the antecedent serves as the point of “branching” between actual nd counterfactual 
alternatives. Contingency is weaker when any of these factors is present, but to a 
lesser extent.
Other counterfactuals develop a weaker sense of contingency for other reasons, 
and these counterfactuals are less easily characterized as xamples of “what might 
have been.” These are statements that do not exploit the possibility of an unrealized 
alternative traced from an antecedent event. Instead, the discourse participants view 
the counterfactual as a contrasting alternative to a present situation.  The statement 
that develops the counterfactual scenario may imply a sense of possibility and the 
existence of an antecedent event, but the antecedent event is not the focus of the 
discussion.  Consider the following statements: 
If Jack had decided to take the coaching job, we’d be winning right now.
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If Jack were the coach, we’d be winning right now.
The first example has a stronger sense of contingency: the antecedent event 
(Jack deciding not to take the coaching job) is in the past relative to the moment of 
speaking, and the outcome is in the present.  It seems clear that at one time, there was 
a chance that Jack might have taken the job. The sentence seems to describe “what 
might have been” – Jack might have taken the job, producing a more favorable result 
for the speakers in the present.  The second example does not develop a strong 
contingency, even though the meaning of the sentence is very similar. Expressed in the 
subjunctive rather than the past perfect, the sentence describes a counterfactual 
scenario that does not develop an unrealized possibility from an antecedent, but rather 
describes a scenario contrasting with the present moment.  The statement does not 
seem to develop two paths, one actual and one possible, that have diverged. The 
contrast is between two alternative versions of the present: Jack is not the coach, and 
the team is not winning, or Jack is the coach, and the team is winning. Presumably, at 
one time Jack might have become the coach, but this past event is not identified by the 
counterfactual.  The counterfactual does not have a strong sense of “branching” 
alternatives from an antecedent event in the past.  
Such counterfactuals may have some unidentified event in the past as a 
precondition, though. Consider a statement made by former President Clinton at a 
fund-raising event for his wife Hillary Clinton when she was running for the U.S. 
Senate: “I would be here for my wife if she were not my wife” (qtd. in Fauconnier and 
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Turner 257).  This counterfactual scenario – in which Bill Clinton imagines himself 
not married to Hillary, but still attending the fund-raiser – elaborates only the present 
situation; the past is not mentioned in the stated counterfactual.  And yet, a present 
situation in which Bill Clinton is not married to Hillary Clinton is logically contingent 
upon an imagined past in which they did not get married.  
We see that some counterfactuals are not strongly contingent because they do 
not develop an unrealized possibility from an antecedent event.  This fact does not 
preclude the existence of a contingent event prior to the situation named in the 
antecedent, but also does not focus on the past point of selection between 
contingencies. Counterfactuals of this form often make statements about presence and
absence.  Familiar forms include “if Rhonda were here, she would know what to do” 
or “if Dad had lived to see you graduate, he would be very pleased.”  In the first 
example, there is no mention of why exactly Rhonda isn’t here, though the statement 
does describe how her presence would affect the current situation.  Similarly, the 
second example does not point to a moment at which the speaker’s father passed 
away, but provides insight through a counterfactual scenario that focuses only on 
present conditions in which the father is deceased and therefore not present.
At the far end of the spectrum are counterfactuals that have no sense of 
contingency at all – the possibilities explored, in other words, do not qualify as former 
possibilities, but depict scenarios that are not and never were available alternatives.  
These scenarios have no contingency for a number of possible reasons, for example 
because they project people into time periods during which they did not live, because 
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they imagine abilities that are not possessed, or because they imagine impossible 
changes to identity or physical laws.  Consider the following statement made by a 
woman decrying the success rate of a Confederate captain whose ship, the U.S.S 
Alabama, sank many clipper ships: “If I could have sunk him, I would”8.  Since the 
speaker did not live during the 19th Century, the prospect that she could have sunk a 
Confederate captain is nonexistent; the scenario she describes is not an unrealized 
possibility. The counterfactual has no sense of contingency, and yet it still makes a 
clear evaluation of the captain’s actions.
As cognitive linguists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner have observed, it is 
common for people to gain insight into a person’s character by imagining him or her 
occupying a different frame, or to gain insight into a particular situation by imagining 
a different person facing it (251-253).  We may imagine, counterfactually, how 
Ghandi or George Washington might handle a modern political problem, or we may 
attempt to counsel a friend by advising “if I were you….” While counterfactuals 
lacking contingency may be just as creative and provide just as much insight as those 
which are highly contingent, they do not provide the same type of insight about past 
actions and events as the ighly contingent “what might have been” scenarios.      
Elaboration
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman has developed a continuum for sorting 
counterfactual thoughts based on intentionality.  At one extreme, he writes, are those 
counterfactual thoughts which are completely automatic and not carefully developed.  
Such a counterfactual thought is invoked, for instance, “when the doorbell makes an 
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unusual sound.”  The normal ring of the doorbell, invoked without any conscious 
intention, is counterfactual with respect to the expectation for normal events.  At the 
other extreme is highly elaborate and intentional counterfactual pondering, such as 
thinking about “an alternative world in which the south won the Civil War” (375).  
Kahneman wishes to distinguish these two ends of the spectrum because he believes 
they operate according to different psychological principles, though he considers both 
ends of the spectrum examples of “counterfactual thinking” (375-378).  
What Kahneman leaves out of his continuum is the point at which 
counterfactual thinking is encoded into language.  In fact, this point is not necessary 
on Kahneman’s scale.  A single person could engage in an automatic, surprise-
induced, counterfactual thought about the ordinary ring of the doorbell.   A person 
could also imagine, without any verbal expression, a highly elaborate counterfactual 
scenario in which the South won the Civil War.  Working only with this continuum, it 
is difficult to distinguish simple linguistic counterfactual scenarios from the simple 
products of automatic counterfactual thinking; it is similarly difficult to distinguish the 
highly elaborate, but nonverbal, results of counterfactual pondering from highly 
elaborate counterfactual scenarios in written or verbal form.
In fact, counterfactuals that exist only in thought can be usefully separated 
from counterfactuals that take a linguistic form.  Although mental simulation takes 
place, obviously, in the mind of an individual thinker, too much emphasis on thinking 
alone underemphasizes the role of language in communicating counterfactuals and 
elaborating them, in particular when the elaboration is a collaborative process. 
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Linguistic encoding itself is a form of intentionality. If we limit the scale to examples 
in which linguistic encoding of the counterfactual occurs, the scale is still extremely 
useful in distinguishing simple from highly elaborate scenarios.  
The degree of elaboration, then, is another characteristic that can be used to 
differentiate certain counterfactual scenarios fr m others.  Every study of 
counterfactuality, including this one, ultimately relies upon the representation of 
counterfactual thinking in linguistic form.  Language is inseparable from thinking, but 
language is our gateway into elaborating, communicating, a d studying 
counterfactuals.  When counterfactual scenarios take a linguistic form, they can be 
highly elaborate, with extended description and detail, and in some cases, 
accompanying visual representation. Other counterfactuals take a less elaborate 
linguistic form, including counterfactual scenarios that are invoked by a single word.
Perhaps the most elaborate counterfactual scenario is the alternate history, a 
fictional genre in which counterfactual alternatives to historical events are described. 
Peter G. Tsouras’s novel Gettysburg: an Alternate History, for example, considers the 
consequences to the Civil War battle at Gettysburg if Confederate Major General 
J.E.B. Stuart had arrived at a different time. Entire feature-length films have also 
explored counterfactual scenarios.  An example is the film Sliding Doors, in which a 
woman’s life is traced along two paths from a point at which she makes a train in one 
scene and misses it in a counterpart scene; the rest of the movie alternates between the 
two resulting versions of her life.  Another example is the movie Groundhog Day, in 
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which a man lives the same day over and over, but he alone has the knowledge that the 
day is recurring, giving him the ability to impress people by forecasting events.  
Shorter works that treat counterfactual scenarios include television shows, 
short stories, and essays.  One episode of the popular sitcom Friends, called “The One 
That Might Have Been,” was an hour-long exploration of imagined scenarios if key 
points in the char cters’ lives had taken different turns 9. The short story “An 
Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge,” by Ambrose Bierce, describes the attempted 
hanging and near-escape of a confederate sympathizer. It is only in the final sentence 
of the story that it becomes clear to the reader that the description of the escape was 
counterfactual all along: the man was in fact hanged and the near-esc pe took place 
only in his imagination. Historical essays, such as those featured in Niall Ferguson’s 
Virtual History and Robert Dallek’s essay “JFK’s Second Term,” are also extended 
counterfactuals that are not as developed as the full novels and films.
Such extended counterfactual scenarios underscore the creativity involved in 
counterfactuality, but much of the work on counterfactuals has focused not on 
elaborate scenarios, but on counterfactual scenarios described in individual sentences.  
The philosophers of language were the first theorists of the mind to label the 
counterfactual; they defined it as an expression of antecedent and consequent, in 
which the antecedent proposes a condition that is false in the actual world, and the 
consequent states an outcome of that antecedent10.  Counterfactuals were associated 
with the form of the  “if/then” conditional statement in this tradition. Conditional 
sentences have a bi-clausal structure, with the first clause or protasis beginning with 
33
“if” and expressing the antecedent, and the second clause or apodosis featuring an 
optional “then” and expressing the consequent. 
The goal of language philosophers was to model the logic of counterfactual 
conditionals.  To do so, they adopted truth conditional semantics, a model in which 
statements are assigned a value of true or false determined by their relation to a model 
of the actual world.  In counterfactual conditionals like “if kangaroos had no tails, they 
would topple over” (Lewis 1), the conditional antecedent’s falseness in the real-world 
model is the defining feature of a counterfactual – in the actual world, kangaroos do
have tails. As Lewis described it, the truth of the antecedent is a sort of “defect” in the 
counterfactual, “but not the sort of defect that produces automatic falsity or a truth-
value gap” (26).  David Lewis wrote that “counterfactuals are notoriously vague,” 
though he concluded “that does not mean that we cannot give a clear account of their 
truth conditions” (1).  
Lewis himself attempted to give a clear account by utilizing a possible worlds 
theory, which proposes that “our actual world is surrounded by an infinity of other 
possible worlds” (Bradley and Swartz 2).  In the possible worlds semantic model, the 
consequent of a counterfactual is taken as an expression of truth not in our own but in 
another possible world.  Thus, the antecedent and its consequent are true and 
meaningful in that possible world, though the antecedent is false in the model of the 
actual world, or as Lewis put it “my truth conditions guarantee that whenever the 
premise is true at a world, so is the conclusion” (26). This application of possible 
worlds theory made it possible for Lewis to perform logical operations on 
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counterfactuals and their truth conditions. The approach of Lewis and other theoretical 
semanticists connects language to models of worlds, not to mental operations. 
This traditional model of counterfactual conditionals has been supplanted by 
cognitive linguistic models that do describe language in terms of mental operations. 
This approach aligns linguists with scholars in other disciplines, though linguists 
continue to study counterfactuality by focusing on shorter forms rather than the more 
elaborate forms often analyzed by psychologists and historians.  New models in 
cognitive linguistics have been utilized in new analyses of conditional 
constructions11.These analyses focus on specific forms and sentences that develop 
counterfactuality within larger stretches of discourse such as conversation and 
narrative.  The goal is to describe the cognitive processes of actual people involved in 
language production and comprehension, rather than to model specific sentences 
according to truth conditions. In other words, cognitive models describe mental 
processes, not theoretical semantic sets. Nonetheless, the focus of these cognitive 
linguistic studies is often on the comprehension of individual sentences and utterances 
like those examined with possible world semantics. 
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner have shown that single words may even 
prompt basic counterfactual scenarios (239). They have shown that the meaning of a 
word such as “wrong” may prompt the hearer to imagine a counterfactual scenario 
(225-227). Consider the earlier statement that school children leaving on a vacation for 
Spain had been driven to the “wrong” airport.  The scene is understood implicitly in 
contrast to another (counterfactual) scenario – one in which the children were escorted 
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to the “right” airport. The contrast between these two scenarios is included in the 
structure of the scene invoked by the word “wrong.” In one scenario, the children’s 
journey ended at the airport fom which they were scheduled to depart – the right 
airport. In another scenario, the journey ended at an airport which their airline did not 
service – the wrong airport. 
One benefit of linguistic analyses at such a detailed resolution is that they 
identify counterfactuality occurring at a level that others have often overlooked, a 
level that is quite common in everyday dialogue.  For example, a man may say to his 
co-worker “I should have brought my umbrella, so I could keep these documents dry” 
as they leave the elevator and notice that it is raining.  So mundane is this statement 
that it is easy to overlook the fact that the person’s statement describes a 
counterfactual scenario in which having the umbrella produces the desirable outcome 
of keeping paperwork dry.  Niall Ferguson observes that historians who eschew 
counterfactual history nonetheless engage in their own simple counterfactuals, such as 
“the British empire could have been preserved after 1940 by means of alternative 
policies such as peace with Hitler” (20).  It could very well be that these historians 
simply don’t acknowledge the counterfactual underpinning of their simple statements, 
associating counterfactuals only with much grander ruminations about “what might 
have been.”
Simple counterfactuals such as these also play a more important role in 
interactive discourse that involves counterfactuality, particularly verbal discourse.  
While counterfactuals can be introduced and then elaborated in a collaborative process 
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involving more than one speaker, the ability to create a sustained counterfactual 
scenario is more limited in a dialogic setting. People may have sustained discussions 
and even arguments about what-might-have-been, but such discussions are unlikely to 
ever reach the elaborative detail of an alternate history. Paying attention to 
counterfactuals at this level, then, is an important step in seeing the influential role 
they play in dialogue. 
Embedding
Thus far in the discussion, I have presumed that counterfactual alternatives 
differ from reality.  This presumption is shared by most researchers who study and 
analyze counterfactuals and counterfactuality, beginning with the logical semanticists.  
As discussed, philosophers of language sought to identify the relation between a 
conditional statement and the actual world, and turned to a p ssible worlds theory to 
account for the logic of seemingly false statements that were dubbed counterfactual. 
While subsequent researchers have utilized many different models to analyze many 
different types of counterfactual scenarios, the generalization has held that 
“counterfactual” means “counter to fact,” in other words, counter to the actual world 
of reality.  
Gilles Fauconner has provided a methodology for modeling counterfactuals 
that do not contrast with reality, but with other logically coherent mental 
representations, referred to as mental spaces.  The defining feature of counterfactuals, 
according to this theory, is “forced incompatibility between spaces” (Fauconnier 
Spaces 109).  The ability to show that counterfactual scenarios share a connection to 
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other mental representations releases the definition of the counterfactual from its 
anchor to reality, and provides the last important characteristic of counterfactual 
scenarios, embedding.  
Mental spaces theory can be used to model and explain natural language 
according to principles of embedding. Central to the theory is the assertion that all 
language is embedded within a specific point of view that serves as the base space for 
discourse, but which can shift as discourse proceeds.  Mental spaces are bounded units 
of information that are by definition incomplete, and which represent “constructs 
distinct from linguistic structures but built up in discourse according to guidelines 
provided by the linguistic expressions” (Fauconnier Spaces 16). They are conceptual 
structures that are the products of language.
As Fauconnier describes in Mental Spaces and Mappings in Thought and 
Language, a mental space itself may contain propositions, actors, and events that 
constitute a unified scenario distinct from other mental spaces in the discourse. 
Differentiation of information occurs when a new space is created as discourse 
unfolds.  New spaces are triggered by pragmatic, lexical, and/or grammatical prompts 
referred to as space builders.  Each new space is connected, but separate, from the 
other spaces that precede it in the discourse; spaces may contribute structure to other 
spaces with which they share a connection. By showing that all discourse involves an 
evolving network of connected mental spaces, mental spaces theory demonstrates that 
embedding is a characteristic of counterfactual scenarios. In other words, even a 
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counterfactual scenario that differs from “reality” can be viewed as a coherent space 
embedded within another space representing a particular person’s view of reality.
A counterfactual space is a particular kind of mental space that is incompatible 
with its parent space. The counterfactual space develops as discourse proceeds 
because certain pragmatic, lexical, and/or grammatical cues force counterfactuality 
within the discourse.  Often, these cues work together to build counterfactual mental 
spaces within a stretch of discourse.  Pragmatic cues include contextual information 
about people and events described in the discourse.  Lexical cues include if/then 
sentences, verbs like “wish,” negatives, and other constructions that introduce a 
counterfactual expression and prompt a counterfactual space.  Grammatical cues 
include tense and aspect, such as present perfect, past perfect and subjunctive forms. 
Each of the cues may function as a strong or weak indicator of counterfactuality.
With mental spaces theory, it is possible to associate reality with the 
perspective of a specific speaker, since that perspective may include false beliefs about 
the world, or be reported within a work of fiction.  For example, when Mrs. Dalloway 
thinks about a counterfactual scenario in which she married her former suiter, Peter 
Walsh, the space created is counterfactual with respect to her own view of her life.  
The parent space, then, is Mrs. Dalloway’s reality, in which she is married to Richard, 
not Peter. The space that represents the counterfactual “Mrs. Dalloway could have 
married Peter Walsh” is embedded within the parent space of “Mrs. Dalloway’s 
reality,” which is itself embedded within the book  Mrs. Dalloway.  
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 Recent work by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner elaborates the mental 
spaces depiction of counterfactual spaces to include another possibility for embedding: 
the embedding of an entire space network that includes a blended space.  The 
conceptual integration model describes, in more explicit detail, the blending process 
that must occur in the creation of all counterfactual spaces, a blending process that 
requires not just two, but four mental spaces. Conceptual integration accounts for 
complex characteristics of counterfactual spaces, such as the fact that spaces may have 
emergent properties and the fact that spaces may contain extensive structure not 
explicitly developed in the discourse (39-57).  
For example, consider the following statement made by a doctor in Colorado 
after he helped to treat a patient who was saved from the brink of death: “This young 
man would have died in Britain” (qtd. in Kenworthy).  The traditional mental spaces 
model would account for this statement using two spaces – a parent space, in which 
the young man lives when treated in the United States (the speaker’s reality space), 
and a counterfactual space, in which the young man dies wh n treated by surgeons in 
Britain.  While this configuration helps us see how the sentence actually alludes to two 
separate scenarios, one actual and one counterfactual, it does not explain some specific 
details of the spaces.  For example, how is it that a surgical team from Britain, and a 
patient from the United States, seem to be actors in a unified scene we might label 
“unsuccessful medical intervention”? 
A four-space model explains the cognitive work necessary to bring the 
elements of this scene together.  There are two input spaces: one that represents the 
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elements of the scenario associated with the United States and one that represents the 
elements of the scenario associated with Britain.   In an intermediate middle space, 
called the generic space, the roles of “doctors” and “patient” provide a structure for 
the composition of counterpart relations across the two input spaces, and other 
relevant frames, such as knowledge of surgical procedures and medical practices, 
contribute structure. Elements of each space and of their shared structure are 
selectively projected into a fourth space.  The patient and his medical emergency are 
projected from the United States space; the hospital and its doctors and medical 
practices are projected from the Britain space, and the knowledge that the surgeons 
apply their professional skill in an attempt to save the patient comes from our frame 
about medical procedures.
The result of the integration process just described is the fourth space, the 
blended space.  The elements that are projected into the blend include features of 
reality in the United States (the patient and his dire condition), reality in Britain (the 
existence of doctors and hospitals), and background knowledge, with a resulting 
counterfactual blend. In the counterfactual blended space the elements are unified into 
a single cohesive scenario – British surgeons treat the patient, but he dies.  The scene 
developed in this blended space has emergent properties, including the implication 
that surgeons in Britain are not as competent as surgeons in the United States.  This 
emergent knowledge projects backward to the input spaces. Even though the statement 
described an imagined counterfactual, a listener may draw the conclusion that 
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surgeons in Britain are incompetent, or that surgeons in America are especially skilled.  
The counterfactual has implications for our real-world assumptions. 
Much of the cognitive work that takes place in assembling counterfactual 
scenarios occurs below the level of consciousness (Fauconnier and Turner 56-57).  In 
the case of counterfactual scenarios that describe “what might have been,” our 
intuitive sense is that two specific situations are being compared, actual to 
counterfactual.  It is the elegance of conceptual integration that the input spaces which 
are brought together to form counterfactual scenarios feel strongly unified, so much so 
that it may be difficult to identify the input spaces from which these elements were 
assembled.  When we think about counterfactual scenarios, the constructive process 
goes unnoticed, and when we discuss counterfactual scenarios, their contrast with 
reality is their most distinctive feature.  I will, then, often discuss these scenarios in 
terms of two spaces because that is our conscious understanding of them at the level of 
discourse, even though the backstage cognitive processes at work to achieve this 
understanding require the blending of several spaces in creating a unified 
counterfactual scenario.
Evaluative Counterfactual Scenarios
This chapter has introduced a wide variety of phenomena that can and have 
been labeled “counterfactual.”  It is easy to get bogged down in the differences 
between counterfactual scenarios, but my goal in the rest of this project is not to 
explore every type of counterfactual scenario, but rather to focus on a particular 
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variety, the evaluative counterfactual scenario, that will allow me to demonstrate the 
dialogic and rhetorical dimensions of counterfactuality.  
From this point on, the examples analyzed in this book are those that not only 
introduce a counterfactual scenario, but which also include an evaluation of that 
scenario.  Simply speaking, the evaluation is an indication that the scenario is “good” 
or “bad” in contrast to reality as it is viewed by the spaker. In other words, the 
speaker creates a counterfactual scenario, or an exploration of an unrealized 
alternative, while also passing judgment on whether the scenario would have been 
better or worse than what actually happened.  There are a number of ways that the 
speaker can introduce a counterfactual scenario and pair it with an evaluation, a topic 
which will be explored in depth in the next chapter.
The particular subset of counterfactuals analyzed are also highly contingent, or 
representations of “what might have been” from the speaker’s point of view.  This 
limitation helps reduce the scope to a rhetorically interesting set of examples: 
counterfactuals with an antecedent in the past relative to the moment of speaking.  It is 
not necessary that every evaluative counterfactual be contingent, or vice versa, but 
highly contingent counterfactuals that are also evaluative form a subset that has unique 
rhetorical implications.  The speaker, in these cases, introduces an alternative scenario 
for the past that essentially introduces a new way of seeing past events by contrasting 
what did happen with what didn’t.  The counterfactual at once depends on the fixed 
nature of past events, while exploiting the variable nature of perspectives toward past 
events.  Evaluative counterfactuals that are also highly contingent reinforce the fact 
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that the past cannot change, while simultaneously demonstrating that attitudes toward 
the past are anything but settled.  
Along the parameter of elaboration, the focus is on counterfac uals that are 
expressed linguistically and that are relatively simple in their development.   While 
many people have created and examined counterfactuals, very few have noted their 
prevalence and importance in our daily conversation and discourse. Counterfactuals 
are present in dialogue that might otherwise seem quite mundane.  In fact, it is 
necessary to examine counterfactuals at a finer resolution to understand their 
importance not only in highly elaborate and creative instances, but in ordinary 
exchanges.  Although they may not be noticed as “counterfactuals,” these simple 
scenarios are the basic rhetorical form that counterfactual scenarios take, and 
understanding the role of evaluative counterfactuals in larger stretches of discourse 
requires first understanding their rhetorical role in simpler forms. 
Finally, evaluative counterfactuals are considered as embedded cognitive 
scenarios that represent the perspective of an individual speaker.  A counterfactual 
scenario, from this perspective, is rhetorical precisely because it represents the 
perspective of a speaker, including that speaker’s views of reality and 
counterfactuality.  Considering counterfactuals as scenarios embedded within a 
particular speaker’s perspective is not only necessary in understanding their rhetorical 
implications, but also in considering their role in fictional narratives.  Fictional 
narratives provide the last and most complete laboratory for considering the embedded 
and rhetorical dimensions of evaluative counterfactual scenarios in discourse.
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Conclusion to Chapter 1 
With the three categories developed in this chapter – contingency, elaboration, 
and embedding – it becomes easier to organize the phenomena called “counterfactual” 
in various disciplines, and thus to determine where theories and findings may be 
generalized across disciplines.  Psychologists and historians, in particular, have 
provided extremely useful insight into counterfactuals that are highly contingent.  
They have tended to neglect, though, any discussion of the linguistic aspects of 
counterfactuals.  Linguists, on the other hand, have always associated counterfactuals 
with the language needed to encode them, though they have included many 
counterfactuals that are not highly contingent, and have at times failed to consider the 
larger creative and emotive potential of counterfactual scenarios.  
The rhetorical force of counterfactuals remains largely unexplored, and 
evaluative counterfactual scenarios are the best starting point for this rhetorical 
consideration.   Evaluative counterfactuals that are highly contingent convey a 
perspective on the past that can influence how the past is viewed.  Evaluative 
counterfactuals that are relatively simple in their linguistic form provide the building 
blocks for larger stretches of discourse and also serve as the best starting point for 
rhetorical analysis.  Evaluative counterfactuals that are embedded within a particular 
perspective demonstrate that counterfactual scenarios convey a particular person’s 
attitude, and also extend the counterfactual analysis to the full range of discourse, 
including fictional narratives. These three parameters have guided the selection of 
examples because highly contingent, simple, embedded scenarios demonstrate 
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particularly well the rhetorical and dialogic nature of evaluative counterfactuals in 
discourse.
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Chapter 2: Evaluative Stance
“Jesus was the only One that ever raised the dead,” The Misfit continued, “and He 
shouldn’t have done it.  He thown everything off balance.” 
 Flannery O’Connor, “A Good Man Is Hard to Find”
In a speech delivered in Memphis before his assassination, Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. recounted an attempt on his life made while he was signing books in New 
York City.  A woman attending the book-signing stabed him; x-rays showed that the 
tip of the knife had lodged at the edge of his aorta, an injury that would have been fatal 
if the knife had penetrated any deeper.  The New York Times reported the next day that 
if he had sneezed, he would have died.  After describing the incident in his speech, 
King quoted a letter he received from a girl who wrote to him: "I read in the paper of 
your misfortune, and of your suffering. And I read that if you had sneezed, you would 
have died. And I'm simply writing you to say that I'm so happy that you didn't sneeze” 
(King).
King’s death, as the girl described it in the letter, was counterfactual.  When he 
was stabbed, he didn’t sneeze, and he didn’t die. She referred to a counterfactual 
scenario published by the New York Times, and she clearly recognized that it was 
counterfactual with respect to what actually happened, and communicated the 
counterfactual status when she repeated it to Dr. King.  In doing so, she used specific 
linguistic and grammatical cues that indicated the counterfactual status of the 
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imagined scenario.  Her letter included a conditional with antecedent and outcome, “if 
you had sneezed, you would have died,” conveyed using past perfect and conditional 
verb forms. The negative statement that ended the quote– “you didn’t sneeze” –
reinforced the counterfactual status of the scenario.           
Counterfactual scenarios, no matter how simple or elaborate, depend on 
markers like these to indicate their status when they are communicated within a 
discourse setting.  These cues help translate the counterfactual as it is imagined into a 
counterfactual scenario that can be conveyed in discourse, and that is clearly 
differentiated from what the persons involved in the discourse see as actual.  The girl 
writing to Dr. King, for example, had several options for communicating the status of 
the counterfactual scenario: “Good thing you didn’t sneeze and die from being 
stabbed,” “They said you could have sneezed and died,” and the one she actually 
chose, “if you had sneezed, you would have died.” Every counterfactual scenario, 
whether simple or elaborate, has its counterfactual status indicated pragmatically, 
lexically, and/or grammatically when it is communicated successfully to a listener. If 
the counterfactual status were not indicated in some way, the person interpreting it 
could be misled about the status of the scenario.
When a counterfactual scenario is communicated, the scenario always 
contrasts with another scenario, which we might describe as “speaker’s reality.”  The 
cognitive process of comparison thus plays a vital role in the communication of 
counterfactuals.  The naturally comparative nature of counterfactuals allows speakers 
to easily express evaluations, in which scenarios are described as better or worse in 
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relation to alternatives.  Such is the case in the example described, in which the girl 
not only described the counterfactual scenario, but also added “I’m so happy that you 
didn’t sneeze.”  This evaluative statement alluded to the counterfactual scenario in 
which King sneezed and died, and the actual scenario in which he didn’t sneeze and 
lived.  Because these two scenarios were already part of the discourse, she was able to 
easily evaluate one scenario in relation to the other. The point of her letter was to 
express her clear preference for what actually happened: Dr. King lived through the 
attempted assassination.
This chapter explores forms available to introduce counterfactual scenarios and 
their mappings, the comparative nature of counterfactual scenarios in discourse, and 
the addition of evaluations to the expression of counterfactual scenarios. I argue that 
the comparative nature of counterfactual scenarios makes them particularly open to the 
expression of evaluation in the form of evaluative stance, a rhetorical stance 
communicated by a speaker toward the counterfactual scenario or its “actual” 
counterpart.  Evaluative stance can be weakly or strongly bound with associated 
emotions. This evaluative stance is ultimately rhetorical because it conveys the
speaker’s point of view toward the counterfactual scenario, and encourages the listener 
to understand and adopt the speaker’s evaluation.
Conditionals, Counterfactuals, and Mappings
The expression “if you had sneezed, you would have died,” takes a form that 
has often been associated with counterfactuality: the conditional. As briefly discussed 
in the first chapter, the conditional construction takes a two-part form, typically 
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consisting of two clauses that are co-referential.  The first clause, or protasis, 
establishes a condition; the second clause, or apodosis, establishes a result that 
depends on the realization of the condition set forth by the protasis.  One conditional 
form includes a protasis that begins with “if,” and an apodosis that may or may not 
begin with “then.” The order of the clauses may be reversed.
In an example like “If you tell him the truth, he’ll stop bothering you,” the 
protasis expresses the condition – you telling him the truth – that will lead to some 
outcome – he will stop bothering you. The outcome does not begin with “then,” but it 
could, “If you tell him the truth, then he’ll stop bothering you”12. The co-referential 
clauses make sense even when the order is reversed: “He’ll stop bothering you if you 
tell him the truth.”  Conditional expressions may enter conversation in a variety of 
abbreviated and partial forms; one person could complain “I wish he’d stop bothering 
me,” to which another might respond “maybe if you told him the truth.”     
As this example demonstrates, not every statement expressed in a conditional 
form is necessarily counterfactual.  Though it is clear that “he’ll stop bothering you” 
holds in an imagined situation in which “you tell him the truth,” it is not clear yet 
whether you will tell him the truth or not.  This statement could be described as 
hypothetical, rather than counterfactual, because the antecedent is proposed, but its 
status is not yet determined. It should not be assumed, however, that only statements 
that describe conditions in the future have the potential to present events with an 
unknown status.  A statement about the past can also describe an event with an 
unknown status, for instance, “If she told him the truth, he’ll stop bothering her.” Even 
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though the protasis is in the past relative to the moment of speaking, this statement 
could be made when the speaker simply is not sure what actually happened. The 
speaker could continue: “If she told him the truth, he’ll stop bothering her, but if she 
didn’t tell him, he’ll keep pestering her until she does.” The statement does not seem 
to create a counterfactual scenario, but highlights the speaker’s lack of confirmed 
knowledge about the conditional antecedent.       
This example shows that linguistic form alone is not always enough to 
determine whether a statement develops a counterfactual scenario.  In other words, a 
statement does not come across as “counterfactual” simply because of the linguistic 
forms used to express it.  Rather, the lexical forms, grammatical forms, and situation 
interact to determine the status of the utterance. In earlier studies of counterfactual 
forms, such as Nelson Goodman’s Fact, Fiction, and Forecast and David Lewis’s 
Counterfactuals, counterfactual conditionals were typically considered as linguistic 
forms removed from a speaker and situation.  More recently, however, it has been 
recognized that counterfactuality is always rooted in the perspective of a particular 
speaker and discourse situation.
In his work on conditional sentences, Charles Fillmore proposes that 
“epistemic stance” be used to describe the speaker’s attitude toward the conditional 
statement.  The notion of epistemic stance refines the definition of counterfactual that 
related it to truth conditions in the actual world by establishing the locus of reality in 
the perspective of the speaker who makes an utterance.  As put forth by Fillmore, the 
epistemic stance describes “the epistemic relationship which the speaker has to the 
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world represented by the conditional sentence: the speaker might regard it as the actual 
world, might regard it as distinct from the actual world, or might not know whether the 
alternative world represented in the conditional sentence is the actual world or not” 
(“Epistemic Stance” 142).  These orientations have also been described as positive, 
negative, or neutral epistemic stances toward the conditional statement (Sweetser 
“Mental Spaces” 321-322; Fauconnier Mappings 93-95).  
A positive stance indicates that the speaker associates herself with a world in 
which the protasis holds; in other words the protasis describes conditions in the actual 
world as viewed by the speaker13.  Fillmore’s example “Because you studied hard, you 
will pass the test” represents an actual world alignment, or positive epistemic stance.  
The speaker is committed to the actuality of  “you studied hard.” A similar statement 
conveys a neutral epistemic stance when the speaker does not associate herself either 
with a world in which the protasis holds, or in which the protasis doesn’t hold: “If you 
studied hard, you will pass the test.”  She simply does not know whether you studied 
hard.  Finally, the example most pertinent to this study is the case in which the speaker 
associates herself with a world in which the protasis doesn’t hold.  This world is 
counterfactual.  A negative epistemic stance of this type is seen in the statement “If 
you had studied hard, you would have passed the test.”
There is a relationship between epistemic stance and the verb forms of a 
conditional sentence.  Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser adopt the term 
“distanced” to refer to verb forms that have an extra layer of past morphology 
(“Conditionals” 87-88).  Distancing can occur for pragmatic reasons, such as the 
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desire to be polite.  For example, when addressing a professor a student might state “I 
wanted to ask you a question” rather than “I want to ask you a question” because the 
extra distancing implied by the past tense comes across as less demanding. Added 
distancing is also an indicator of negative epistemic stance. When an event occurred in 
the past relative to the moment of speaking, for example, the past tense would 
normally be adopted to describe the event.  In cases in which a negative epistemic 
stance is also implied, the event is typically described using the past perfect.  For
example, “You sneezed” indicates that an event took place in the past relative to the 
moment of speaking, but “If you had sneezed” indicates not only that the event took 
place in the past relative to the moment of speaking, but also that a negative epistemic 
stance is adopted toward the realization of that event.  Charles Fillmore shows that 
there is a systematic relationship between the choice of verb form, the time of the 
protasis relative to the moment of speaking, and the time of the apodosis relative to the 
moment of speaking (“Epistemic Stance”)14.  In situations in which a negative 
epistemic stance is adopted toward a past protasis, a past apodosis will be expressed in 
the “conditional perfect,” as we see in the example, “If you had sneezed, you would
have died.” 
Eve Sweetser extends Charles Fillmore’s discussion of epistemic stance by 
describing the mental space mappings involved in conditional expressions (“Mental 
Spaces”).  She argues that “an analysis in terms of embedded mental spaces helps 
motivate the regularities to be observed in Fillmore’s data” (321).  According to her 
analysis, conditional forms generate embedded mappings between a “base space” of 
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speaker’s reality and the space containing the event described in the protasis of the 
conditional.  Distanced verb forms indicate a negative epistemic stance, and therefore 
generate a mapping in which a counterfactual space is embedded within the base space 
of speaker’s reality. Sweetser points out that any details that elaborate the situation 
described in the conditional protasis are likewise embedded within the base of reality, 
and so it is not surprising that any event associated with the conditional protasis would 
also inherit the epistemic stance that applies to the protasis. Thus, the apodosis of the 
conditional will also be described with a distanced verb form, the regularity originally 
noted by Fillmore, because of the fact that both protasis and apodosis are embedded 
within the base mental space of speaker’s reality.   
While the if/then conditional that is the focus of Fillmore and Sweetser’s 
analyses is perhaps the most prototypical and most often studied form associated with 
counterfactuality, I will reiterate the point made in the first chapter that it is hardly the 
only available linguistic form.  Fauconnier describes the mappings invoked by a 
combination of pragmatic conditions and lexical and grammatical forms that generate 
counterfactual mappings (Mental Spaces 109-127).  As Fauconnier describes it, 
pragmatic properties of the discourse, including background knowledge, produce 
counterfactual space mappings in statements like “In that movie, Brigitte Bardot is an 
ugly witch” because the discourse participants’ real world knowledge that Bardot is in 
fact very beautiful are incompatible with the counterfactual space in which she is an 
“ugly witch” (110). Counterfactuality may be lexically imposed by strong negatives 
like “not” and “prevent,” by verbs like “wish,” by conditionals, or by modals like 
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“might” and “could” (111). Grammatically, counterfactuality may be imposed by 
combinations of tense and aspect (111- 3), as detailed above in the description of 
distanced verb forms.         
Comparison
Like the conditional, the comparison has been studied as both a linguistic form 
and a cognit ve process.  A comparative statement is an utterance in which two 
individuated entities, or comparands, are described in terms of a shared property.  The 
comparative statement establishes each entity’s expression of this property along a 
scale. The result is that the relationship between the entities is established by the 
extent to which they each express the scalar property. Examples of comparative forms 
include: “John is taller than Maria”; “Kazakhstan is four times the size of Texas”; 
“This lecture is more interesting than the one I saw last week”; “She’s as nice as her 
sister.”
In Mental Spaces, Gilles Fauconnier demonstrates that comparative statements 
often involve mapping across two mental spaces.  He gives the general form of 
transspatial comparatives, or comparisons across spaces, as E/M more than E’/M’/Sc 
(131). E is an event or state that holds in a space M, which maps to its counterpart E’ 
in space M’; Sc is the scale along which E and E’ are compared.  A statement like 
“this lecture is more interesting than the one I saw last week” involves two spaces – a 
present mental space (M) containing the lecture (E) is connected to a past mental 
space (M’) containing another lecture (E’) that took place last week. The lecture E in 
space M maps to its counterpart E’ in space M’, and interest level is the scale along 
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which they are compared.  The statement establishes that the interest level of the 
lecture in space M is greater than the interest level of the counterpart lecture in space 
M’.
The same type of comparative statement can also involve a counterfactual 
space.  Fauconnier considers the example “Her headache prevented Rosa from 
answering more questions than she did” (133).  Like the previous example, this 
statement involves two spaces, though they ar  not present and past spaces, but 
speaker’s reality and counterfactual.  In speaker’s reality space M, Rosa has a 
headache and answers x number of questions.  In another space representing a 
different scenario, Rosa has no headache – the space is based on  “a counterfactual 
situation (‘no headache’) in which Rosa would have answered more questions than she 
actually did” (133, italics in original).  The speaker’s reality space M maps to 
counterfactual space M’, and the actual number of questions answered, x, maps to the 
imagined number of questions answered, x’.  Along a scale of quantity, x’ outnumbers 
x.  Thus we see that explicit statements of comparison may involve counterfactual 
spaces.
Even when a counterfactual statement does not explicitly involve a 
comparative linguistic form, as the example above does, the nature of counterfactual 
spaces involves the cognitive process of comparison.  The development of 
counterfactual scenarios requires the discourse participants to be aware of at least two 
distinct spaces.  Of course, just because a statement involves two spaces does not 
imply that it has to involve comparison.  A past tense verb, for example, prompts a 
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past mental space from the base space representing the present speaking moment. 
There is not a strong sense, when using the past tense in an expression like “I read the 
paper this morning,” that we are inviting our listeners to compare the present to the 
past.       
But because counterfactuals are defined by contrast with another space, the 
counterfactual statement always invokes a comparison of the counterfactual space to 
the speaker’s reality space. In the earlier example, “If you had sneezed, you would 
have died,” the speaker was suggesting that the scenario in which Martin Luther King, 
Jr. snezed and died contrasted with the actual scenario in which he didn’t sneeze and 
didn’t die. This statement contains no explicit prompt for comparison: it is in a 
conditional form, not a comparative form, yet it involves the process of comparing two 
scenarios that are incompatible with each other. The incompatibility is established by 
the key difference identified, the sneeze. The contrast involves counterpart events or 
conditions in the speaker’s reality and the counterfactual spaces that share a 
disanalogy connector15. The event of “not sneezing” in speaker’s reality is connected 
by a relation of disanalogy to the event of “sneezing” in the counterfactual space.   
Besides the contrast that exists between counterfactual and speaker’s reality 
spaces, there is also a rhetorical pressure that produces a comparative reading of 
counterfactual scenarios.  When introduced into discourse, a counterfactual scenario is 
no longer a possible course of action or situation.  The negative epistemic stance 
associated with counterfactuals indicates to a listener that the speaker does not believe 
the counterfactual did or will happen.  When a speaker proposes a counterfactual, it is 
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only natural that we assume the counterfactual space has been introduced by a speaker 
for a particular reason.  Specifically, we assume the counterfactual space will bear on 
reality in some useful way.  Through the introduction of counterfactual scenarios, 
people encourage their interlocutors to compare reality to an alternative.  
It is no surprise that we see statements of an explicitly comparative form that 
involve counterfactual spaces, as in “Her headache prevented Rosa from answering 
more questions than she did.”  It is also no surprise that we find statements of an 
explicitly counterfactual form that also include comparative forms, as in Dancygier 
and Sweetser’s example “If John had come to the meeting, I’d be happier” 
(“Conditionals” 84).  Counterfactual scenarios require two mental spaces, and the 
comparison process is invoked by the contrast between them, so the comparative 
expression “happier” is easily interpreted as a statement about how the speaker in 
speaker’s reality differs from the speaker in the counterfactual space along a scale of 
“happiness.”  In the counterfactual space, her happiness is greater.
Evaluation
In his paper describing epistemic stance, Charles Fillmore also introduced 
another concept important to the understanding of conditional expressions, a notion he 
labeled “interest.”  Interest, as he defines it, is “whether or not the speaker puts a 
positive valuation on the alternative situation in which P [the condition put forth by 
the protasis] holds” (“Epistemic Stance” 142).  Conditional statements that display 
positive interest are those which express a judgment that the pres nce of the condition 
put forth by the protasis is, simply enough, good from the perspective of the speaker.  
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He provides two examples of linguistic expressions that are related to judgments of 
positive interest, the verbs hope and wish.   As Fillmore notes, these verbs are closely 
associated with conditional sentences of the if/then type because they accept the same 
distanced verb forms that are often found in conditional expressions. Additionally, 
these verbs express “the speaker’s positive interest in the state of affairs expressed as 
the complement clause” (154).  In his example “I wish you liked him,” the speaker has 
a positive interest in the situation expressed in the complement of “wish” (156).
Fillmore does not elaborate on how negative interest might be expressed, but it 
helps to consider not just how the speaker feels toward the complement clause, but 
which world (or in Fauconnier’s terms, mental space) the complement clause 
describes.  In the example “I wish she hadn’t said those things” (Fillmore 154), the 
speaker expresses a positive interest in an alternative state of affairs.  It is implied that 
in the actual scenario, the person referred to with the pronoun “she” said certain things 
that were inappropriate.  In the counterfactual scenario, the person remained silent.  
This counterfactual scenario in which the person remained silent is the one toward 
which the speaker feels positive interest: in other words, the speaker prefers the 
imagined scenario to reality.  
The speaker might have expressed her interest in another way, “I regret that 
she said those things.”  In this case, it is the actual situation – in which the person 
referred to with the pronoun “she” said things that were inappropriate – that is 
described in the statement.  Extrapolating from Fillmore’s discussion of positive 
interest, we might label this statement an example of “negative interest.”  In this case, 
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the speaker ‘s investment is expressed as a negative evaluation of what did happen, 
rather than a positive evaluation of what could have happened.  We see that the 
expression of an evaluation can be either a positive or negative assessment of the 
scenario described in the statement.  
What is interesting about these two examples is that whether the speaker’s 
words indicate a positive or negative interest, the evaluation seems to be the same.  In 
either case, the speaker is unhappy with what was said by a person that she knows.  In 
one example, “I wish she hadn’t said those things,” the speaker’s focus is on the 
counterfactual scenario, and it is described in terms of her own positive interest in 
what didn’t happen.  In the other example, “I regret that she said those things,” the 
speaker’s focus is on the actual scenario, and it is described in terms of her own 
negative interest in what did happen. 
We see from these examples that it is necessary not just to consider whether a 
positive or negative interest is expressed, but toward which state of affairs the 
expression of interest applies.  Furthermore, because of the comparative nature of 
counterfactuals, we see that positive interest in one state of affairs relates conversely 
to negative interest in its counterpart scenario.  Also, upon further consideration, it is 
apparent that judgments of value arise from many types of cues.  “Hope” and “wish” 
are two of the many linguistic expressions that encode a judgment of value, but there 
are many more, and pragmatic circumstances affecting evaluation as well.
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Counterfactuals and Evaluative Stance
Fillmore’s work on interest represents a starting point in the consideration of 
value judgments toward counterfactual scenarios, but clearly a more complete 
consideration of these judgments is warranted. Speakers can align themselves with 
either actual or counterfactual scenarios when making their judgments, and a variety 
of cues besides “hope” and “wish” are available for making evaluations. When 
describing counterfactual scenarios and their role in discourse, I adopt the term 
evaluative stance. The evaluative stance is based on Fillmore’s notio  of interest, and 
like epistemic stance, indicates the speaker’s expressed attitude toward the focal 
scenario.  
Evaluative stance differs from interest not only in being a more comprehensive 
concept, but also in allowing for a value-based judgment of a scenario. Evaluation is a 
primary tactic of persuasion that allows a speaker to recruit cultural values in passing 
judgments about people, events, actions, etc.  These values reflect criteria or standards 
that may be held very broadly or more narrowly by specific groups within a culture, at 
times requiring the speaker to defend the criteria for an evaluation when the audience 
cannot be expected to readily accept it (Fahnestock and Secor 209-233). Jeanne 
Fahnestock and Marie Secor maintain that “evaluation is not a matter of taste” (210).
    Evaluative stance, on the other hand, can reflect personal taste or cultural 
values, or a combination of both, depending on the specific discourse situation. In this 
respect, I split slightly from the more traditional rhetorical definition of evaluation. In 
arguing for the “rhetorical” nature of evaluative stance, I do not require that evaluative 
stance convey only cultural values with no personal preferences; rather, I accept a 
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definition of “rhetorical” that includes the conveyance of personal perspectives, 
including personal taste, as a rhetorical tactic, in the sense that it encourages a listener 
or audience to view a particular scenario in a particular way.       
Some expressions of evaluative stance, specifically those that seem to fit 
Fillmore’s definition of “positive interest,” convey the speaker’s views of a particular 
scenario that seem rooted in the speaker’s own best interest.  The speaker may 
evaluate a scenario not because it would have been good per se, but because it would 
have been good for her.  In other examples of evaluative stance, the speaker’s views of 
a particular scenario seem rooted in a more culturally-defined system of values, rather 
than in her own best interest.  Of course, the “culturally defined system of values” 
expressed may align quite well with the speaker’s own personal preference, so it is not 
always easy to determine whether personal preference or cultural values are primarily 
represented by evaluative stance. In some cases, which ill be discussed in a moment, 
the personal preference expressed may actually be at odds with cultural values. In the 
rest of this book, “evaluative stance” is used to describe judgments made by a speaker, 
with the understanding that the criteria justifying the judgment may be either personal 
or cultural.     
The evaluative stance expressed toward a scenario may be positive or negative 
with a focus on the counterfactual space, or positive or negative with a focus on the 
actual space.  The scenario that is described in the statement is the focal scenario.  
Thus, there are four possible combinations of evaluative stance and focal scenario.  In 
one case, a positive evaluative stance may be expressed toward the counterfactual state 
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of affairs.  This situation is demonstrated in the example, “It would have been better if 
she told me.”  Alternatively, the speaker may make a negative evaluation that focuses 
on the actual scenario, as in the example “It was worse that she kept the information to 
herself.” As noted in the last section, the positive and negative evaluations of 
connected counterfactual and actual scenarios are conversely related.  
Another pair of converse evaluations arises when the counterfactual scenario is 
negatively evaluated.   Instead of saying, “It would have been better if she told me,” 
for example, a speaker might instead state that “It would have been worse if she told 
me.”  In this case, the scenario described is counterfactual, but it is evaluated 
negatively in contrast to an actual situation in which the person kept the information to 
herself.  The speaker might also make a similar statement by focusing on the actual 
scenario: “it was better that she kept the information to herself.” 
When the counterfactual scenario is the focal state of affairs, counterfactuality 
is forced.  In other words, the statement requires a counterfactual space mapped from 
the parent space of speaker’s reality. When the actual state of affairs is the focal 
scenario, the counterfactual alternative is suggested by the evaluative reading, but it is 
not necessarily forced and may not be set up as part of the discourse.  The fact that it is 
made available, though, is demonstrated by the fact that the counterfactual scenario 
can be elaborated easily in subsequent discour e: “It’s better that she kept the 
information to herself.  If she had spoken up, she would have made the situation even 
worse.”  In this case, making the situation worse is a counterfactual alternative 
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prompted by the evaluative stance in the first sentence, which weakly prompts for a 
counterfactual space.      
In prompting for counterfactuals, speakers have at their disposal lexical, 
grammatical, and pragmatic cues that indicate negative epistemic stance. Similar 
prompts may also convey the speaker’s valuative stance toward the scenario.  When 
evaluative stance is indicated, it guides the listener to encode that evaluative stance as 
part of the space configuration representing speaker’s reality and the counterfactual 
space.  The evaluative stance may be strongly or weakly presented, with a strong 
evaluative stance being associated with a strong commitment on the part of the 
speaker to the evaluation, and a weak stance with a weak commitment.  Very weak 
expressions of evaluative stance may be lost on the listener altogether16.  
In most cases, the linguistic cues that prompt for counterfactuality are separate 
from the linguistic cues that prompt for evaluation, though there are some exceptions.  
Certain modal verbs, such as “should” and “ought to,” may force counterfactuality 
when they appear in a past perfect verb construction, while also indicating evaluative 
stance.  Let me first note, though, that these verbs have many uses as auxiliaries that 
do not imply counterfactuality, such as “you ought to go with us,” or “the party should 
be fun.” In some cases, “should” may prompt a counterfactual scenario without 
implying an evaluative judgment, as in a statement like “since we were playing at 
home, we should have won, but we didn’t play that well.”   
In certain examples, “should” and “ought to” indicate either a positive or 
negative evaluative stance toward a counterfactual scenario, while also helping to 
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create the counterfactual space as part of the verb construction.  Let us consider 
“should” as the example case.  In the strongest cases, “should” indicates a clear 
positive stance toward the counterfactual scenario, as in the statements “I should have 
married Anna” or “You should have quit that job a long time ago.”  In this case, 
“should” indicates that the option to pursue the counterfactual scenario had at one time 
been available, and that the scenario is preferred when compared to speaker’s reality.  
The speaker does not need to be an actor in the scenario, but this particular use of 
“should” does imply some volitional actor.  Most people would find it odd to hear 
someone say “The dinosaurs shouldn’t have gone extinct” as an expression of 
evaluation17, because “should” generally expresses a judgment of a perceived 
volitional choice. The modal “should” can also be negated, as in “You shouldn’t have 
told her.”
When used as an evaluative counterfactual auxiliary, “should” may indicate a 
split between a person’s own preference and an evaluation based on the presumed 
judgments of others or social mores.  When someone declares “I should have gotten 
more work done this morning” after sleeping in late and reading the paper, we suspect 
that he is not entirely unhappy with his choice, but feels the need to admonish himself 
anyway.  A speaker can also directly represent another person’s evaluation, as in  
“John thinks we should have left earlier,” or “the voters seem to think that we should 
have run our campaign differently.” In some cases, these expressions of evaluation 
based on cultural values or third-party judgments may be superseded by the personal 
preference of the speaker: “You shouldn’t have told me, but I’m glad you did.”
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Besides the modal examples of “should” and “ought to,” there are a number of 
verbs that may be used as part of a verb construction that forces counterfactuality, 
while also indicating a particular evaluative stance toward the described state of 
affairs.  These verbs include “hope,” “wish,” “save,” and “regret.”  Each of these may 
be used to introduce a counterfactual state of affairs: “I had hoped she would attend, 
but she’s not here”; “I wish she would try harder”; “She saved him from a horrible 
fate”; “I regret that I kept my thoughts to myself.” In each case, the verb helps to 
prompt a counterfactual space that is elaborated by the rest of the statement.  The 
meaning of the verbs also indicates that a particular evaluative stance is taken toward 
the state of affairs described.  
There are other linguistic cues that function as statements of evaluative stance 
in counterfactuals, but which are separate from the counterfactual prompts themselves. 
In some cases, these can be statements that label the counterfactual scenario “good” or 
bad”: “You could have skipped the meeting, but it’s better that you attended,” or “If 
we hadn’t placed the jewelry in the safety deposit box, this situation could have been 
even worse.”  In each case, counterfactual prompts, such as the past perfect “could 
have skipped” and the conditional “if/then,” build a counterfactual space, while 
additional linguistic cues, in this case the use of “better” and “worse,” express the 
evaluative stance toward that scenario. Evaluative stance can also be expressed 
through sarcasm; for example, when a speaker intends to imply that a situation is 
negatively evaluated, she may do so by ironically stating, “failing the test would have 
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been great,” when what she means to convey is “it would have been terrible if I 
failed.”  
These are rather blatant expressions of evaluative stance, but the indicators of 
evaluative stance can be more subtle, and can rely on implication more than on 
explicit value labels of “good” and “bad.”  In many cases, these expressions may seem 
evaluative because they rely on cultural frames with associated values – in other 
words, they call to mind our preconceived notions about what constitutes a preferred 
person, event, or situation.  We know, for example, that most people prefer to be 
happy, so we have no trouble understanding the positive evaluative stance expressed 
in a statement like “if we had stayed in Paris, we’d be happy.” Similarly, most people 
do not enjoy pain, so there is a clear evaluation expressed by a statement like “If you 
had taken the medicine, you would have felt less pain.”  Whenever a positive or 
negatively valued state of affairs is included as a prominent part of the counterfactual 
scenario, the evaluative stance may be assumed, but let me emphasize again that this 
indication of evaluative stance may be quite subtle and subject to interpretation by the 
listener.  
Pragmatic situation also contributes to the indication of evaluative stance 
toward a counterfactual scenario.  Consider the following situation: A husband and 
wife enter a restaurant for the first time.  They are both vegetarian.  They sit down, 
look at the menu, and simultaneously notice that salad is the only vegetarian option.  
One of them might remark, “I don’t see many vegetarian options.  We could have 
gone to Vishnu’s” (Vishnu’s being their favorite vegetarian restaurant).    The 
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statement prompts a counterfactual scenario in which t ey went to a different 
restaurant.  It is strongly implied, though not indicated linguistically, that the 
counterfactual situation in which they went to Vishnu’s is preferred.  The reading is 
brought about by pragmatic knowledge that the lack of vegetarian options on the menu 
means neither of them will enjoy a good dinner.
Finally, the causal relationships developed by many counterfactuals also 
provide another option for expressing evaluative stance – th  assertion of a positive or 
negative outcome from a particular antecedent.  Evaluations in general are often 
substantiated by citing good or bad consequences (Fahnestock and Secor 210).  
Simply put, something is good when it causes good things to happen, and something is 
bad when it causes bad things to happen.  In the case of evaluative counterfactuals, an 
emphasis may be placed on the positive or negative outcome that arose from the 
antecedent, and the evaluation will then extend to the entire counterfactual scenario.
Several types of cues can also w rk together to indicate evaluative stance, as in 
the example: “If you had had a good night’s sleep, you would have felt better.”  The 
counterfactual scenario is elaborated with the positively valued “good night’s sleep,” 
which is reinforced by our frame knowledge that feeling good is a good thing.  The 
use of the comparative “better” also strengthens the indication that the counterfactual 
scenario is being favorably compared to speaker’s reality.  The evaluation of the 
counterfactual scenario is further enhanced by the implication that the antecedent 
would have led to a positive outcome. 
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Evaluative Stance and Emotion
Counterfactual thinking, and accompanying feelings of regret and relief that 
can be either adaptive or incapacitating, have been widely studied by social 
psychologists, most recently in the book Regret by Janet Landman.  As Landman 
describes, these feelings, and their relationship to counterfactual thinking, is complex.  
I will presume, consistent with psychological findings, that counterfactual scenarios 
are closely related to emotions like regret and relief.  For consideration of 
counterfactuals in discourse, however, I am not so much concerned with the emotions 
themselves as with the way that these emotions are conveyed from speaker to listener.  
The emotional attitude that is conveyed in dialogue is closely related to the notion of 
evaluative stance. 
Emotions are deeply connected to our evaluations, and therefore emotions are 
a way for us to indicate our evaluative stance toward a scenario.  We feel positively 
toward scenarios that we prefer.  We feel negatively toward scenarios that we disdain.  
Descriptions of emotion thus become another way by which speakers indicate their 
evaluative stance toward a scenario.  We have seen the capacity of emotive words in 
examples like “I’m happy that you didn’t sneeze.”  Because the meaning of these 
words includes an emotional attitude toward a counterfactual scenario, they are words 
that convey evaluative stance while also prompting a counterfactual senario.  Our 
frames for certain emotions prompt us to expect consistent evaluative stances toward 
scenarios that invoke those emotions.
Counterfactuals can also provide a means by which we relate our emotions to 
others.  The linguistic nature of counterfactuals, then, is important in describing not 
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just how we think about emotions through counterfactuals, but how we talk about 
emotions using the language of counterfactuality.  When counterfactuals are 
introduced into conversation with emotive descriptors, we may presume a certain 
evaluative stance toward that counterfactual, as when terms like “good” and “bad” are 
used to describe counterfactual scenarios.  Similarly, when evaluative stance is 
indicated, an emotional stance toward the counterfactual scenario m y be implied.  If 
someone describes a counterfactual scenario as better or worse, there are strong 
implications that feelings such as regret, relief, or disappointment that are consistent 
with the evaluation are indicated as well. 
Thus, we see that the relationship works both ways: emotive words can 
indicate a positive or negative evaluative stance consistent with the emotion conveyed, 
and evaluative stance implies a corresponding emotional attitude, such as regret or 
relief, that is consistent with t e evaluation. Consider a statement made by the husband 
of astronaut Laurel Clark that illustrates the relationship between evaluative stance, 
counterfactuals, and emotion. Clark died aboard the space shuttle Columbia six weeks 
after her entire family had been involved in a small aircraft collision.  Her husband Jon 
Clark expressed his regret that the entire family survived the crash, stating “I’ve 
lamented about that, wishing that we had all just died, because then it would have 
changed the course of history.  They wouldn’t have launched” (qtd. in Dunn).
  The statement refers to two events that are clearly emotional for Clark: the 
plane crash itself and the death of his wife aboard the space shuttle Columbia.  Clark 
uses the word “lament” to describe hisfeelings about the family surviving the plane 
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crash, then invokes a counterfactual scenario with the use of “wish” in the statement 
“wishing that we all just died.”  The family didn’t die, but Clark expresses both a 
positive evaluation of the scenario in which they died, and an associated emotional 
judgment of the survival, which he “laments.”  Such a judgment of a seemingly 
positive event – the survival of his family in a plane crash – is explained by the details 
of the counterfactual that he imagines.  In the counterfactual scenario, the antecedent 
event is the plane crash.  As a result of the plane crash and his wife’s counterfactual 
death in the plane crash, the space shuttle Columbia does not launch and the lives of 
the astronauts aboard are spared. The causal connections developed in the 
counterfactual space explain the evaluative judgment of the counterfactual space, 
which in turn reinforces the emotion of regret associated with their survival in reality.   
   This is not to imply, however, that ll counterfactual statements are somehow 
connected to deeply rooted emotions.  Quite the contrary.  Counterfactual scenarios 
may very well be connected to deeply rooted emotions when the dialogue takes place 
between intimates who are likely to share these emotions with each other, or when a 
person like Jon Clark feels comfortable expressing his emotions about events.  In 
everyday conversation, emotions related to evaluative stance in counterfactuals may 
be more casual or may in fact be a response to situational circumstances.  Many types 
of counterfactual utterances may express regret over not buying a new ink cartridge, 
forgetting to mail a bill payment, or wasting time standing in line at the grocery store.  
People may use emotive words in these situations as well, even though they do not 
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invoke the deeply rooted emotions that can also be associated with counterfactual 
scenarios. 
The expression of emotion in counterfactuals, just like the expression of 
emotions in any type of language, may also be used a a rhetorical tool.  The speaker 
may be using an emotional appeal to persuade the listener to adopt a particular attitude 
toward the counterfactual scenario.  Although all counterfactual expressions are linked 
to the speaker’s perspective, and often encourage the listener to adopt a particular 
attitude, they are most unarguably rhetorical when persuasion is the primary purpose 
of the counterfactual expression.  For example, a recent appeal to Maryland motorists 
asked them to consider pedestrian accidents by asking them to “imagine the impact if 
this had happened to someone you love.” They are asking the listener to call up a 
counterfactual scenario filled with emotion. The emotion is triggered by replacing the 
victim in the crash scenario with a counterpart counterfactual victim who happens to 
be “someone you love.”   The clear purpose of the ad is to change attitudes and 
behavior.  
Case Study: “Good Thing”
The natural connection between counterfactuals, comparison, and evaluation 
has given rise to two special constructions that utilize evaluations as simple prompts 
for counterfactual scenarios.  These expressions are “good thing” and “too bad.”  
While they are not always used to introduce counterfactual scenarios, they are readily 
available for this purpose.  Consider the following examples:
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Good thing you’re my friend.
Good thing you’re my friend; otherwise, I’d have no one to turn to.
In these examples, “good thing” indicates a positive evaluative stance toward 
an actual state of affairs.  In the first example, only the actual state of affairs is 
described, and the prompt for a counterfactual space is weak.  In the second example, 
the evaluation of the actual space is the same, but it is followed by a description of a 
condition in the counterfactual space.  This condition is provided as a justification for 
the evaluation. This pairing of evaluation and justification for the evaluation is the 
hallmark of “good thing.”  Too bad is used in much the same way, except for the fact 
that it indicates negative, rather than positive, evaluative stance:
Too bad he came with us.
Too bad he came with us; otherwise, we would have had a nice time.
In the second case of “too bad,” similar to the second case of “good thing” 
above, the justification provided for the evaluation describes a condition in the 
counterfactual space.  The condition “we would have had a nice time” is 
counterfactual with respect to the situation “he came with us.” In other words, the 
speaker believes that the scenario in which he didn’t come is pr ferred to the situation 
in which he did, but the preferred scenario is counterfactual. 
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In other cases, the statement can describe a condition in the “speaker’s 
reality” that relies on an inferred condition in the counterfactual space, but without 
actually describing the counterfactual space itself.  If someone lamely joked, “Good 
thing your name is Mark.  We’re out of nametags for Steve,” only conditions in the 
reality space are described – according to the statement, it is true that your name is 
Mark, and that the person speaking is out of nametags for Steve.  And yet, the 
statement may seem highly anomalous if the listener does not imagine a counterfactual 
scenario.  In that scenario, it is bad that your name is Steve because then you won’t get 
a name tag.  Conversely, it is good that your name is Mark because you will get a 
nametag.   It is the evaluative statement which licenses, in fact necessitates, the 
development of this counterfactual scenario in understanding why the evaluation is 
justified. 
“Good thing” and “Too Bad” can be used in a number of forms that follow 
this pattern.  The range of forms include statements like: “Good thing he told her, 
because she never would have figured it out herself”; “Too bad you’re late; you 
missed seeing Dad”; “Good thing you just cleaned your room, or else you would have 
been in big trouble”; “Too bad you’re tired, since I was going to take you out to 
dinner.” All of these forms follow the basic patter of offering an evaluation, and then 
presenting a counterfactual alternative that justifies the evaluation.
Additionally, “Good thing” and “too bad” can be used as interjections to 
comment upon the last statement made by a conversational partner. An employee who 
declares, “I’m here to resign my position,” might be troubled to learn of the 
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counterfactual alternative when his boss replies, “Too bad!  I just authorized your 
raise” or relieved to learn of the counterfactual alternative he avoided when his boss 
replies, “Good thing! I was planning to fire you anyway.”  
Conclusion to Chapter 2
As we have seen, counterfactuals are closely connected to the cognitive 
processes of mental space mapping, comparison, evaluation, and to the linguistic 
expressions that prompt for these processes.  Counterfactuals are comparative in that 
they develop two spaces, speaker’s reality and counterfactual, and invite comparison 
between them. Comparative forms may require counterfactual spaces, just as 
counterfactual forms may also include specific comparisons.
One outcome of the inherently comparative nature of counterfactuals is that 
they easily convey evaluations.  Evaluative stance refers to the speaker’s attitude 
toward a counterfactual scenario, the communication of which depends on linguistic 
and/or pragmatic cues.  Some expressions f evaluative stance also function as 
counterfactual prompts, like “should” and “wish,” while other expressions of 
evaluative stance supplement counterfactual prompts.  Because a counterfactual 
implies a contrast with the actual scenario, there is a converse relation between the 
evaluation of the counterfactual scenario and the evaluation of the actual scenario.  
Emotion is also related to evaluation.  We have expectations that our emotions 
toward actual and counterfactual events are consistent with the evaluations we make 
of them.  Emotive language is one way to indicate evaluative stance.  When emotions 
are not explicitly called up, they may be implied by the evaluative stance that is 
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expressed. Emotions may enhance the rhetorical functions of counterfactuality when 
counterfactuals and emotional appeals are paired for persuasive purposes.
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Chapter 3: Counterfactuals as a Dialogic Phenomenon
Listen Ana hear my words / They’re the ones you would think I would say if there was 
a me for you  They Might Be Giants, “Ana Ng”
A few years ago, during the very early stages of this project, I spent a week at 
my sister’s house in Wisconsin.  One day during my visit, we went out to lunch while 
her husband was at work.  Her three children were with us, and while she gathered 
various items from the car and helped the kids out of their seats, she set the car keys 
down on the front seat of the car.  The driver’s side door was still open, and when she 
had finished getting all the kids out of the car, she returned to the driver’s side and 
used the auto-lock button to lock all of the doors in the car automatically, as she 
usually does when parking the car in public.
 Just as she was about to shut the door, she noticed the keys lying on the seat.  
She grabbed the keys before shutting the door, and as we walked away from the car, 
she exclaimed: “I almost locked the keys in the car. That would have been great!  Can 
you imagine?  Joe would have had to come from work to bring the keys.” I responded 
by agreeing, “yeah, that would have really changed our plans.”
The counterfactual that is the topic of this short conversation – the scenario in 
which the keys were locked in the car – was part of a communicative exchange, not 
just a proposal made by my sister.  Thus far in this book, I have considered the 
pragmatic, lexical, and grammatical choices available to a speaker when she 
introduces a counterfactual into discourse, and the range of possibilities for expressing 
an evaluation of either the counterfactual or actual situation described in the statement. 
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The expression of counterfactuality has been examined as an interactive phenomenon, 
with an understanding that both a speaker and a listener are involved in the discourse, 
but I have focused almost entirely on the choices available to the speaker in 
establishing and describing the counterfactuals in dialogue.
This example underscores the fact that it is also necessary to consider the role 
of the listener within the dialogic framework. When I responded “yeah, that would 
have really changed our plans,” I was entering the dialogue in a particular way that 
“played along” with the counterfactual scenario.  In the paradigm of face-to-face 
communication, the listener has many available options in which he may reinforce the 
counterfactual and its evaluation, as I did, or may revise the counterfactual scenario or 
the evaluation in a less supportive response.  Alternatively, the listener may 
completely reject the counterfactual or the evaluation that is asserted by the speaker.  
In this chapter, I will consider a range of available responses that help us understand 
the listener’s role in dialogue that involves evaluative counterfactuals.
Of course, unlike this example, many other discourse situations involve 
speakers and listeners who arenot engaged in a face-to-face exchange.  When Trent 
Lott made his comments about Strom Thurmond, most of the people who would later 
criticize him were not present, and responded to his remarks publicly after his speech 
was made public.  In this case, the r torical interaction included a counterfactual 
statement, and a host of responses, that were not made in a face-to-  exchange 
between speaker and listener. Written discourse, too, obviously precludes synchronous 
interaction between two communicators.  As E.D. Hirsch describes it, “In normal oral 
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communication speaker and audience inhabit the same moment, whereas in writing 
they occupy different moments, making the model of communication an analogy or 
metaphor rather than a reality” (37).  I disagree that e model of communication in 
asynchronous communication is a metaphor only, for it shares important and 
predictable features with face-to-face exchange, but evaluative counterfactuals are 
certainly more complex when the communicators are separated by time and space. For 
one thing, the speaker may never know the listener’s response.  For another, written 
discourse also involves a “speaker” and “listener,” whom we may also call author and 
audience, who often do not know each other’s specific identities.  
Fictional narrative is by far the most complex example of written discourse, 
since the temporal and spatial distance between author and audience is further 
complicated by the fact that the perspectives of multiple speakers can be conveyed by 
a single text. The speakers in fictional narrative include characters whose words and 
thoughts are conveyed through direct and indirect means, a narrator who may have a 
more or less overt presence in presenting the story, and the author, who may be 
understood as the speaker with ultimate control over the discourse situation. Fictional 
narratives also include multiple listeners, such as characters who listen and respond to 
other characters in depicted dialogue, and the reader who interprets and derives 
meaning from what the many speakers have to say.  In interpreting the roles of 
multiple speakers and listeners, the reader must also juggle counterfactual situations 
that are embedded elements of a fictional text.
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Clearly, accounting for the possibilities of literature presents the most complex 
and multi-layered application of the dialogic paradigm of counterfactuality.  What 
qualifies as a counterfactual in a literary text?  How do the various speakers pass 
judgments on the counterfactuals that are introduced? How do readers understand 
these judgments while also arriving at their own evaluations of embedded 
counterfactual scenarios? To answer these questions, I begin by exploring the basic 
paradigm of listener response in a conversational, face-to-face situation in which 
speaker and listener are in the same place at the same time.  Though there are a host of 
asynchronous discourse situations that could be examined, for the purpose of the 
current project I focus on the most complex example, fictional narrative discourse. I 
explore the dialogic nature of literature, and consider how evaluation of 
counterfactuals can function as a crucial aspect of meaning in literary texts.
The Listener’s Response
When a speaker engages a listener in conversation, the listener has various 
cues available to him that allow him to make meaning from the information that is 
provided.  Many of these cues are provided by the speaker: presumably, she speaks in 
a language he understands and uses grammatical and linguistic constructions that he 
can interpret.  Other cues are provided by memory and environment; these may 
include the pragmatic situation, the listener’s knowledge of the speaker and of their 
shared common ground, and his own cultural frames brought to bear on all aspects of 
the language and the discourse situation.
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 The actual language involved in the exchange, then, is just one aspect of the 
discourse situation, but the aspect over which the speaker has the most direct control.  
In choosing words and constructions in the production of meaningful discourse, the 
speaker provides the listener with guidance that allows him to create meaning from her 
utterances.  Nonetheless, language always underspecifies meaning; in other words, the 
meaning conveyed by an utterance is significantly more complex than the language 
used to convey it.  Mental spaces and conceptual integration theory is a tool that 
makes the seemingly hidden layers of meaning apparent and predictable, particularly 
in the case of counterfactual scenarios.
For his part, the listener must pick up on and understand the cues that are 
available to generate the more elaborate meanings expressed.   In applying mental 
spaces theory, I will assume that the listener has the ability to construct the mental 
spaces made available by the language of the speaker.  In many situations, multiple 
space configurations are possible and the listener may not arrive at the exact meaning 
intended by the speaker.  There are also, of course, circumstances in which words are 
not heard, misinterpreted, misunderstood, or simply unfamiliar to a certain listener 
because of differences in common ground.
Much more could be said about the ambiguities and breakdowns of 
communication that disrupt the transmission of meaning from speaker to listener; 
however, the consideration of these disruptions is a sidetrack from the purpose of this 
project. In discourse situations the listener’s ability to make meaning from a particular 
utterance or set of utterances is the foundation of rhetorical analysis – from this point 
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forward, I will begin with the assumption that the listener is successful in 
understanding the basic meaning intended by the speaker.  But what then?  The 
listener is not just a passive recipient of information, but a full active participant in an 
exchange of meanig.  
Herb Clark characterizes this exchange of meaning as a joint activity, similar 
to other joint activities “like shaking hands or playing a piano duet” (325).  The 
speaker and listener are engaged in an interaction requiring them to coordinate their 
activities if the discourse exchange is to succeed and proceed; otherwise, it breaks 
down. Communication requires not just that speakers talk and listeners pay attention, 
but there must also be a coordination of “what speakers mean and what listeners take 
them to mean” (Clark 325).   In other words, the listener is not a passive recipient, but 
a participant in the ongoing creation and elaboration of meaning that is undertaken 
jointly with the speaker.  
It is here, though, that it is necessary to consider the hetorical nature of 
meaning exchange.  Clark describes the ongoing joint actions and cooperation of both 
speakers and interlocutors in the ongoing exchange of meaning18.  With his emphasis 
on coordination, he sometimes overlooks the conflicting goals and potential 
disagreements that may disrupt truly cooperative interaction, as well as the persuasive 
intentions of the speaker and the judgments of the listener.  These potential disruptions 
and rhetorical goals and judgments are not counter to coordinated exchanges of 
meaning, but part of them.  Communication is a joint activity requiring the interaction 
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of speaker and listener, but people are not strictly accommodating or devoid of 
persuasive intentions and suspicions in the service of coordination.
Evaluative counterfactuals demonstrate this point quite well.  When a speaker 
shares a counterfactual scenario and evaluates it, and a listener hears and understands 
what has been said, there is a great degree of coordinated language, framing, and 
creativity involved. But the listener may also answer within a predictable range of 
responses, not all of which reinforce the speaker’s meaning or rhetorical intention.  It 
is possible to understand, and yet respond in a way that is not completely cooperative.  
This is not necessarily a subversion of coordination, but coordination considered 
within a broader range of interactive and rhetorical options. 
Conceptual Integration Analysis
At this point, I would like to return to the example in which my sister and I 
were “almost” locked out of the car.  This example may seem mundane and not 
strongly persuasive, but for these reasons I think it can provide an excellent example 
of the role that counterfactuals play in everyday conversation.  Upon analysis, it will 
become clear that most of the meaning involved in the exchange is not explicitly 
developed, and that in fact, this seemingly basic and short example is much more 
complicated than it may at first appear to be.  
The situation we imagined, being locked out of the car, is what psychologists 
call a “close counterfactual” – the feeling that something almost happened (Roese and 
Olson 22-25). The relief we felt when we escaped this situation was typical and 
probably not unlike the reaction most people would have had in a simil r situation. I 
83
am much more interested not in how we felt, but in what my sister meant when she 
said: “That would have been great!  Can you imagine?  Joe would have had to come 
from work to bring the keys.” How was her understanding of the situation, and her 
evaluation of that situation, conveyed to her listener (me)?  And moreover, what did I 
mean when I responded, “Yeah, that would have really changed our plans,” and how 
else could I have answered her?
Our cultural frames played an important role in our understanding of the 
situation.  When my sister told me “I almost locked the keys in the car,” her statement 
was drawing on the extensive cultural experience we both have with keys. Like most 
members of our culture, we both knew that a key to a car is necessary to gain entry to 
that car when it is locked; furthermore, we both knew that modern cars have a feature 
called “auto-lock” that allows every door to be locked at the same time, a feature 
which many people use consistently whenever parking the car, thus making it easier to 
“lock out” both potential car thieves and oneself.  We also had frame knowledge of the 
situation “being locked out,” in which the person who wishes to gain access to the car 
cannot do so because the keys are not available; the experience of being locked out of 
the car often involves frustration, delay, reliance on another person to open the car, 
and in some cases the ability to see the keys through the windows.  Neither of us 
needed to mention these aspects of our shared cultural know edge – they were invoked 
when my sister made reference to almost locking the keys in the car.
The frame scenario of being “locked out,” in fact, is itself a counterfactual 
blend that can be imported whole into a person’s understanding of a particular 
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situation.  The notion of “locked” and “unlocked” are contrasting terms with meanings 
that rely on a blend with the other.  Consider something that is “locked.”  In one 
mental space, a container has an opening, a person who intends to gain access, and it is 
in the open position.  Another mental space features the container with the opening, a 
device that changes the opening from open to closed, a person who intends to gain 
access, and it is in the closed position.  In order to envision the container as “locked,” 
we must blend the scenario in which it is closed with the scenario in which it is open. 
The blended space involves the projection of information from both the “open” 
and “closed” input spaces. Depending on which elements of the input spaces are 
projected, different integration scenarios are possible. If the container’s state is 
projected from the  “closed” space and the opening device is also projected, it can be  
“unlocked” and access can be attained.  If the container’s state is projected from the  
“closed” space and the opening device is not present, the container is “locked” and the 
person who intends to gain access is “locked out.” Each of these blends includes 
information from both “open” and “closed” input spaces that stand in contrast to each 
other, because the “unlocked” condition includes the projected inference that the 
container could be locked, and the “locked out” condition includes the projected 
inference that the container could be open.
    My sister’s statement, “I almost locked the keys in the car” recruited these 
basic counterfactual blends as part of a more elaborate blend network.   In this 
particular situation, the container was the car, the opening was the door, and the device 
was the key, and the counterfactual blend was invoked by her use of the word 
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“locked.” This basic blend informed the input spaces in a more extensive blend 
representing our actual situation.  In this more elaborate blend, the “speaker’s reality” 
space included the two of us, my sister’s children, her car, the doors in a locked 
position, the key’s location in her hands, and the result that the car could be 
“unlocked” with the keys and we were not locked out.  The disanalogous 
“counterfactual input space” included the two of us, my sister’s children, her car, the 
doors in a locked position, the key’s location on the seat, and the result that the keys 
were unavailable and we were “locked out.” 
The counterfactual blend – the one invoked by her statement “I almost locked 
the keys in the car” – projected the elements of these spaces into a coherent 
counterfactual scenario in which the location of the keys on the seat would have meant 
that we were “locked out” of the car instead of being able to unlock the doors with the 
keys, a scenario in contrast to reality in which we could, in fact, open the doors when 
we needed to do so.       
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Figure 1. Counterfactual Blend
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This counterfactual scenario was present in both of our minds as we continued 
our dialogue.  My sister referred to this scenario with the pronoun “that.”  There was 
no antecedent for “that” in our discourse, other than our shared understanding of the 
scenario that had almost occurred, the “locked out” counterfactual blend.  The verbal 
construction “would have been” confirms that my sister was aware that this scenario 
did not occur. In other words, my sister did not have to say “if I had not retrieved the 
keys from the seat, we would have been locked out,” for the counterfactual nature of 
the scenario had already been established by the context of the discourse. Her arcastic 
use of “great” also made an evaluation of the scenario depicted by this counterfactual 
– she did not compare this situation favorably to speaker’s reality, the actual situation 
in which the keys were “saved.” This evaluation enhanced the contrast between the 
reality space and the counterfactual input space: it was clear that the actual space was 
preferred to the counterfactual.  The contrast between the good and bad inputs became 
a part of the counterfactual blend that now included an evaluation. The evaluation 
which took place in the blend – compressing the contrast between good and bad –
projected backward to the input spaces, further enhancing the evaluation by 
reinforcing the goodness of speaker’s reality, and making the “locked out” scenario 
seem even more displeasing in comparison to the preferred “keys in hand” scenario.
When my sister elaborated her statement by adding “can you imagine?”, she 
was highlighting the imaginative nature of the counterfactual blend.  By highlighting 
the creative construction of the space, she gave herself an opening to provide more 
structure to the basic scenario that we both shared in which the keys were locked 
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inside of the car and we were all locked out.  When she added “Joe would have had to 
come from work to bring the keys,” she enhanced the space with details that 
elaborated the counterfactual blend.  Because we shared this space, she did not need to 
provide any more specific information that identified the counterfactual scenario – we 
both knew that the counterfactual was the focus of our discussion and the product of 
her imaginative reasoning. In this elaboration of the counterfactual blend, we were all 
locked out of the car, and her husband Joe had to leave work to come open the doors 
for us.  She did not have to tell me that Joe had a set of spare keys, nor did she have to 
tell me that no other keys were available or that gaining access to the car would be a 
priority that would justify his leaving work.  She was able to elaborate the 
counterfactual blend with an assumption that I understood these points already and 
that I shared her vision of the scenario and her evaluation of it.
My response confirmed these assumptions.  First, by responding “yeah,” I let 
her know that I had followed her logic and that I greed with the conclusions she had 
reached about the consequences that would have followed from locking the keys in the 
car in the counterfactual space.  By adding, “that would have really changed our 
plans,” I emphasized the difference between the counterfactual and the actual space by 
noting the “change of plans” that arose in the counterfactual blend, which then 
projected back to the input spaces in a dynamic adjustment to the counterfactual 
network.  In speaker’s reality, our plans included a nice lunch out with the kids.  In the 
counterfactual input space, some other “plan” for the same period of time, though not 
identified, shared the “bad” stigma that the entire counterfactual input space had 
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attained.  In the blend, the two different plans for the same period of time were 
compressed into an unwanted “change of plans” indicated by my statement. 
In summary, we see that this very short dialogue involved complex conceptual 
integration network and development of meaning that was largely unspecified within 
the discourse.  The contrast between the “reality” of having the keys and the 
“counterfactual scenario” of locking ourselves out involved existing blends for 
“locked” and “unlocked,” as well as cultural frames for auto-lock, for keys, and for 
being locked out.  All of these were brought together into a counterfactual scenario 
that my sister also evaluated sarcastically in comparison to reality.   
My response to my sister’s evaluative counterfactual reinforced her statements.  
I supported her imagined counterfactual scenario by acknowledging it with “yeah,” by 
adding structure to the blend network by noting the change of plans it would have 
involved, and by implicitly supporting her evaluation that the counterfactual scenario 
would have been unfortunate and unpleasant.  My response was not surprising given 
the situation, in which we both desired to have a nice lunch without bothering her 
husband and worrying about the car.  In a more fixed sense, my response was not 
surprising within a general pattern of accommodating interaction between my sister 
and me.  But the interaction could have been much different, and that is what I am 
most interested in exploring here. 
Reinforcement
When my sister made her statement: “That would have been great!  Can you 
imagine?  Joe would have had to come from work to bring the keys,” there were a 
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number of other ways that I could have responded that would have been cooperative in 
different ways from the actual response I made.  I will focus on this specific example, 
but these general patterns extend to any interaction between discourse participants that 
involves evaluative counterfactuals.  In general, a listener may focus on the evaluation, 
the input spaces, the connectors between inputs, or the blended space when 
responding. Though I will consider these patterns of response separately, they may 
appear in concert; additionally, “reinforcement,” “revision” and “rejection” are types 
of responses that may appear together in a listener’s actual reaction.  
I would also like to note that identifying the focus of the listener’s response 
does not imply that the rest of the blend network remains unchanged. In fact, that 
would be misleading – any small change to an element of the network will have 
cascading effects.  Rather, the response categories represent entry points by which the 
listener can adjust or enhance the entire network.  Even a small change or addition is 
bound to have implications for the rest of the network; I do not intend to focus on 
these implications at present, but to consider the various entry points that represent 
types of responses available to a listener when an evaluative counterfactual scenario 
has been introduced into discourse.  
The first option is reinforcement – a listener may specifically support the 
speaker’s evaluation by reinforcing the evaluation of the contrasting input spaces in 
the blend network.  My response “Yeah, that would have really changed our plans” 
implicitly confirmed my sister’s evaluation of the “bad” counterfactual input space, 
the space in which we were locked out of the car, which she judged with her own 
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sarcastic remark “that would have been great.”  In essence, a listener can add to the 
space by reinforcing and extending the evaluation that has been made by the speaker.  
This confirmation could have been even more direct.  For example, I could have 
replied “You’re right – that would have been terrible,” or “You’re right – hat would 
have been really great,” essentially echoing the evaluation she already made with 
either a literal or sarcastic evaluation of my own focusing on the “bad” space.  
Alternatively, I could have made a complementary evaluation of the speaker’s 
reality space, in this case, the “good” space, by saying something like: “It’s a good 
thing you noticed the keys on the seat.”  This statement functions in a similar manner 
to the last example, in that I would be reinforcing her evaluation by extending it 
without changing the structure of the two input spaces that have already been set up.  
The only difference is that in this case, the statement reinforces the implied evaluation 
of the speaker’s reality space, the space in which we were not locked out.  Because the 
two spaces have contrasting evaluations, a positive evaluation of speaker’s reality 
confirms the original evaluation just as a negative evaluation of the counterfactual 
space does.  In both cases, the speaker’s response strengthens the existing relationship 
between the input spaces by focusing on the contrasting evaluative status, simply good 
or bad, that exists between them.
The structure of the counterfactual blend can also be elaborated by adding 
structure to either input space which would then be available for projection into the 
counterfactual blend.  I could have said, for example, “Yeah, we have a lot to d  
today” an addition to the speaker’s reality input space that has implications for the 
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counterfactual blend. While the original input space contained no details about the rest 
of our day, my response would have enhanced the input space by adding to reality th  
fact that we had a lot to do. This fact may then be projected into the blend, where our 
imagined scenario now includes even more annoyance over the fact that we have to 
wait to get into the car when we have many other things to do.  The result is a 
reinforcement of the “bad” and “good” evaluations of the original input spaces.
I also could have offered reinforcement by more fully elaborating the original 
structure of the blend space beyond the structure she had already developed with “Joe 
would have had to come from work to bring the keys.”  There are any number of ways 
in which the counterfactual blend could be elaborated.  I could continue to focus on 
Joe, saying “It would have been a real inconvenience for him,” or on us, saying “if the 
baby needed diapers, we would have been in real trouble.” In turn, my sister might 
have added more structure herself, responding “Joe might have had to go home first to 
get the keys.”  In this way, discourse participants can elaborate a counterfactual 
blended space quite extensively as long as they both continue to add structure and 
make it the focus of discussion.
In fact, such extended discussions often serve as a justification for a 
counterfactual evaluation.  In the example above, the situation in which my sister and I 
found ourselves was accidental and not a result of a conscious decision made by either 
of us.  In other cases, a speaker may evaluate a counterfactual situation primarily to 
justify a decision that has been made, and listeners may respond by adding structure to 
the counterfactual that further enhances the evaluation. Consider a speaker who has 
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decided not to take a cruise to Alaska.  In discussing the decision with a friend, the 
speaker might state “It was a bad time of year for us to go – July would have been a 
terrible time for me to miss work.” A speaker might respond by offering many more 
details that justify the evaluation and therefore the decision – “you wouldn’t have had 
a good time,” “You would have been thinking about work constantly,” “your c -
workers would have been in a bind without you,” or “you would have had twice as 
much work to do when you got back.”  All of these responses reinforce the 
undesirability of the counterfactual blend by adding structure that supports a negative 
evaluation, thus reinforcing the evaluation and the speaker’s original decision. 
Revision
There are other types of responses that revise the original blend; they imply 
that the speaker has not whole-h artedly accepted the evaluation or other aspects of 
the structure of the counterfactual network.   In other words, the speaker does not 
simply mirror and/or add to the existing statements and structure, but revises the 
evaluation, the connectors, the input spaces, or the counterfactual blend in some way.  
In some ways, responses that revise the original blend are the most interesting to 
analyze because they highlight the underlying complexity of counterfactual scenarios.
I’ll begin by considering ways in which a listener may respond by challenging 
or adjusting the speaker’s evaluation.  In the original example, my sister presented a 
sarcastic evaluation of a counterfactual situation by stating “that would have been 
great.”  Rather than directly or implicitly confirming her evaluation, I could have 
focused on the evaluation itself as the part of her statement needing adjustment.  For 
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example, I might have replied “It wouldn’t have been that bad” or “it’s not the worst 
thing that could have happened.”  The conversation might end here, or I might 
elaborate my own evaluation by introducing new elements to the counterfactual space.  
For example, I might have said, “It wouldn’t have been that bad – we could have had 
lunch while we were waiting for Joe,” in which the added detail, having lunch while 
waiting for Joe, is meant to illustrate a more tolerable aspect of the counterfactual 
scenario.  I also could have introduced an entirely new counterfactual scenario to act 
as the focus of comparison, such as “It could have been even worse – if Joe didn’t 
have a spare key, we would have had to pay for a locksmith.”
These examples illustrate techniques for partially accepting the evaluation that 
has been put forth while also offering some revision.  Yet another general tactic of 
response is for a respondent to partially accept the counterfactual blend, but with some 
revision of the inputs that have been projected into the counterfactual blend.  For 
example, recruiting from our background knowledge that Joe is a surgeon, I could 
have responded to my sister’s statement “Joe would have d to come from work to 
bring the keys” by stating “he may not have been able to leave work right away, since 
he’s in surgery this afternoon.”
In this case, the information that has been projected from one input space – the 
input space of speaker’s reality – included our knowledge that Joe was at work, and 
would have left work in the counterfactual scenario because of the importance of our 
situation.  By introducing an event with even more urgency, a surgical operation, as 
part of reality, my reply questions the legitimacy of elaborating the counterfactual 
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blend with the description of Joe leaving work to come help us.  Instead, my statement 
that Joe is in surgery this afternoon implies that elaborating the blend in this way 
would be an error.  My revised statement does not question the legitimacy of the 
whole counterfactual blend, but revises the blended space by replacing one inference 
based on a projected detail with a different inference based on a different projection. 
In the revised counterfactual scenario, Joe is unable to leave work to bring the key. 
There are also ways in which a respondent can revise not just the evaluation or 
content of existing input spaces, but the entire blend constructed from the two input 
spaces. One example relates back to the notion of contingency, and the understanding 
that a speaker and listener share that a counterfactual situation is more or less 
probable.  In fact, a listener may disagree with a speaker on this point.  My sister’s 
declaration, “that would have been great,” was based on the assumption that we both 
focused on the all-important keys – in other words, that the keys were in our common 
ground – and that we both understood that being locked out of the car had “almost” 
occurred. But her assumption might have been wrong, and I could have responded by 
questioning the likelihood of this event.  I might have replied, for example, “You 
definitely would have noticed the keys before you shut the door.”  My statement 
questions the legitimacy of projecting the “keys on seat” detail to the counterfactual 
blend.  This revised blend is constructed from the same inputs, but the state of the keys 
as “retrieved” is projected to the blend rather than the state of the keys “on the seat.”
Finally, a counterfactual blend may becompletely revised by a listener who 
fails to accept the antecedent event identified in the counterfactual, and replaces it 
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with a different antecedent event. In other words, the listener introduces new events 
and new connectors between the input spaces, while retaining most elements of the 
original input spaces and blend. Imagine that I had responded to my sister’s remark 
“that would have been great,” by stating “well, you should have gotten the Onstar 
option when you bought the car.”  Onstar is an expensiv  system that allows a vehicle 
to be unlocked remotely.  By making this response, I would have been identifying a 
different antecedent than the one that was implied by the current discourse and 
situation, but keeping much of the existing network.  The causal event in the original 
counterfactual was the point at which my sister retrieved the keys from the seat.  In my 
revised causal assertion, the important prior event was the decision not to order Onstar 
as an option on the car. In the revised counterfactual blend, rather than calling Joe and 
having to wait for the keys, we could have called Onstar and had the car unlocked 
immediately.   
Finally, a counterfactual blend may be revised almost completely by a listener 
who fails to accept the antecedent event identified in the counterfactual, and replaces it 
with a different antecedent event. In other words, the listener introduces new events 
and new connectors between the input spaces, while retaining only a few elements of 
the original spaces and original blend. I could have responded, “If we had taken the 
train like I suggested, we wouldn’t have had to worry about the car.” In this case, 
some of the original elements of the input spaces are retained – w  are still out to 
lunch, and the kids are still with us, and the “locked out” situation still exists as a 
coherent scenario, and is still undesirable.  But in this case, the situation is avoided not 
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because my sister retrieved the keys, but because speaker’s reality is completely 
different – the keys don’t even matter in this scenario because we have taken the train 
instead of bringing the car.   Responses of this type rely on the notion that 
counterfactuals identify specific events in a longer chain of related events, and imply a 
specific causal relationship between the antecedent and outcome.  
Rejection
Finally, there are a number of ways in which a listener can respond to a 
speaker by simply refusing to engage the counterfactual conversationally, even when 
the counterfactual has been understood.  In other words, the respondent acknowledges 
the counterfactual space network, but rejects it altogether by refusing to maintain it as 
a topic of discussion.  One mode of disengagement is dismissal – dismissive responses 
could include statements like “that’s stupid” or “Let’s not even talk about it.” A 
response of this type can also point to the counterfactual nature of the space network 
as a motive for its dismissal: “Why even talk about it now?” or “it’s a moot point, 
now, isn’t it?” Note that in each of these repli s, the existence of the counterfactual 
network is acknowledged pronominally.
  A respondent can also reject the evaluation that has been put forth instead of 
the counterfactual.  By rejecting the evaluation, the listener completely disrupts the 
space network by rejecting the assignment of “good” and “bad” to the original input 
spaces and also dismissing the disanalogy connector between them.  It’s hard to 
imagine that I would have rejected my sister’s assertion that the counterfactual 
situation, in which we got locked out of the car, could have been anything but 
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unpleasant, but I might have said something like “I wish we had been locked out.”  In 
this case I am simply rejecting the evaluation with no explanation.
And of course, a respondent can refuse to cooperate with a counterfactual 
evaluation in all the same ways that he can refuse to respond to any other discourse 
situation.  The respondent can pretend not to understand, ignore the speaker, change 
the subject, etc.  In these cases, the speaker does not acknowledge either the 
counterfactual blend network or the evaluation.
Literature as Rhetorical Dialogue
The next two chapters of this book, in which I closely analyze counterfactuals 
in two works of literature, may seem like a dramatic leap from a si ple conversation 
about locking the keys in the car.  I contend that this leap is justified, though, by the 
fact that literature can be examined using the same basic model of dialogue that I have 
used to analyze counterfactual statements and their responss.  Extending this dialogic 
model to literature involves several assumptions: that literature is one example of a 
rhetorical exchange between a speaker and an audience; that literature is not only 
rhetorical, but that dialogic models of speakers and listeners extend to literature and 
provide insight into literary texts; that literature does include counterfactuals as part of 
this dialogic meaning exchange; and finally, that literature has the ability to convey an 
evaluative stance, and that this stance can be accepted, revised, or rejected by a reader. 
As I will describe, these assumptions are grounded in the work of other literary 
theorists as well as in my own analysis of counterfactuality as a literary phenomenon.  
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Though it may not be prototypical of persuasive writing, literature has long 
been considered a form of discourse that can function “rhetorically.”  Wayne Booth’s 
influential 1969 book, The Rhetoric of Fiction, proposed a framework for the 
rhetorical analysis of fictional narratives. In his view, fiction is rhetorical because 
authors make specific choices that are intended to communicate values and beliefs to 
an audience.  The evidence of these choices, he argues, can never be expunged from a 
text.  Characters, scenes, direct commentary and other narrative techniques serve 
“rhetorical” ends because they have been selected by the author with the needs and 
reactions of an audience in mind.  Booth writes that “the author cannot choose whether 
to use rhetorical heightening. His only choice is of the kind of rhetoric he will use” 
(116). 
Thus, the essence of the rhetorical nature of literature is the communication 
that takes place between an author and an audience.  Booth was well aware, though, 
that the identity of the author in a literary text is masked by the presence of a narrator, 
and shaped by the details of the story that lead the audience to make conclusions about 
the author’s beliefs and values, regardless of any knowledge of the author’s actual 
biography.  He therefore replaces the term author with the term “implied author,” 
noting that “the implied author chooses, consciously or unconsciously, what we read; 
we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of the real man; he is the sum of his 
own choices” (75).  Anyone who reads a text, in other words, encounters the implied 
author as its controlling speaker.
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While Booth complains that “there have been innumerable efforts to rule the 
audience out of critical consideration” (39), his own analysis focuses largely on the 
implied author and evidence of the choices made in creating the text, such as inclusion 
of overt commentary.  An alternative approach to the rhetorical nature of texts focuses 
more attention on the audience, and the audience’s interpretation of the elements of 
the text. This is the view taken, for example, by Sonja K. Foss, when she notes that 
“…a narrative, like all rhetoric, is addressed to someone and is designed to appeal to 
that person” (232).   Various methods have been applied to describe the experience of 
an audience reading a text, from Stanley Fish’s reader-r sponse criticism to more 
recent cognitive approaches like the approach taken by Todd Oakley in analyzing the 
graphic novel Maus: a Survivor’s Tale.
As the methods of analysis have evolved, so has the precision with which the 
audience’s experience has been described. Using cognitive methods such as mental 
spaces and conceptual integration theory, it is possible to analyze the way that cues 
made available by the text structure certain responses and interpretations.  These 
responses are not unlimited, any more than a sentence has an unlimited number of 
meanings, but constrained in predictable ways and open in predictable ways to 
individual judgments.  The increase in precision has also moved the level of analysis 
from a general audience, to specific “readers” who experience the text as they read and 
construct meaning within a rhetorical framework.    
In adopting this mode of analysis, I view literature as rhetorical because it is a 
form of communication between author and audience, and also because the language 
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of a text always influences the reader who encounters it, even though the “influence” 
may not be intentionally persuasive or intended to move the reader to a particular 
action. The elements of the text combine to portray fictional events and characters 
according to a particular perspective or series of perspectives.  It is not possible to tell 
a story without conveying a particular point of view or views. The reader of a literary 
text, like a member of any audience, may ultimately reject the perspective or 
perspectives represented, but the rhetorical exchange is successful, from my view, 
when the reader must first adopt the perspective in order to reject it.  
The “rhetoric” of the text is not a blueprint of the author’s views, but rather a 
result of the cumulative effect of implied author, narrator, character viewpoints and 
the details of the text that make available to the reader these particular perspectives.  
This cumulative effect can be analyzed well with models of dialogue that may be 
extended to account for characteristics of narrative. Recent work in linguistics has 
emphasized this point by treating face-to-face conversation as a basic paradigm that 
provides insight into narrative structure.  Vera Tobin, for example, has argued that the 
principles of joint communication that Herbert Clark has identified for conversation 
apply equally well to literature, though they are complicated by the layers of narrative 
meaning. Similarly, in their forthcoming book Conditional Space-Building and 
Constructional Compositionality, Barbara Danygier and Eve Sweetser analyze 
conditional statements in literature using the theory of mental spaces that was 
originally developed as a model for natural language. 
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Counterfactuals in Literature
Let me propose simply that there are three levels at which one can consider a 
work of literature “counterfactual.”  In a very broad sense, entire works of literature 
are counterfactual with respect to the real world.  In other words, the “actual world” is 
the base space for a literary text that is counterfactual with respect to this base. On the 
narrative level, works of literature include embedded elements that are counterfactual 
with respect to other details of the text. In this case, fictional reality is the base for a 
counterfactual alternative represented in the text.  Finally, narrative dialogue and other 
representations of a particular character’s point of view can include embedded 
counterfactual scenarios, and the base space in this case is the perspective of a specific 
character.  I’m particularly interested in the last two embedded levels, but first let me 
consider the way in which all literary texts can be labeled counterfactual in relation to 
an actual world base.    
Before cognitive linguists developed an explanatory model for 
counterfactuality that defined it in terms of a speaker’s perception of reality, 
counterfactuals were defined as statements with an antecedent that was false in the 
model of the actual world. A counterfactual conditional was viewed as meaningful in 
another possible world, though it was false in our own world.  This notion of 
counterfactuality has been extended to literature because in a sense all literature is by 
definition “false” in relation to the actual world, and its meaning does indeed seem to 
arise from a very full exploration of another “possible world.”     
Whatever the limitations of possible worlds theory as an explanatory model for 
counterfactual statements, the notion that literary texts explore “possible worlds” has 
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provided insight into the nature of literature and reading.  Ruth Ronen has observed 
that applying the possible worlds tradition to literature has turned fictional works into 
a legitimate topic of philosophical discussion because fiction annot be dismissed on 
the grounds that it is devoid of truth value or simply false (20-21). Marie-Laure Ryan 
extends the connection between possible worlds and literature by describing reading as 
an experience of “re-centering” in which the reader takes on the identity of someone 
living in the world of the text, regarding that world as actual (21-23).  Ryan, like other 
narrative theorists, has based a model of fiction on the assumption that experiencing a 
text is like experiencing another possible world.  Narrative models in this tradition 
often adopt the term “world,” as in Ryan’s “text worlds,” Richard Gerig’s “narrative 
worlds,” or Umberto Eco’s “fictional possible worlds.” 
Besides a sense of inherent falseness, and a meaning that seems to depend on 
another world of possibility, fiction is also “connected” to the actual world in a sense 
similar to the “connection” between a counterfactual and its base (see Figure 2).   As 
Ryan points out, all texts must have a minimal connection to the actual world in oder 
for the text to be accessible to readers (31-47).  But some texts exploit this 
connectedness by explicitly presenting probable or possible alternatives to the world in 
which we live; exploring these alternatives is not a byproduct of fictionality but part of 
the very purpose of the text.  For example, utopias and dystopias, works of science 
fiction, or satiric works like Gulliver’s Travels all present fictional worlds which 
exploit specific connections to the actual world by presenting alternatives. Th 
connection can also be based on contingency, or the sense that the narrative explores a 
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Figure 2. Fiction as Counterfactual
These examples demonstrate ways in which the terms “possible world” and 
“counterfactual” can and have been applied to entire works of fiction. Narrative 
theorists have also noted the existence of embedded narrative alternatives – including 
variations of past events, dreams, and alternative endings – within works of fiction. 
Marie-Laure Ryan, who has developed a series of labels to identify types of “possible 
worlds” that can exist within a narrative, calls them “textual alternative possible 
worlds” (32). Gerald Prince refers to his version of narrative alternatives as the 
“disnarrated,” or, as he puts it, “...all the events that do not happen but, nonetheless, 
are referred to (in a negative or hypothetical mode) by the narrative text” 
(“Disnarrated” 2).  In a similar vein, David Herman refers to the exploration of non-
events as “hypothetical focalization” (231).    
While all of these may appear as embedded narrative elements, not all are 
necessarily presented with equal degrees of narrative authority in the texts in which 
they appear.  Lubomír Doležel has noted that interpreting the status of narrative 
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possibilities requires the reader to assess the authority with which they are presented  
(237).  A character’s wishes and dreams, for example, are subordinate in narrative 
status to the rest of the t xt.  Other possibilities may be presented by sources of 
varying authority in the text.  The implied author or creator has the most authority, 
with the narrator having less authority than the implied author but more authority than 
the individual characters. For example, in The French Lieutenant’s Woman, two 
different endings are presented by the narrator, giving them more authority than 
possibilities presented directly by a character, but less authority than possibilities 
presented with no narrative interv ntion.
In addition to variations in authority, it is also true that not every space 
embedded within the narrative level of a text is a clear-cut example of a counterfactual 
space.  Counterfactuals are a particular type of space connected by disanalogy to the 
space of fictional reality, and developed by a speaker who conveys a negative stance 
toward the embedded space (see Figure 3).  As mentioned previously, narrators and 
implied authors are two of the speakers whose points of view are represented in the 
text. These speakers who develop the narrative provide cues that the alternative is 
characterized by a negative stance.  In other words, the embedded alternative does not 
share the same level of “reality” as the rest of the narrative.  The reader may assess the 
reality of the space through linguistic and grammatical cues – for example, a narrator 
may describe an alternative to the past using a distanced verb tense.  Other cues are 
available too, such as the details of the embedded space, the relation of the embedded 
space to the rest of the text, and even the spacing and font of the text19.     
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It is clear, then, that there are constraints on what can be considered a 
counterfactual scenario embedded in a text, and certain embedded narrative elements 
fall outside of this definition.  A character or narrator’s plans for the fictional future, 
for example, may not be presented with a negative stance because the plans may 
become actualized in the text. Similarly, a character’s dream world may have no 
connection of disanalogy to the fictional base – it may simply explore a fantasy, rather 
than present a counterfactual alternative.  Alternative endings – such as that of The 
French Liuetenant’s Woman – are not easily characterized as counterfactual elements 
when the speaker does not convey a negative epistemic stance toward either scenario. 
Because fiction is inherently creative, the status of an embedded scenario as a 
counterfactual space may be subject to interpretation, particularly in experimental 








Figure 3. Embedded Narrative Counterfactual
Finally, counterfactual alternatives may be embedded in the represented speech 
or thoughts of a particular character.  This level of embedding differs from the 
narrative level in that the counterfactual space is presented specifically as  space that 
contrasts with reality as it is viewed by that character, not with the narrative as a whole 
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(See Figure 4). The character’s perspective may be conveyed in a number of ways.  
Most directly, the character’s words may be directly represented i  narrative dialogue.  
The characters words and thoughts may also be represented indirectly, as in free 
indirect discourse.  Mrs. Dalloways’ thoughts about “what might have been” if she 
married Peter Walsh, for example, represent an embedded counterfactual scenario that 









Figure 4. Character's Counterfactual
Counterfactual spaces embedded in a character’s perspective are always made 
more complicated by the fact that the speaker’s perspective is embedded within the 
base of the text.  The layers of embedding, with different “speakers” and 
“perspectives” represented at each level, means that even seemingly straightforward 
dialogue about “what might have been” must be considered within a larger network of 
embed ed spaces.  As a result of the multiple layers of embedding in the text, the 
reader must also understand that a counterfactual associated with a character’s point of 
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view is counterfactual only from that character’s perspective, and perhaps not from the 
perspective of the narrator, implied author, or even another character who also 
participates in the dialogue.
Literature and Evaluative Stance
Thus, it is well established that literature is rhetorical, and that literature 
includes counterfactual spaces that are embedded at various textual levels.  The 
outcome of these two facts is that literature, like the many other examples of written 
and spoken discourse that I have analyzed thus far, has the ability to convey an 
evaluative stance through the introduction of a counterfactual scenario and an 
evaluation of that scenario.  The counterfactual space is connected to a base space, and 
that space is associated with a particular speaker.  The speakers include implied 
author, narrator and characters.  
When a counterfactual scenario is part of a fictional text, the implied author, 
narrator, or character can each take an explicit or implicit evaluative stance toward 
that counterfactual scenario.  And in fact, the evaluation is typically distributed across 
all three, with the reader often left unsure of the true source of the evaluative stance. 
Even an evaluation made in the direct speech of a character may seem to reflect the 
implicit evaluative perspective of a narrator or implied author.  For example, in “The 
Snows of Kilimananjaro,” which will be analyzed in the next chapter, the main 
character describes stories that he wishes he had written.  Since a major theme of the 
story is the importance of using one’s gifts before they are lost, the evaluation seems 
to belong as much to the implied author as to the main character.  In this case, with the 
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character’s perspective embedded in the fictional text presented by narrator and 
implied author, the evaluation is distributed across all three speakers.  When a narrator 
makes an evaluation, the evaluative stance is shared with the implied author but not 
necessarily with a character. When a character acts as the narrator, the evaluative 
stance is shared with the implied author.    
Not every speaker in a text has equal authori y in the assertion of evaluations, 
either, just as the level of authority varies in the introduction of counterfactual 
scenarios.  In cases where details of the text seem to present conflicting evaluative 
stances coming from character, narrator, or implied author, the evaluative stance of the 
implied author carries the most authority.  In the excerpt from Mrs. Dalloway included 
in the introduction, for example, Mrs. Dalloway declares it a “a good thing” that she 
did not marry her former suitor, Peter Walsh.  While Mrs. Dalloway’s evaluation of 
the counterfactual scenario is clear, the evaluative stance taken by the narrator and 
implied author is arguably ambivalent.  Mrs. Dalloway’s life is not particularly happy, 
and her husband has trouble communicating his feelings to her while Peter Walsh is 
emotional and exuberant, though also impulsive.  The implied author’s more 
ambivalent evaluative stance toward the counterfactual scenario, conveyed through the 
narrator, supersedes Mrs. Dalloway’s direct evaluation.
So we see that a fictional text conveys the perspectives of multiple speakers, 
and that the evaluation is therefore distributed rather than clearly associated with one 
speaker’s stance.  Depending on the text, the speakers may seem to share the same 
evaluative stance or take conflicting views of a counterfactual scenario.  In some 
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cases, the evaluative stance is represented directly in the language of the text, whereas 
in other cases, the evaluative stance must be inferred from textual evidence that 
supports an implicit view toward the counterfactual scenario.  Evaluations that are 
linked to the perspective of the implied author carry the most authority in the text, 
while the character’s evaluations carry the last authority and may be contradicted by 
the evaluations of the implied author. Generally, though, the character’s evaluations 
are made more explicitly and therefore more easily recognized; the evaluations of an 
implied author and narrator are rarely made explicit, and therefore are typically more
ambiguous and subject to interpretation.    
Audience Response
Just as there are a number of potential speakers in narrative discourse, there are 
similarly a number of potential listeners.  Characters may act as listeners, and in 
certain types of texts, the narrator may respond to a character’s thoughts or words as a 
listener also.  The reader also acts as a “listener” who may respond to the evaluation of 
counterfactuals presented in the text. Just as the implied author’s evaluation has the 
most authority within the text, so the reader’s response to the counterfactual is the 
highest space of meaning for that particular reading of the text.  The reader is the 
listener who has access to all embedded spaces, and all evaluative stances, and the 
reader’s own response to events in the text are shaped by this access to each embedded 
layer of meaning.  In order to explain the potential responses of the reader in more 
detail, I will examine each layer of embedding in turn, beginning with the embedded 
mental space representing the perspective of a specific character.
111
As described, literary dialogue may include counterfactual scenarios 
introduced by specific speakers, and the speakers may assess them with all the same 
evaluative techniques as real people in conversation. The character’s evaluations may 
then be contradicted by other characters. Just as a listener can reinforce, revise, or 
reject a counterfactual in conversation, so a fictional character can reinforce, revise, or 
reject the evaluation of a counterfactual scenario presented by another character.  
Readers identify the perspective taken on the counterfactual with the speaker who 
introduces it into dialogue. If another character responds, the reader identifies the 
response with the perspective of the responding character. In this case, the reader is an 
overhearer who has a modeled response available as part of the total space network, 
but the reader is always in the most informed position to analyze both the speaker’s 
evaluation and the response within the total network of embedded meanings. 
Besides direct dialogue in which both a speaker and listener are represented in 
the text, certain narrative techniques, such as free indirect discourse, give the reader 
access to the perspective of a single character, and th t perspective may include the 
exploration and evaluation of embedded counterfactual events.  In this case, the 
presence of a direct listener is removed from the equation, and the reader is in a more 
straightforward position to “listen” to the speaker’s perspective without another 
character acting as a responding intermediary.  In this case, though, the narrator’s 
presence is more noticeable, since “…the words are the narrator’s and a paraphrase of 
the character’s speech” and “we cannot be sure that the words attributed to the 
characters are the exact ones spoken by them” (Foss 233).  Thus, when an evaluation 
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is identified with the perspective of the character, the reader may additionally ascribe 
that evaluation to the narrator and/or implied author. In some cases, other details of the 
text may undercut the character’s explicit evaluation.  As the only listener in this 
dialogic exchange, the reader must determine whether an evaluation of a 
counterfactual situation given by a particular character should be weighed against 
other details of the text.  
One way to think about a character’s embedded counterfactual space is to 
return to the idea of contrast.  When a counterfactual space is embedded within the 
character’s perspective, and the counterfactual is evaluated, the counterfactual space is 
being put in contrast with speaker’s reality, that is, the character’s views about what 
counts as “reality” in the fictional world.  The character’s evaluation may be 
completely foolish – in fact, the character’s notion of “reality” may not match the 
reality of the fictional world as it is presented by the rest of the text.  The focus is on 
the contrast between the “actual” world of the character and the “counterfactual” space 
introduced by the character, but the reader’s total space network always involves other 
embedded spaces and the potential for other evaluative perspectives.
When a counterfactual space is embedded within the narrative level but not 
associated with the perspective of a particular character, it contrasts with the reality 
not as a particular character views it, but as it is depicted by the entire text.  In some 
cases, these counterfactual spaces may be directly evaluated by the narrator or implied 
author by being labeled with evaluative terms.  An evaluative stance toward 
counterfactual spaces may also be conveyed through a consistent depiction of the 
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counterfactual scenario as either “good” or “bad” in relation to the narrative base. The 
evaluation may also be implied (or supplemented) through the contxtual details of the 
counterfactual space and the rest of the narrative with which it contrasts – the 
counterfactual space may contain “better” or “worse” options than the narrative base.     
A good example of an evaluative perspective on a counterfactual space from 
the narrative level is seen in the classic movie It’s a Wonderful Life.  In this movie, the 
character George Bailey is allowed to see the counterfactual world that “might have 
been” if he had never been born.  He is coached to consider this space in a negative 
light, just as the details of the movie influence the viewer to consider the space in a 
negative light. In the “reality” of the film, for example, George saved his brother from 
drowning and his brother became a war hero. In the counterfactual alternative his 
brother died and the many soldiers his brother later saved in the war also died. This 
unfortunate consequence, avoided in fictional reality, gives reality a positive luster 
because of its positive consequences. These details are supported by many others that 
provide an unambiguous depiction of the counterfactual as an undesirable alternative.  
A person viewing this movie will undoubtedly agree with the evaluation, 
unless he or she takes an extremely uncooperative stance that directly conflicts with 
the stance conveyed by the details of the film, because the evaluation is presented in a 
very consistent manner at a high level of authority20. In most literary texts, on the 
hand, evaluations are not presented in a consistent and unambiguous manner, but must 
be assessed through an analysis of details and perspectives that may themselves be 
contradictory.  There is rarely an unambiguous evaluation that a counterfactual 
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alternative is “good” or “bad”; even when a character declares this to be so, the 
distribution of evaluative stance across speakers leaves room for contradiction. As a 
listener with access to all embedded spaces, the reader is in a position to contrast 
counterfactual alternatives, and to understand the explicit and implicit evaluations of 
these alternatives, as part of the reading experience.  Evaluative counterfactual 
scenarios are an available source of meaning for readers who may impose their own 
judgments and analysis on the details of the text.   
Finally, certain books that emphasize the contrast between the “actual world” –
in other words, the reader’s reality space – and the contents of an entire fictional 
narrative convey an evaluation of the actual world through contrast with the 
counterfactual alternative.  Such is the case for alternate histories, in which the 
connection to the actual world is exploited, providing the potential for evaluation 
particularly through the exploration of alternative consequences.  If an alternate 
history depicts the south winning the Civil War, for example, and shows the United 
States and Confederate States in a favorable position as a consequence of this event, 
then a positive evaluation is implied. If, on the other hand, an alternate history depicts 
the south winning the Civil War, then focuses on the continued existence of slavery 
and the unfavorable position of United and Confederate States as a consequence of 
this event, then a negative evaluation is implied.  Because the contrast is between the 
fictional text and the actual world, the evalutive stance conveyed has the potential to 
influence the reader’s actual judgments of real historical events.
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Conclusion to Chapter 3
In this chapter, I have attempted to link what may at first seem like 
dramatically different activities – face to face conversation and literature – using the 
theory of mental spaces and conceptual integration as a common framework. There are 
many types of reactions available to a listener that may be broadly characterized as 
responses that reinforce, revise, or reject the counterfactual scenario.  In other words, 
the listener may reinforce the counterfactual blend and/or the related evaluation, may 
revise the counterfactual blend and/or the related evaluation, or may reject the 
counterfactual blend and/or the related evaluation.  The listener’s various options for 
reinforcing, revising, or rejecting the evaluative counterfactual scenario have been 
described in terms of entry points into the counterfactual blend network.
Literature is both dialogic and rhetorical, though special considerations must 
be made to account for the embedded nature of literature.  Counterfactual spaces in 
literature can be represented at three levels of embedding: literature itself can be 
considered counterfactual with respect to the actual world or “reader’s reality space”; 
coherent scenarios within the narrative can be counterfactual with respect to the 
“fictional space”; and coherent scenarios representing the perspective of a character 
may be counterfactual with respect to that character’s “reality space.”
Literature also includes the potential for multiple speakers and listeners.  When 
an evaluative stance toward a counterfactual scenario is included in the text, it may be 
distributed across the perspectives of character, narrator, and implied author.  These 
perspectives may align or contradict each other, and textual elements may contribute 
to the evaluative stance implicitly.  Listeners in the text include characters who listen 
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and respond to other characters in dialogue, and the reader who has acces to all 
embedded spaces and evaluative stances.  The reader is at the highest level of 
interpretation and has access to the full meaning conveyed by the various evaluative 
perspectives and embedded scenarios in the fictional text. The reader, like a listener in 
conversation, may be influenced by these perspectives, and an act of literary 
interpretation may ultimately include acceptance, revision, or rejection of certain 
evaluative stances.  These points will be elaborated in much more detail in the 
analyses of “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” and “The Wife of His Youth” in the next two 
chapters.
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Chapter 4: He Had Never Written a Word of That
She said a good day / Ain't got no rain / She said a bad day’s when I lie in bed / And 
think of things that might have been    Paul Simon, “Slip Slidin’ Away”
Ernest Hemingway’s 1936 story “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” demonstrates the 
variety of roles that counterfactuals play in narrative discourse.  This story includes 
counterfactuals at various embedded levels of the story.  In the narrative dialogue, one 
character introduces counterfactual scenarios and another character responds, 
highlighting the discord between a husband and wife.  The wife’s evaluative 
counterfactuals introduce the theme of regret, and the husband’  testy responses 
heighten the tension between them and underscores his own struggle with regret in the 
story.
The dialogue establishes counterfactuality, evaluation, and regret as themes 
that are crucial in binding the other elements of this story. The story includes two 
somewhat unusual narrative techniques that also represent embedded counterfactual 
scenarios.  Some sections of the story are printed in italics and seem to represent the 
stories that the main character might have written, in fact wishes he had written, but 
never did.  The story also includes two incompatible endings presented at different 
levels of authority. In this chapter, I consider the elements of the narrative that present 
counterfactual scenarios and the means by which evaluation is c veyed at each 
embedded level of the narrative.  I consider how some critics have either criticized or 
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ignored the story’s disparate elements, and propose a unified reading that integrates 
the various embedded levels of counterfactuality.
Approaches to “The Snows of Kilimanjaro”
I begin with a confession: when I first read Ernest Hemingway’s “The Snows 
of Kilimanjaro” as an undergraduate, I skipped the story’s italicized vignettes, 
dismissing them as superfluous to the “actual story.”  Thevignettes, similar to the 
inter-chapters of Hemingway’s collection I Our Time, consist of graphic narrative 
fragments which are distinct from the rest of the text.  Detailing events and scenes far 
removed from the African setting of the story, the vignettes at first blush seem to bear 
little on the story’s development. The story is developed instead by sections of 
dialogue and by free indirect discourse that conveys the thoughts of the protagonist, 
Harry, directly to the reader. 
Upon many subsequent readings since my days as an undergraduate, I have 
come to appreciate that the disparate components of this story – which also include an 
epigraph and the two incompatible endings – each contribute fully to the meaning it 
achieves.  But my early experience highl hts a problem facing any reader of this text 
– the need to integrate its fragments into a global interpretation of the story.  The 
nature of the text challenges readers to construct and appreciate the story as an 
integrated unit; the story’s fragmentation is a significant interpretive problem for both 
novice and expert readers who hope to understand and appreciate the story holistically.  
The plot of the story is carried primarily by the dialogue and free indirect 
discourse. The protagonist Harry, stranded at an African safari camp with his wife and 
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their servants, lies on a cot dying of gangrene.  He dwells on the lost opportunities of 
his life, specifically, the squandering of his talent and his failure to live up to the 
promise of his early writings.  He concludes, “It was a talent all right but instead of 
using it he had traded in on it” (11).  As his wife Helen attempts to make him 
comfortable, he treats her with alternating tenderness and contempt as his thoughts 
turn increasingly inward and toward the past. His memories of the past are represented 
in the italicized vignettes as would-be stories, and two versions of Harry’s last 
moments are depicted in the two alternative endings.  
Some early critics of the story cited its fragmentation as a major artistic flaw.  
In their commentary, Caroline Gordon and Allen Tate admired the story, but 
ultimately felt that the story exhibited “both the virtues and the limitations” of 
Hemingway’s method.  Finding the story lacking in  “tonal and symbolic unity,” they 
lamented especially that the controlling symbol, the mountain of Kilimanjaro, appears 
only at the end and does not integrate the various “planes” of the story.  They found 
the story to be a “magnificent failure” (143-144).  Marion Montgomery attempted to 
provide a framework for the major symbols of the story, which he identified as the 
hyena of the plain and the leopard of the mountain (145-149).  He too found the story 
lacking in artistic unity, however.  He identified the endings as the point at which the 
story falls apart (149).
More recently, criticism of the story has taken its artistic success for granted.  
Rather than criticize the story’s fragmentation, critics have often assumed that each 
section comments on Harry’s decay as a writer, viewed as the central problem in the 
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story that integrates its components. The presumed significance of Harry’s character is 
certainly warranted – after all, it is his imminent death that gives the story its 
wrenching poignancy.  Harry has often been read as a semi-autobiographical stand-in 
for Hemingway himself, perhaps contributing to the inclination to make him the center 
of attention and to view the story as his  “professional manifesto” (Dussinger 54).  
Gennaro Santangelo notes “Almost all critics agree that the story is among 
Hemingway’s most autobiographical with its clearly veiled allusions to personal 
events in his own life” (252).
But Harry’s centrality brings with it an implicit understanding that the other 
main character, his wife Helen, contributes little to the significance of the story.  Like 
Margot Macomber in “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber,”21 Helen has been 
readily dismissed as the emasculating wife of a sympathetically under-fulfilled 
husband22.  Dismissing Helen so readily has led to an error of omission: the dialogic 
sections in which she speaks, and the second ending in which she discovers Harry’s 
body, have figured far less prominently in the criticism than the vignettes and first 
ending.  Though Harry’s imminent death gives rise to the psychological crisis at the 
heart of this story, Helen and the sections in which she appears deserve more attention.  
A reading which focuses exclusively on Harry – or which considerably downplays 
major segments of the story – is simply not an integrated reading.  
I propose that one way to better integrate Helen and the various components of 
the story is to focus not just on Harry, but on the major preoccupation of the characters 
and the central theme of the various fragments  – explorations of what might have 
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been. On one level, the characters themselves have perspectives on what might have 
been, and these counterfactual scenarios are conveyed to the reader by the dialogue 
and free indirect discourse. The story provides a glimpse of both Helen and Harry’s 
views of the past through their own exploration of counterfactual scenarios, and 
through their responses to each other. Helen’s perspectives are conveyed primarily by 
the narrative dialogue, while Harry’s are conveyed by both the dialogue and italicized 
vignettes. A counterfactual scenario contrasting with fictional reality also occurs in the 
first ending of the story. 
At each level of the narrative, counterfactuals are not only introduced, but 
evaluated by characters, narrator, and implied author.  The various explicit and 
implicit evaluations of what has been, what could have been, and ultimately what 
should have been develop the theme of regret so central to the meaning of the story.  
Counterfactuals are the primary unifying premise of this story, and provide one prism 
through which we can analyze the integrated meaning it achieves. Through the various 
representations of counterfactual scenarios, the story itself becomes a meditation not 
just on the role counterfactuals play in the experience of regret, but also on the 
relationship of the counterfactual to writing and narrative. By providing various 
representations of “good” and “bad” counterfactual scenarios, the story encourages the 
reader to accept a global evaluation of “good” and “bad” writers and writing.
Narrative Dialogue
The key moment that introduces evaluative counterfactual scenarios in “The 
Snows of Kilimanjaro” occurs early in the narrative dialogue.  As Helen and Harry sit 
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together, worried and wondering what to do with themselves while they wait for help 
to arrive, they bicker over whether Harry should drink a whiskey-soda.  Helen changes 
the subject abruptly in the following excerpt:   
“I wish we’d never come,” the woman said. She was looking at 
him holding the glass and biting her lip. “You never would have 
gotten anything like this in Paris. You always said you loved Paris.  
We could have stayed in Paris or gone anywhere.  I’d have gone 
anywhere.  I said I’d go anywhere you wanted.  If you wanted to 
shoot we could have gone shooting in Hungary and been 
comfortable.” (5).
In this stretch of dialogue, Helen introduces a series of counterfactual 
scenarios.  In this instance, it is Helen’s regret, not Harry’s, which is in focus.  Helen 
first shifts the focus to a discussion of counterfactual alternatives by stating, “I wish 
we’d never come.”  The linguistic prompts23 develop a scenario in which Harry and 
Helen did not travel to Africa at some point in the past.  The antecedent event that 
distinguishes speaker’s reality from counterfactu l is the trip to Africa: in Helen’s 
understanding of reality, the couple is in Africa on a safari, but the simple alternative 
scenario she first describes contains no trip and no safari.  
Helen’s simple statement expresses her attitude toward her immediate past.  As 
readers, we know that Helen’s husband is suffering from gangrene on their African 
safari.  When she makes the statement “I wish we’d never come,” Helen does not 
name the condition, nor does she name the location to which they traveled, though the 
reader knows that it’s Africa.  We can infer from her statement that she “wishes” for 
an alternative because she views it as preferable to the actual situation, presumably 
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because she wishes to avoid the pressing problem of her husband’s condition.  In his 
first vague counterfactual, Helen is beginning to establish a causal link between an 
action and an outcome.  She wishes for an alternative in which not coming to Africa 
means that Harry does not get ill. It is the causal connection between Africa and 
Harry’s condition that explains why Helen “wishes” that they’d “never come,” even 
though the scenario she develops does not explicitly mention either Africa or 
gangrene.  
Helen then continues her engagement in alternative possibilities by elaborating 
her vague counterfactual:  “You never would have gotten anything like this in Paris,” 
she declares, “You always said you loved Paris. We could have stayed in Paris…”24.  
In the counterfactual alternative, the couple stayed in Paris, which we can infer was 
their location before the safari.  The claim “you never would have gotten anything like 
this in Paris” indicates that Harry’s dire condition is not part of the counterfactual 
scenario, reinforcing the assertion that the trip to Africa was the direct cause of 
Harry’s condition.  Helen introduces the idea that another vacation might have been a 
better choice, and through contrast with their current situation, this scenario reinforces 
Helen’s asserted attitude toward their current location and predicament. She views this 
counterfactual scenario as a better alternative than their actual African safari. It is not 
clear from the story whether the couple considered staying in Paris at the time of their 
departure; but regardless, it is the option which Helen retrospectively sees as an 
alternative possibility that she wishes they had chosen.
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Helen does not continue to elaborate on the scenario in which they stayed in 
Paris, instead shifting back to vague statements about past options.  When she says 
“we could have stayed in Paris or gone anywhere,” she ceases her elaboration of the 
Paris narrative, instead shifting to more general terms.  It is not that she wanted to stay 
in Paris, but that she recognizes that there were other options besides Africa; in fact 
the options were seemingly unlimited, for they could have “gone anywhere” besides 
Paris. Presumably, the only place excluded from these options is Africa, for avoiding 
Africa is the ultimate goal of her deliberation.   When she continues,  “I’d have gone 
anywhere,” the focus shifts from the available options themselves to Helen’s attitude 
toward those options.  Helen does not specify the location of any particular trip in this 
statement, and actually it is the lack of specificity that carries her point.  That point is, 
any trip to any location would have suited her.  The counterfactual possibilities 
themselves are not as important as Helen’s willingness.  
Her next statement, “I said I’d go anywhere you wanted,” seems very similar 
to the last, though in fact it provides a shift that changes the antecedent event that 
Helen has identified.  By adding “you wanted,” Helen recasts the contingency she first 
established when she stated “we could have stayed in Paris.”  Rather than a past 
choice that both Helen and Harry made, H len stresses the divergence between actual 
and counterfactual scenarios as a point at which Harry made a choice.  Helen now 
assigns herself a passive role – she said she was willing to take any vacation that 
Harry wanted to take.  If they came to Africa, the logic follows, it was because Harry 
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chose to take this vacation in Africa.  It is Harry’s choice, and not her own, which 
Helen regrets.
As she continues (it is the longest single statement Helen makes in the story), 
she drops everything she has said to imagine a new counterfactual possibility. “If you 
wanted to shoot,” she says, “we could have gone shooting in Hungary and been 
comfortable.”  Helen’s assertion shifts from her wish to stay in Paris, to a vague 
longing for anything else, to an imagined alternative in which they chose a different 
destination for a safari-like vacation.  This scenario is consistent with her proclamation 
that she would have done anything Harry wanted, for presumably Harry wanted to 
shoot25.  This statement further reinforces the causal link between Africa and the 
condition – it is not just going on a safari that caused her husband’s gangrene, but 
taking the trip to Africa specifically.  The result is a focus on Africa as the primary 
cause of Harry’s condition, and on Harry as the person who chose the trip to Africa.  
Helen’s counterfactual statements establish several simple scenarios, all of 
which are more preferable, from her perspective, to their current predicament.  Her 
evaluation is conveyed largely by the pragmatic situation, since her husband’s 
condition and possible death are clearly something that she wishes to mentally undo.  
The evaluative stance is also conveyed when she begins her litany of counterfactual 
options with the verb “wish.”  Her statements express her desire for other vacations in 
Paris, Hungary, or anywhere, and her evaluations of these vacations have implications 
for her views of reality.  Specifically, her positive evaluations imply a negative view 
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of the safari they are on and a negative view of Africa, which she implicitly identifies 
as the cause of her husband’s condition and their current discomfort.   
The shifting nature of this stretch of dialogue also reflects the point that Helen 
is making about their vacation destination: Helen has a preference for something, 
anything, besides a safari vacation in Africa, and she also seems to have an unlimited 
sense of contingency for the past.  Helen does not, even in her imagined alternatives, 
settle on any one possibility.  She begins with an imagined trip to Paris, but quickly 
abandons that possibility before her narrative is developed.   She continues to develop 
only vague expressions of possibility that emphasize her willingness to accede to 
Harry’s wishes, and she concludes with another simple counterfactual in which the 
couple traveled to Hungary. Even in the vacations she imagines, Helen is unable or 
unwilling to commit to a single counterfactual option.  The unfolding possibilities she 
describes are not elaborate narratives, though they succeed in conveying her 
evaluation of their situation. The reader must juggle these evolving counterfactuals in 
interpreting events from Helen’s point of view.   She does not develop a single 
detailed counterfactual scenario, but expresses her attitudes using a series of sh fting, 
unelaborated alternatives.
We can view Helen’s ability to imagine a host of scenarios for leisure as a 
symptom of the lifestyle that her wealth has enabled.  It has not been necessary for 
Helen, or for Harry since their marriage, to choose exclusively between desirable 
options.  For them, whatever has not been done today can still be done tomorrow.   
Helen’s ability to imagine alternative vacations in either Paris or Hungary – o  
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anywhere – demonstrates the freedom that she is accustomed to in pursuing her 
whims.  Even in imagining the past, she does not make an exclusive choice, but 
considers a series of possibilities, any one of which would have been better and more 
“comfortable” relative to their African predicament.
Harry focuses on her wealth, and the whimsy made possible by such wealth, 
when he testily responds “your bloody money” (5). At this point, the dialogue shifts to 
Harry’s words and the reader develops a new mental space to represent Harry’s 
perspective. It becomes immediately clear that his perspective will not reinforce 
Helen’s views of the immediate past.  He is unwilling to cooperate with the sentiment 
of her counterfactual musings, and he does not validate her evaluation of either the 
actual situation or the counterfactual vacations she imagines.  He does not 
commiserate with her, share his own regrets, or elaborate her counterfactual scenarios. 
Instead, he points out what he sees as the enabling factor in all of their vacations, both 
real and imagined: Helen’s money.  
It later becomes clear that the most destructive effect that money and comfort 
have had on Harry is his tendency to approach writing with the same sense of limitless 
opportunity reflected in Helen’s counterfactuals. He had “delayed the starting” (5), 
even as he had saved the things he meant to write “until he knew enough to write them 
well” (5).  At times, he had considered writing about Helen’s friends (10); he had even 
considered writing about the “big birds” which encircle their African camp (3).   Harry 
has been saving stories, saving them while he lived his comfortable life, saving them 
until he can muster the discipline to write them down.  But as long as the opportunities 
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of each tomorrow have provided him with the option to shift from one experience to 
the next, the stories have never been committed to paper.  As Harry puts it, “it was 
never what he had done, but always what he could do” (11).    
Imminent death, of course, has changed all that.  As psychologist Janet 
Landman notes, “Perhaps [regret] all boils down to death: for if we weren’t mortal, we 
could always re-do the unhappy things in some future ” (34).  As he lies on a cot 
dying, Harry repeatedly thinks and talks about the things he has never done and will 
never do.  Even so, he does not seem completely committed to the foreclosure of 
opportunity.  Even after he repeatedly mentions the “nevers” of his future, he later 
seems more optimistic when he claims “if he lived he would never write about her” 
(23). Helen’s words describing alternate vacations not o ly remind Harry of the 
degenerate effect of her wealth, but also prepare us to recognize the role of unlimited 
contingency in ruining Harry’s productivity. In this respect, Helen’s counterfactuals 
reflect Harry’s own inability to make definitive choices, which persists even as death 
looms. 
As the dialogue continues, Helen defends herself, eventually restating her 
original wish that they had not gone on the trip, saying, “I wish we’d never come 
here” (6).  To this, Harry responds “you said you loved it.” With this response, he 
petulantly locks in on Helen’s evaluation of Africa, in essence accusing her of being 
fickle in displaying changing attitudes.  It is Helen’s evaluative stance toward Africa 
that Harry has finally acknowledged and rejected, calling her to task for it.  It is at this 
point that Africa, and Helen’s implication that Africa has caused their problems, 
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becomes a point of contention between them, and a point that will trouble Harry 
throughout the story.
Through Harry’s own represented thoughts later in the story, the readers gain 
an understanding of what Africa, and this specific trip to Africa, symbolizes for Harry.  
After considering the dullness and futility of the lives of the wealthy – is current 
acquaintances and spouse – Harry turns to the subject of Africa, thinking “the people 
he knew now were all much more comfortable when he did not work.  Africa was 
where he had been happiest in the good time of his life, so he had come out here to 
start again” (10).  The notion that the people he knew were “more comfortable” when 
he did not work echoes Helen’s statement that they could have “gone shooting in 
Hungary and been comfortable.”  That was precisely the point for Harry – Africa was 
a place where he could feel refreshingly uncomfortable.  H  thinks, “They had made 
this safari with the minimum of comfort.  There was no hardship; but there was no 
luxury and he had thought he could get back into training that way” (11). Harry had 
hoped that this back-to-basics vacation would restore his soul and sense of motivation. 
Debra Moddelmog has noted that it is ironic to think of Helen and Harry as 
“roughing it” – the Africa they experience is the Africa of rich vacationing Americans 
(123). They are surrounded by black servants! Yet, from Harry’s perspective, this 
vacation represents a link to the past and to the type of writer he was and wants to be 
again.  To him, as Moddelmog describes it, Africa is a type of “fat farm” (119) where 
he claims he can “work the fat off his soul the way a fighter went into the mountains 
to work and train in order to burn it out of his body” (11).  Africa is not what he will 
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write about, but it is the context in which he can imagine himself becoming a writer 
again. Moddelmog points out, “Harry perceives his return to Africa as an attempt to 
resuscitate that former, more desirable self that he was when he was young, poor, and 
disciplined” (124). Harry suffers from an internal conflict that has stymied his writing 
career: he desires comfort, and has married the woman who can provide it, though it is 
discomfort that allows him to write. Even his death, in the form of painless gangrene, 
proceeds with a minimum of discomfort.  Even so, he clings to the vision of Africa not 
as one of many vacation options as Helen imagines it, but as the site of inevitable 
discomfort that would have allowed him to write.
It becomes clear, when the symbolic value of Africa is revealed later on in the 
story, why Harry responded so contentiously to Helen’s counterfactual statements.  In 
refusing to vindicate her attitude of regret, he responded harshly to the implied 
evaluation she was making of Africa, and perhaps by extension, to his potential to 
write again, since Africa represented the wellspring of his future work.  By insisting 
that another trip would have been more “comfortable,” Helen discounted the very 
quality of the trip that had made it so appealing to Harry, its (in his view) discomfort.  
He equates comfort with failure to write, as when he considers that “each day of not 
writing, of comfort, of being that which he despised, dulled his ability and softened his 
will to work so that, finally, he did no work at all” (10). Africa, on the other hand, is a 
place of discomfort and inspiration.  Helen’s counterfactuals irritate Harry because 
they imply a negative view of Africa while also reminding Harry of the wealthy 
lifestyle and its possibilities that had made him seek out Africa in the first place.
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As Helen and Harry continue to bicker, and Helen plies him with “I don’t see 
why that had to happen to your leg. What have we done to have that happen to us?” 
Harry shows increasing irritation.  First, he gives her several logical causes for his 
condition – a scratch, lack of iodine, a poor mechanic and a broken-dow  truck.  
When she responds, “I don’t mean that,” he introduces a counterfactual scenario of his 
own.  He responds “if you hadn’t left your people, your goddamned Old Westbury, 
Saratoga, Palm Beach people to take me on—” In Harry’s counterfactual scenario, it is 
the marriage and not the trip to Africa that should be undone.  In the implied cause and 
effect logic, it is their marriage that has led to their current predicament, and by 
extension it is their marriage which is chosen as the target of a negative evaluation.  
Helen attempts to counter his view when she replies, “Why, I loved you.  That’s not 
fair,” but his attitude has been communicated.  He has appropriated her use of 
counterfactual scenarios, and his negative evaluation of their marriage has superseded 
her negative evaluation of Africa.
As Helen did in her own counterfactual thinking, Harry also uses the 
counterfactual alternative to emphasize her responsibility and to de-emphasize his 
own.  The point of contingency that he identifies is their marriage, and he frames the 
marriage as a choice made by Helen.  It was Helen’s decision to leave “her own 
people” to pursue him that led to their current situation.  Both characters identify 
antecedent events that undo their African safari, then suggest the desirability of these 
other unrealized alternatives.  In doing so, both characters also emphasize the fault of 
the other in choosing the doomed alternative.  Harry’s evaluation of Helen later 
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preoccupies him and we see that his view of her is intimately intertwined with his 
visions of what might have been.          
In keeping with the attitude introduced by his previous counterfactual – that 
Helen’s “taking him on” was the point at which their problems began – Harry 
continues to pass judgments on their marriage, and especially on Helen hers lf, later in 
the story.  He continuously assesses and reassesses both her and the perceived effects 
their marriage has had on his career. His awareness of impending death – symbolized 
by a hyena that passes by his bed and sits on his chest – a  brought a new salience to 
his assessments of the past.  He is wracked by feelings of regret, particularly about the 
course his life has taken since he met Helen. 
  Harry blames Helen for the wealth, and the lifestyle, that she has provided 
him.  He thinks of her as the “rich bitch” and  “destroyer of his talent” (11).  He refers 
to their marriage repeatedly in the terms of economic exchange26, as if by prostituting 
himself he has also sold away his talent. He feels that by marrying her he has “traded 
away what remained of his old life” (13) – the life of discomfort that allowed him to 
write.  He had “sold his vitality,” (12) and “he had chosen to make his living with 
something else instead of a pen or pencil” (11).  The rich friends who surround them 
he at first considers interesting enough to write about, but he later realizes that only 
fools like “poor Julian,” a thinly disguised F. Scott Fitzgerald, are bamboozled into 
writing about the glamour of the rich.
    Ultimately, though, he tempers his bitter attitude toward Helen, reminding 
himself twice that his failure is not her fault.  He manages to find points about her to 
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praise.  He finds that “she was always thoughtful” (10), that she “loved him dearly as a 
writer, as a man” (11), that she “was a good looking woman, and had a pleasant 
body,” (12), that she “was a damned nice woman too” (13).  Ultimately, he concludes 
that “she was very good to him. He had been cruel and unjust in the afternoon.  She 
was a fine woman, marvelous really” (14).  Though he never concedes feeling any 
love for her, maintaining that it was all a lie, he retracts the harsh evaluation of their 
life together first introduced in the dialogue, and later elaborated in his own thoughts.  
He even gets her to admit that apart from his medical condition, she had, in fact, 
enjoyed traveling to Africa.
The initial evaluative counterfactuals that appear in the dialogue display the 
discord between Harry and Helen, and also expose the difference in their evaluative 
perspectives.  Helen’s simple counterfactuals depict a negative view of Africa, a view 
at odds with Harry’s vision of Africa as the ultimate site of discomfort and inspiration. 
Though Helen’s evaluation is motivated by his own impending death, Harry 
stubbornly refuses to reinforce her views or to sympathize with her regrets.  Instead, 
he targets their marriage with his own negative evaluation.  Though his assessment 
wavers, his evaluation of Helen and their marriage continues to preoccupy him 
throughout the story.  Evaluations of Africa also continue to preoccupy him, until he 
finally gets Helen to admit that she has enjoyed Africa. Harry accused Helen of being 
fickle, but ultimately the story shows that they are both somewhat fickle in their 
evaluations. While understanding the characters’ initial evaluative stances, the reader 
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sees how these evaluations change in the story, and how the evaluations actually 
function as a channel for regret. 
The reader’s access to both characters’ perspectives also underscores the role 
of contingency and possibility in the meaning of the story. Both characters’ 
counterfactual statements are motivated by their awareness that Harry could die.  
Counterfactuals represent unrealized alternatives of the past, but until this point in 
their lives, both characters have also been plagued by an awareness of the unlimited 
possibilities for the future. For Helen, there was always the possibility of another 
vacation to Paris or Hungary.  For Harry, there was always the opportunity to write his 
masterpiece when he regained his discipline and finally mustered the will to write.  In 
both of these cases, Harry’s possible death brings a new finality to the choices of the 
past.  
But we see that both characters’ counterfactuals are still muddled by an 
unlimited sense of contingency. Counterfactuals in the dialogue reveal that coping 
with regret, for Helen, includes imagining vague counterfactual narratives, but her 
imagined scenarios are short and indistinct precisely because she moves so readily 
from one to the next.  Helen explores counterfactuals as a way to escape discomfort, 
yet even as she imagines scenarios she seems unwilling to focus on a specific 
alternative to the past. Her counterfactuals, as a result, are neither specific nor 
memorable.  
Harry’s recent past, we learn, has been characterized by a similar inability to 
develop specific narratives when faced with the possibility of limitless comfortable 
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choices. Even as his death seems imminent, he still dwells on the topics he will or will 
not write about – not Helen, not her rich friends, but perhaps the buzzards encircling 
the camp.  Elaborating a simple counterfactual into a narrative requires one to focus on 
it, and neither Helen nor Harry seems capable of this kind of focus either now or in the 
recent past. In later sections of the story, Harry moves readily from one possible story 
to the next as he gathers his memories into narrative material. The reader comes to 
appreciate that so long as the narrative impulse is tempered by comfort and 
opportunity, the results lack the true finality of artistic creation. Removed from the 
immediate surroundings, though, Harry’s would-be stories come closer to narrative 
material than anything Helen could ever imagine, and that is what the italicized 
vignettes represent.
Stories That “Might Have Been”
Thus far, my analysis has focused on a small excerpt of the story’s dialogue, 
and on the connection between that dialogue and the perspectives and evaluations of 
the characters expressed in other parts of the story.  I have attempted to show how the 
attitudes revealed by counterfactuals in this early section are picked up by later 
sections of dialogue and free indirect discourse.  I will now return to the general topic 
of counterfactuals –scenarios of what might have been – to show that the italicized 
vignettes are another counterfactual form functioning within the story.  
These vignettes are both spatially and temporally separate from the rest of the 
text. Distributed throughout the story, the five italicized sections seem to represent 
Harry’s memories of the past as a soldier, a husband, an expatriate, and a grandson.  
136
Told from Harry’s point-of-view, the vignettes mix loosely connected scenes and 
stories.  The short final vignette is the only one which focuses on a single coherent 
episode.  Though separate from the rest of the text, the vignettes pick up language and 
topics raised by the rest of the story, such as Paris, pain, death, quarrels, love, and 
marriage.
Like the counterfactuals in the dialogue, which are introduced with linguistic 
prompts like modal verbs and negatives, the vignettes are marked by explicit linguistic 
forms that guide the reader in interpreting these as the stories that Harry should have 
written.  In describing the scenes, Harry dwells on the fact that “he had never written a 
line of that” (7), “he had never written a word of that” (8), “he had never written any 
of that” (17), “he had never written about Paris” (22), “he knew at least twenty good 
stories from out there and he had never written one” (23).  The counterfactual reading 
is reinforced when he notes:  “Now he remembered coming down through the timber 
in the dark holding the horse’s tail when you could not see and all the stories that he 
meant to write” (22, my emphasis).  Scott MacDonald called these italicized sections 
the “experiences Harry had put off writing and which, indeed, were worth writing 
about.  The italicized sections, in other words, portray those experiences which should 
have been used in the creation of fiction” (71, emphasis in original). Their visual form, 
with a different font and separation from the rest of the text, helps to indicate their 
counterfactual status. 
Clearly, these are the stories that Harry wishes he had written, and the 
vignettes prove to us what Harry had the talent to produce.  It is only in the vignettes 
137
that Harry’s true vision, symbolically separated from Helen, her wealth, and Africa, 
can be witnessed and evaluated by the readers.  The counterfactual stories Harry 
imagines in the vignettes are distinguished by their specificity and clarity.  These 
vignettes are detailed, sensuous, and concrete. It becomes clear that Harry does indeed 
possess real talent because his would-be stories are so artistic – they contain several 
plots that might have formed whole stories, as well as details and settings that could 
have graced the fiction he might have written.  These counterfactuals seem to 
represent true writing, the type of writing that would have been worthy of him.  
However, the vignettes still present multiple possibilit es without settling on 
the important elements of each potential narrative.  While the vignettes seem to 
present interesting possibilities for narrative material, they still lack selectivity – Harry 
has not performed the most important operation a writer must make on his narrative 
material, choosing what to include and exclude.  As a result, the narratives seem to 
have the promise of true writing while still presenting a largely unorganized 
hodgepodge of ideas and details.  Each subsequent italicized vignette, though, seems 
to present pieces that are closer to whole, true stories.  The last italicized vignette, 
which describes a single episode, comes the closest of them all.
The inclusion of these vignettes, in all their concrete detail, allows the reader a
glimpse into a non-existent world – we can appreciate the counterfactual stories that 
do not exist.  The foreclosure that comes with impending death, and Harry’s 
recognition that these stories have been irrevocably lost, has tragically provided the 
only clarity that enabled him to produce them, and even then it is without the 
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selectivity needed to turn them into actual stories.  It is ironic that his act of creation is 
placed squarely in the realm of the counterfactual, where it does not “actually” exist. 
In fact, these italicized sections have an unusual logical status.  They are 
counterfactual from Harry’s perspective, and the reader shares this perspective 
because he relates the vignettes to us.  We appreciate that in Harry’s thoughts, these 
are stories that don’t exist – they are the stories that were never written (though they 
could have been).  But in fact, for the reader, they exist in some form.  It’s not that 
they were “never” written – they were written, for the reader’s intents and purposes, 
by the implied author. The reader must juggle contending mental representations of 
the same narrative material.  In one state of affairs, a series of “memories” as 
unrealized stories exist in counterfactual relation to reality from Harry’s point of view 
– he might have written these stories, but didn’t.  In another state of affairs, the 
memories are realized narrative elements of an actual story written by the implied 
author Ernest Hemingway. Though Harry failed at this goal, his stories do have an 
actual existence, and as readers we get to understand them as both counterfactual 
scenarios from Harry’s point of view, and actual elements of the fictional narrative 
written by the implied author.  As a result, to the reader the counterfactual vignettes 
represent both the promising but unorganized products of Harry’s imagination and true 
narrative material, for they exist in spaces at each level of embedding.  
Harry’s attitude toward these stories and his own ability to write them is also 
made clear in various places in the narrative.  Clearly, these are the stories that he 
wishes he had written.  His repeated use of “never” conveys a sense of hopelessness 
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and despondence.  He regrets the turn he allowed his life to take.  He goes so far as to 
state that he had a duty to write these stories, and failed.  Helen imagines a different 
vacation in which Harry’s condition is avoided.  Harry imagines a different lifestyle 
altogether, in which he worked and produced rather than allowing his talent to atrophy 
while he was “comfortable.”  While Helen wishes for Paris, Harry wishes for his 
masterpiece.
The specificity of his imagined stories contrasts with the vagueness of Helen’s 
own counterfactual scenarios.  When she imagined vaguely “what might have been,” it 
was only to avoid the pressing problem that they were facing, and to attempt to share 
an emotional connection with her dying husband.  Her scenarios were not all that 
important in and of themselves, but were vehicles for expressing her attitudes. Her 
lack of imagination is consistent with her character – she is someone who reads rather 
than produces anything of her own.  “She was always thoughtful,” her husband noted, 
but only about things that “she knew about, or had read, or had heard somewhere” 
(10).  She cannot take dictation, and even as Harry lies dying, she offers to read to 
him, as if he would be soothed by hearing what others have produced.  Helen’s regret 
is authentic, but not creative. 
Harry’s counterfactuals also convey his attitudes – they reflect his regret and 
disappointment with a concrete poignancy.  But more than that, they are concrete in 
the way that only literature is elaborate. Harry’s counterfactuals embody the clarity 
that has been missing from his cushy, comfortable existence.  Unlike Helen, he has the 
ability to produce and create, when removed from the degenerative influence of 
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money and comfort.  Though the italicized vignettes are ultimately not true stories, 
and they in fact belong to the implied author as much as to Harry, they suggest his 
promise as a writer had he been able to overcome his desire for comfort.  But of 
course, the reader knows that only death will allow him to escape his comfortable 
existence.
The Two Endings
I have introduced an analysis of counterfactuals in this story that first focused 
on scenarios developed within embedded spaces representing the characters’ 
perspectives and introduced and evaluated with contextual and linguistic cues in the 
narrative dialogue and free indirect discourse. The second example of counterfactual 
scenarios, the italicized vignettes describing Harry’s stories, represent both embedded 
counterfactuals from Harry’s point of view, and Harry’s actual memories at the level 
of fictional reality (written by the implied author).  In the case of the vignettes, 
linguistic cues, such as the use of “never,” were supplemented with the use of spacing 
and an italicized font to set the vignettes apart visually and to imply a status distinct 
from the rest of the narrative. 
The existence of two mutually incompatible endings provides the reader with a 
third experience of counterfactual scenarios in the story.   The first ending, in which 
Harry is rescued and flown toward Mt. Kilimanjaro, is logically incompatible with the 
second ending, in which Helen awakes to find Harry dead in his cot.  These endings 
lack the explicit markers utilized by other sections of the narrative – n ither ending is 
printed in italics, and neither begins with or includes linguistic markers of 
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counterfactual status.  The only textual marker that distinguishes these two elements is 
their spatial separation from the rest of the story.  Nonetheless, the reader must resolve 
the contradiction of the endings.
  Of course, another possible reading is that resolution of the two endings is 
simply impossible, that they exist in a conflicting status that cannot be resolved. In his 
discussion of narrative self-erasure in modern and post-modern texts, Brian McHale 
notes: 
Narrative self-erasure is not the monopoly of postmodernist 
fiction, of course.  It also occurs in modernist narratives, but here it 
is typically framed as mental anticipations, wishes, or recollections 
of the characters, rather than as an irresolvable paradox of the 
world outside the characters’ minds.  In other words, the cancelled 
events of modernist fiction occur in one or other character’s 
subjective domain or subworld, not in the projected world of the 
text as such. 101.
This description of a modernist technique applies well to “The Snows of Kilimanjaro.”  
I will show that the first ending fits McHale’s analysis perfectly – it is a seeming 
contradiction which takes on the characteristics of a dream, allowing the reader to 
resolve it with the second ending by embedding it within Harry’s view of reality.
In the first ending, Harry is rescued and flown toward Mount Kilimanjaro, a 
rescue that ultimately proves to be a fantasy.  On first reading, though, the first ending 
can easily be mistaken for the “actual ending.”  For one thing, it is printed in regular 
font, not in the italic font that has been used to represent Harry’s counterfactual 
stories.  Neither is it introduced or marked with the expected linguistic markers for 
“what might have been.”  And finally, the ending provides the concrete detail and 
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elaboration we expect from an actual narrative – details about the plane, about the 
pilot, and about the situation of Harry’s rescue that seem perfectly in accord with 
fictional reality.  As the scene ends, though, this section of the narrative seems more 
like a dream, including a description of flying toward a mountain “unbelievably white 
in the sun” (27).  When the section ends with “and then he knew that there was where 
he was going” (27), it is reminiscent of the symbolic epigraph describing a leopard 
which froze near the summit of Mount Kilimanjaro (3).  
The reader’s suspicions that the ending is not “actually happening” are 
confirmed by the second ending, in which Helen finds Harry with his gangrened leg 
exposed, and discovers that he is not breathing.  Since Harry is dead and still i  the 
camp in the second ending, it forecloses the possibility that the first ending concluded 
the story.  The second ending appears after another break in the story, indicating a 
narrative shift.  Obviously, the first ending, in which Harry is rescued and lives, is 
incompatible with the second ending, in which Harry dies. Furthermore, the first 
ending is set in the morning, while the second ending is set at night, another confusing 
contradiction in an otherwise sequential plot.
Readers navigating their way through these endings in the creation of meaning 
are now faced with an interesting interpretive dilemma.  Two incompatible endings to 
the story have been presented.  The endings cannot both be absorbed into the logic of 
the text.  Like a jury deliberating about what version of events “actually happened,” 
readers, primed by their experience with other stories, are driven to develop one 
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complete story from the two disparate pieces, and may feel inclined to choose one 
ending as the “actual ending.”  
As readers, like jurists, we can only interpret based on the available evidence.  
The second ending seems to supercede the first ending because of its placement in the 
story. We expect the final sentences of a story to give us the final outcome of the 
story, based on our expected frames for “endings.”  Because we have also been given 
access to Harry’s thoughts throughout the story, Harry’s rescue seems to change easily 
from an actual account of fictional reality to a dream that exists entirely within Harry’s 
perspective.  This interpretation is one adopted frequently by critics of the story, like 
Gennaro Santangelo, who writes that the plane journey is best understood as a fantasy 
(256). 
The first ending can also be viewed not only as a dream or fantasy embedded 
within Harry’s reality, but also as a counterfactual scenario embedded within fictional 
reality.  The second ending takes over the status of “actual ending” when the first 
ending is subordinated to the status of dream.  From a narrative perspective, the dr am 
also represents the story as it might have been.  Harry could have been rescued, rather 
than dying as he did in the second ending.  The possibility for rescue, mentioned 
frequently by Helen through the course of the narrative, is excluded as a narrative 
reality by Harry’s death.  But it is still available to readers as the counterfactual 
outcome of the story, the unrealized alternative in which Harry was rescued.  Like 
Helen’s imagined trip to Hungary, and like Harry’s would-be stories in the italiczed 
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vignettes, the first ending represents something that never “actually” happened with 
respect to the reality of the story.  
And yet this first ending, with its connection back to the title and epigraph and 
its suggestive symbolism, has proved to be more intriguing to many readers than the 
second ending.  Debate has raged about whether this ending represents a confirmation 
of Harry’s failure or his ultimate redemption.  Some readers seem to have forgotten 
that the second ending even exists27.   In the 195 Scribner edition of the text, a picture 
of a plane flying toward a snow-capped mountain graces the cover.  For a fantasy and 
counterfactual, this ending has garnered much attention from readers who consider it 
the most crucial part of the story.  What is interesting to note is that the first ending 
depends for its meaning on the final ending – like all counterfactuals, it exists in 
contrast to “reality,” in this case fictional reality.      
The final ending ultimately forces Harry, Helen, and the reader into a similar 
position – every alternative is finally and irrevocably foreclosed by Harry’s death in 
the final ending.  Helen and Harry will never return to Paris, Harry will never write his 
masterpiece, and this will never be a story in which the protagonist is rescued.  Like 
Helen and Harry, the reader is required to accept the finality of the second ending, 
providing a new clarity on the counterfactual alternative that preceded it.  We too truly 
appreciate the counterfactual narrative when we are forcd to accept its impossibility.
Unlike the other counterfactual scenarios, though, in this case the reader is 
given little guidance in how to evaluate the counterfactual scenario. The penultimate 
ending is not clearly marked as better or worse than the “actual ending” with any 
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specific evaluative details presented by the text. Rather, the reader must determine 
how to evaluate the ending in a comprehensive reading of all counterfactual scenarios 
and perspectives in the story, a task which some critics have obviously taken to heart, 
focusing much critical attention on this penultimate ending and its meaning. Though 
the fact has gone previously unnoticed, I propose that this meaning is crucially 
dependent on the counterfactual scenarios introduced in other section  of the story.
The penultimate ending does in fact make an evaluative comment about the 
specificity and clarity of narrative.  Like Harry’s would-be-stories represented in the 
vignettes, the penultimate ending is sensuous, concrete, and artistic. It depends for its 
meaning on its own foreclosure.  This ending has become so much a part of the 
narrative that in a sense it is more real than the actual plot, and has garnered more 
attention.  In giving us this final elaborate counterfactual section, Hemingway 
dramatically moves the counterfactual from the indistinct, unrealized realm of 
imagination, to the specificity of actual narrative.
We see a progression of counterfactual scenarios, and a developing evaluation 
of the impulse to create them, as the narrative proceeds.  Helen, driven by regret, and 
subject to whims and possibilities symptomatic of wealth and comfort, creates only 
simple scenarios as she moves readily from one unrealized contingency to the next.  
Harry, also driven by regret and atrophied by wealth, but possessing a true talent, 
creates concrete and sensuous scenarios that become more organized and elaborate as 
he moves closer to death.  The penultimate ending, a counterfactual scenario 
introduced by Hemingway and more detailed and elaborate than any other 
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counterfactual in the text, provides the definitive example of a counterfactual scenario 
raised to the level of narrative material.  It is introduced by the author and is 
counterfactual with respect to fictional reality, so in this respect the “good” 
counterfactual ending belongs to Hemingway just as the “good” stories in the 
vignettes belonged to Hemingway, too.  Harry’s death confirms the counterfactuality 
of the ending, and demonstrates Hemingway’s willingness to select between available 
options and to force his reader to do the same.  The ending also confirms that only the 
author of the story has the ability to turn a counterfactual scenario into true narrative 
material. 
Conclusion to Chapter 4
It is clear from this analysis that the narrative dialogue introduces a theme of 
counterfactuality central to the meaning of the story.   Narrative dialogue that includes 
evaluative counterfactuals represents reality from the perspectives of each character, 
and the counterfactuals serves as a hallmark of the discord between them. Their 
different attitudes toward Africa and toward their marriage highlight the regret 
experienced by both characters in the story, and become important recurring topics in 
Harry’s thoughts.  Ultimately, it becomes clear that Africa and the marriage are just a 
veil for Harry’s real source of regret – his unwritten stories.  As becomes clear in the 
italicized vignettes, the stories are the most important element of any past alternative 
he wants to imagine.  
Through an examination of counterfactuals, it becomes clear that what-might-
have-been scenarios function at another narrative level in the story.  While 
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representing the embedded perspectives of the characters, counterfactuals also 
represent actual narrative memories in the case of italicized vignettes, and a 
counterfactual narrative possibility in the case of the penultimate ending.  Only by 
considering the sections together is it possible to appreciate the connection developed 
between writing and counterfactual alternatives.  From the vague counterfactuals 
imagined in the context of wealth and opportunity, to the more concrete 
counterfactuals imagined by Harry but conveyed by Hemingway, to the elaborate 
penultimate ending which belongs to Hemingway alone, the counterfactual 
alternatives move progressively from the vague and banal to the level of artistry and 
narrative.  The story forces us to recognize that counterfactuals, motivated by regret, 
are also made lucid by the awareness of foreclosure, an awareness which the 
characters and the readers eventually share.  The story emphasizes the role of the 
writer – both the fictional writer Harry and the implied author Hemingway – in turning 
unrealized possibilities into the realized elements of narrative.  
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Chapter 5: He Should Have Acknowledged Her
I shall be telling this with a sigh / Somewhere ages and ages hence: / Two roads 
diverged in a wood, and I / I took the road less traveled by, / And that has made all 
the difference.  Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken”
Ernest Hemingway’s story “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” demonstrates some of 
the forms that counterfactual scenarios can take when they are embedded in literature. 
They can appear within dialogue, playing the same rhetorical role that counterfactuals 
play in the real conversations on which dialogue is modeled.  In this case, characters 
serve as the “speaker” and “listener,” with the reader in a position to overhear the 
conversation.  Counterfactual scenarios may also appear in the character’s thoughts 
that are conveyed, with narrative intervention, to the reader.  In this case, the character 
and narrator act as dual speakers with the reader in the position of listener.  Finally, as 
we saw in “The Snows of Kilimanjaro,” the presence of two incompatible endings 
allows the implied author to assert narrative authority by offering one “counterfactual” 
and one “actual” ending. The explicit and implicit evaluative stances toward the 
counterfactual scenarios provide the reader with a series of spaces that can be fully 
evaluated in a rich, integrated reading of the story.
“The Snows of Kilimanjaro” includes each of these possibilities in a single 
story, and for this reason provides an excellent demonstration of the use of 
counterfactuality as a unifying theme.  The short story “The Wife of His Youth” by 
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Charles Chesnutt does not include the same variety of narrative techniques, but does 
include another excellent demonstration of a counterfactual scenario in the narrative 
dialogue that has broader implications for the textual meaning.  The counterfactual 
scenario plays a blatantly rhetorical role in achieving a remarkable change in attitudes. 
This important counterfactual allows a speaker to convey his own evaluative stance 
and to change the attitudes of his listeners, whoecho his evaluation. 
But of course the story is a narrative with greater complexities of embedding. 
Unlike the “Snows of Kilimanjaro,” this story has an overt narrative presence.  The 
narrator’s commentary at times undercuts the evaluations and moral authority of the 
main character.  As a result, this story is a particularly good example of evaluative 
stance that is distributed across speakers in narrative discourse.  The reader must 
assemble the various perspectives, and integrate spaces of varying knowledge, in 
arriving at an understanding of the story.  Through these multiple narrative spaces, the 
story allows the reader to resist the uncritical and sentimental evaluation made by the 
textual audience.    
“The Wife of His Youth”
Published in 1899, but set in 1880,  “The Wife of His Youth” is a short story 
exploring the lives of free African Americans living in post-Civil War Ohio.  The 
main characters are united by their involvement in a social club dedicated to the 
societal and educational advancement of i s members.  The protagonist of the story, 
Mr. Ryder, is the leader of this club.  The members of the club all live in Groveland, 
Ohio, commonly believed to be a fictional counterpart to Cleveland, the Ohio city 
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where Charles Chesnutt lived during most f his adult years (Fleischmann 462).  The 
story’s setting, along with the experiences of black characters in the story, alludes to a 
particular time and place in American history.
Specifically, the story’s references to “the war” and to the existence of slavery 
in America ground it in the era directly following the Civil War.   During this 
postbellum era, a shift occurred not only in the status of slaves relative to white 
citizens, but in the status of slaves relative to half a million other African Americans. 
By 1880, a generation after the 13th Amendment, millions of former slaves, the first 
generation of free children born to former slaves, the population which had already 
been free before the war, and a generation of their children, constituted the African 
American population of the United States.  While it is easy to assume that African 
Americans all faced the challenges and opportunities of freedom simultaneously with 
the end of the Civil War, some black Americans belonged to families who had already
achieved freedom before the war even began28, d as a result black citizens had 
varying degrees of personal identification with slavery, though all were now equal in 
their entitlement to freedom.   
The official erasure of slave and free categories that had defined the African 
American demographic was further complicated by the stratification of racial 
composition in the population of African Americans.  African Americans of mixed 
black and white heritage, who, according to available records, had been more likely to 
be kept in privileged slave roles and to be set free, were counted in the 1850 census as 
a separate racial category.  By 1880 the distinction between African Americans and 
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those of mixed race was blurring, a trend that would be further solidified by the “one 
drop rule” of segregation.  As Anne Fleischmann points out, it is important to note that 
“The Wife of His Youth” is set during a time period when traditional groupings used 
to distinguish African Americans had become outmoded, and the story itself 
dramatizes the challenges to identity wrought by the evolution of these racial 
categories. This story, Fleischmann writes, is about “the post-Civil War extinction of 
‘mulatto’ and ‘free born’ as social and legal categories” (462). 
The group of characters at the center of the story are light-skinned black 
Americans who did not experience slavery firsthand, either because they were free 
already, or because they were born after the war.  The social club that unites them 
becomes a vehicle to demonstrate th  race and class tensions that arise between this 
particular group of African Americans, who pride themselves on exclusivity, and those 
whom they exclude.  Additionally, the story provides an ironic commentary on the 
idealization of white standards inherent in the club’s goals and activities.  The club 
described in the story strives for a particular type of “refinement” characterized by 
European educational standards and social practices and a preference for light skin.  
The stated purpose of the club is to “establish and maintain correct social standards” 
amongst African Americans, a group “whose social condition presented almost 
unlimited room for improvement” (47). 
The tone in the story is set by the narrator, who describes the club in a subtle 
yet unmistakably ironic style.  As the narrator introduces the club in the opening 
paragraphs, he labels it the “Blue Vein Society” – a name given not by the members 
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but by those outside it, who contend that the club’s members have skin that is light 
enough to show blue veins.  Though acknowledging that the members deny this 
requirement as well as the other supposed requirement of free birth, the narrator also 
notes that very few of the members had either dark skin or a slave past.  By exposing 
the readers to both t e accusations and the denials of the club’s requirements, but then 
proceeding to call the club the “Blue Veins” throughout the story, the narrator aligns 
us with the viewpoint of those who mock the club and its purposes.  The narrator 
points out, too, that “opinions differed…as to the usefulness of the society” (47).  The 
club’s harshest critics, according to the narrator, often become its staunchest 
supporters once they have been granted membership.  
Thus the narrator’s tone is both descriptive and subtly mocking.  An even more 
blatant irony suffuses the narrator’s depiction of Mr. Ryder, the leader of the Blue 
Veins and protagonist of the story. The narrator exposes the hypocrisy of Mr. Ryder’s 
position simply by quoting his own words and describing his actions.   He relates Mr. 
Ryder’s own comment that he “has no race prejudice,” immediately followed by a 
statement of his own blatant desire to move closer to whiteness and white ideals:
We people of mixed blood are ground between the upper and the 
nether millstone.  Our fate lies between absorption by the white 
race and extinction in the black.  The one doesn’t want us yet, but 
may take us in time.  The other would welcome us, but it would be 
for us a backward step. 48.
Mr. Ryder’s belief that identification with the black race represents a “backward step” 
is a clear indication that he does, in fact, harbor race prejudice.  In his spare time, Mr. 
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Ryder loves to read the English poets, particularly Tennyson, and plans to propose to a 
woman “whiter than he” (49) by quoting from a Tennyson poem.  In describing Mr. 
Ryder as both a man with “morals above suspicion” and with racist biases toward 
other (darker) African Americans that excludes them from the scope of his 
consideration, the narrator shows us a man with obvious contradictions in his 
character.  
Nevertheless, by telling the story of the club and its leader in more detail than 
an outsider could possibly know, the narrator invites us to sympathize with the club 
members and especially with Mr. Ryder.  Furthermore, the ironic tone is sometimes 
undetectable: throughout the story, the descriptions are at times detached and 
seemingly uncritical.  We learn of the support many members draw from the club and 
of Mr. Ryder’s unwavering dedication to the club and its goals. He is described as a 
“genius of social leadership” (48).  We learn of his sincere love of literature, his hard 
work in a profession that has enabled him to buy his own home, and his willingness to 
sustain a long contented bachelorhood.  We are left to weigh Mr. Ryder’s more 
admirable characteristics against his racism and glorification of whiteness.
In this respect, the narrative technique is quite different from Hemingway’s 
telegraphic style, in which the narrative intervention and interpretive s ance is harder 
to detect.  In this story, there is a clearer distinction needed between the embedded 
spaces of narrator and characters.  The characters’ perspectives obviously do not take 
into account the narrator’s ironic commentary, though the reade  is aware of both their 
words and actions and the potential irony of their situation as conveyed by the 
154
narrator.  As the plot develops, certain events are known to the reader, narrator, and 
Mr. Ryder, but not to the other members of the Blue Vein club, so that the separate 
spaces within the story also contain varying levels of knowledge about events in the 
plot.  Juggling the contents of these separate spaces is essential to interpreting the 
story. Suspense and tension in the story depends on the reader’s ability to contrast the 
contents of Mr. Ryder’s space with those of his friends, and to keep them both distinct 
from the perspective of the narrator.
The tension of the story is heightened by the introduction of a character who 
epitomizes everything Mr. Ryder and his friends disdain.  A woman arrives at Mr. 
Ryder’s house on the very day he has planned to give a ball to honor Molly Dixon and 
to serve as the romantic backdrop for his proposal of marriage.  Although the woman, 
who introduces herself as “Liza Jane,” interrupts the work of writing the toast and 
marriage proposal to Molly Dixon, Mr. Ryder graciously offers her a place in the 
shade and refers to her as “madam.”  If we suspect him of overt racism, his actions do 
not reveal it here – he listens to her patiently and seems sympathetic to her situation. 
At worst, his behavior is patronizing but polite.
Both the description and dialogue that ensue reveal the differences between 
Liza Jane and the members of the Blue Vein club.  While many of the members are 
too young to remember the war – Mr. Ryder, at about 50, is one of the oldest – Liza 
Jane is “quite old.”  Even her clothes are of  “ancient cut,” and a bonnet reveals tufts 
of “short gray wool.”  Most remarkable is her color, which is very black, in fact so 
black that “her toothless gums…were not red, but blue.”  While blue veins are the 
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symbol of light skin and black gentility in the story, Liza Jane’s empty blue gums are 
emblems of her own dark color and impoverished history.  In fact, she is such a living 
embodiment of her slave past, that “she looked like a bit of the old plantation life, 
summoned up from the past by the wave of a magician’s hand, as the poet’s fancy had 
called into being the gracious shapes of which Mr. Ryder had just been reading” (51).  
He had been reading of Tennyson’s  “sweet pale Margaret,” an idealized version of 
white womanhood that contrasts so perfectly with the image of Liza Jane that she too 
seems an idealized version of something very different – womanhood ravaged by 
racism and history. Werner Sollors has described her as “South and slavery, black 
culture and black consciousness, folk and past, mother culture and memory” (161).
When Liza Jane opens her mouth to speak, her words are delivered in a slave 
dialect that also contrasts with Mr. Ryder’s standard dialect.   She reveals to Mr. 
Ryder that she has been wandering from place to place since being set free after the 
war, and for twenty-five years has been working as a cook while searching for her 
former husband, a “mulatter” man named Sam Taylor.  Though Sam was free before 
the war, his freedom was threatened, and she warned him to that he was about to be 
sold into slavery.  Though Sam escaped, she was punished for her actions by being 
sold “down de ribber” (52), and as a result was unable to locate Sam, and assumed 
Sam was unable to locate her, after the war. Mr. Ryder asks her gently prodding 
questions about the possible success of her twenty-five year quest, even suggesting 
that “perhaps he’s outgrown you, and climbed up in the world where he wouldn’t care 
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to have you find him” (53).  Liza Jane is adamant in her belief that her search will 
eventually prove successful.
The text does not give any hint as to whether Liza Jane recognizes Mr. Ryder 
as her former husband Sam Taylor, though she does state that she could “pick him out 
of a thousand men” (53).  If she does recognize him, there is nothing in the text that 
would reveal this fact to the reader.  Neither does Mr. Ryder reveal to her his own 
realization that he is the man whom she is seeking.  It is not clear to the reader, either, 
when Mr. Ryder realizes who she is.  At a point in their conversation, he asks to see a 
picture of Sam Taylor, which he studies “long and hard.”  After their conversation, he 
looks at himself in the mirror.  As Barbara Dancygier has discussed, images of 
reflection in fiction are often used to represent a decompression of identity, with 
character and reflection presenting two distinct aspects of a single character.  The 
decompression of identity is also marked in literature, she notes, by the use of two 
different proper names, in this case “Sam Taylor” and “Mr. Ryder” (“Identity and 
Perspective”). A reader experienced in these literary conventions will no doubt infer at 
this point that Mr. Ryder and Sam Taylor are indeed one and the same, and that Mr. 
Ryder has realized this fact as well, though the point is never explicitly made in the 
narrative.
The story ends with the ball given by Mr. Ryder, the ball at which he had 
planned to propose to the woman “lighter than he,” Molly Dixon.  By this point in the 
story, three distinct spaces of knowledge have been created. The first is Mr. Ryder’s 
space, which contains detailed knowledge of his own life history, of the meeting with 
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Liza Jane that afternoon, and of his own identity as Liza Jane’s long lost husband.  
The second is the space of the members of the Blue Vein Club, including Molly 
Dixon, none of whom are aware of Mr. Ryder’s true identity or of the existence of 
Liza Jane. The third space is that of the narrator, which includes access to the 
perspectives of both Mr. Ryder and his Blue Vein guests, as well as the narrative 
potential of irony and completion possible in the story’s ending.  The reader must 
juggle all of these spaces as the ending proceeds.  
The Ending
The ending of this story demonstrates the rhetorical nature of evaluative stance 
in communicating a perspective from a speaker to an audience, as modeled by Mr. 
Ryder and his guests at the ball.  In this case, Mr. Ryder develops an elaborate 
counterfactual scenario for his friends, and his goal is to encourage them to share his 
own perspective on the events he describes.  His purpose is both moral and personal: 
his own fate will be determined by whether or not he can convince his friends to share 
his evaluation.   Convincing them is no small matter, since the perspective he wishes 
them to adopt represents a drastic shift from their previous attitudes.  In short, his 
intention is to encourage them to accept Liza Jane as his wife.
At this point in the story, identified in the text as section III, Mr. Ryder is 
prepared to address the social club which has gathered for the ball.  The reader knows 
that the original purpose of the ball was to create a forum for Mr. Ryder to propose 
marriage to Molly Dixon; the proposal was to be delivered in the toast he had been 
writing that afternoon before the arrival of Liza Jane. As the ball begins, the narrator 
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describes a setting that is quite formal and up to the standards of etiquette which the 
club wishes to maintain.  We are informed that the ball has brought together all the 
distinguished “colored” people of the city, including teachers, doctors, and lawyers. 
The guests are arrayed in evening costume, entertained by live string music, and 
waited on by black servants. The narrator also informs us that although the guests are 
“colored,” that “most of them would not have attracted even a casual glance because 
of any marked difference from white people” (54).  
As the evening proceeds through literary program, dinner, and after-dinner 
toasts, the scene represents the epitome of the cultural elitism that the Blue Vein 
society has come to represent in the story.  While the “colored” guests are 
indistinguishable from white people, their “black” servants are not. While the 
statement that the guests have no “marked difference from white people” may simply 
imply that the bearing of these guests would not set them apart in a white crowd, it 
clearly suggests that their color is a factor as well.  In other words, there is a conflation 
in this description between the formal, professional, “colored” guests who are lighter 
in skin tone, and their servants who are described as “black.”  Liza Jane – who 
informed Mr. Ryder that she has kept herself for twenty-five years working as a cook 
– is aligned by color and by trade with the servants rather than with the guests.
As the host of the ball, Mr. Ryder is the person responsible for the decorum 
and respectability of the people and events, and also, we would assume, for hiring the 
black servants.  The narrator has informed us that Mr. Ryder had hoped the ball 
“would serve by its exclusiveness to counteract leveling tendencies, and his marriage 
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to Mrs. Dixon would help further the upward process of absorption he had been 
wishing and waiting for” (49).  He had also planned to propose during a climactic 
toast, not eschewing the publicity of the proposal when he felt sure he would receive 
“the answer he expected” from the light Mrs. Dixon (49).  If the ball seems to 
epitomize the elitism and white idealization of the club, that is because Mr. Ryder has 
planned it himself.
Of course, Mr. Ryder planned the ball and the toast before he knew that his 
long-lost wife would arrive on the scene to indirectly challenge all that he has 
esteemed in his social life.  The ending creates a new sense of irony for the reader, 
since the reader can appreciate both how Mr. Ryder intended to enjoy the ball – as  
celebration of exclusivity and upward mobility for both himself and his friends – and 
the racial dilemma that Mr. Ryder now confronts.  Though the description of the ball 
indicates that it is proceeding as Mr. Ryder had hoped, the reader’s understanding of 
the ball is changed by the double identity of Mr. Ryder as both “dean of the Blue 
Veins” and “Sam Taylor.”  While the dean of the Blue Veins planned an exclusive ball 
to which “black” people were invited only as servants, Mr. Ryder and the reader know 
that as Sam Taylor he was/is married to one of these black servants.
    The final toast hat Mr. Ryder gives is a deliberate rhetorical situation in 
which he must align his old and new identities.  He had planned to use the toast for 
one type of performance – a proposal of marriage.  Though Mr. Ryder’s life has 
changed, the rhetorical situation has not.  He is faced with an audience of friends he 
must address, an audience of friends whose attitudes toward race are very similar to 
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his own. Rather than confirm those attitudes with a proposal to Mrs. Dixon and a 
move “upward,” Mr. Ryder chooses to exploit the rhetorical situation in a much 
different way.  The reader, from a much more privileged position of knowledge, can 
appreciate the rhetorical situation from both the audience’s and speaker’s points of 
view.       
Mr. Ryder begins his toast with a discussion of woman as the “gift of Heaven 
to man,” noting that “the quality which most distinguishes woman is her fidelity and 
devotion to those she loves.”  So far, the toast is what his friends expected.  But he 
uses this opening as a segue to the story of Liza Jane, which he works into his toast 
using the “same soft dialect” with which she told it to him, a dialect that comes 
“readily to his lips.”   The use of this dialect is the first instance in which Mr. Ryder 
willingly associates himself with Liza Jane.  It is a surprising choice for a man whose 
public image has been distinguished by his educational elitism, and who has made a 
social career of distancing himself from people like Liza Jane.  The readiness with 
which he speaks in this dialect shows that the distance he has worked so hard to 
maintain between himself and “the plantation” disappears easily – also suggesting that 
the distance was not as great as he supposed.  Mr. Ryder’s choice to speak in the 
dialect has a positive effect on his listeners; they are not shocked, but rather listen 
“attentively and sympathetically.”  Mr. Ryder has judged his audience well.
Mr. Ryder concludes his brief recount of Liza Jane’s story with a rhetorical 
flourish:
Such devotion and confidence are rare even among women. There are 
many who would have searched a year, some who would have waited 
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five years, a few who might have hoped ten years; but for twenty-five 
years this woman has retained her affection for and faith in a man she 
has not seen or heard of in all that time. 55.
Through the emphasis created by this crescendo, he illustrates Liza Jane’s extreme 
“devotion and confidence.”  Though he had originally planned to praise women for 
their beauty, in praising Liza Jane he focuses on attributes of character rather than 
physical appearance. 
Mr. Ryder next asks his friends to imagine a counterfactual scenario, beginning 
“suppose that this husband, soon after his escape, had learned that his wife had been 
sold away, and that such inquiries as he could make brought no information of her 
whereabouts.”  (55).  He continues to elaborate a scenario in which Liza Jane’s 
husband has given her up for lost, sought his own life and fortune in the north, and 
done quite well for himself.  In the imagined scenario, the husband has even “set his 
heart upon another” and managed to “win the friendship and be considered worthy of 
the society of such people as those I see around me.”  His contentment is interrupted 
by “the fact that the wife of his youth, the wife he had left behind im…was alive and 
seeking him, but he was absolutely safe from recognition or discovery unless he chose 
to reveal himself.”  Mr. Ryder’s description of the man brings Liza Jane’s story closer 
to the lives of his audience, since this long-lost husband so closely resembles a man 
they might actually know, a point he takes pains to emphasize. Of course, he presents 
this scenario as a counterfactual with no personal contingency: it represents what 
might have happened to someone, but not necessarily him.    
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Of course, to the reader the scenario is not counterfactual, and the resemblance 
between Mr. Ryder and the man more than uncanny.  As the reader maintains the 
space representing the audience’s perspective, it must be assumed that his friends may 
or may not suspect that Mr. Ryder is describing his own situation.  On the other hand, 
the reader knows, in the space of Mr. Ryder’s perspective, that the story he is telling is 
his own. Each detail that he adds provides structure to both of these spaces – the 
“counterfactual” space that he describes to his friends, and the “fictional reality” space 
of which both Mr. Ryder and the reader are aware, in which he is the man being 
described.      
Mr. Ryder ends the description of the scenario by asking “what would he do, 
or rather what ought he do, in such a crisis of a lifetime?”  This is a rhetorical 
question, though, which he does not allow his friends to answer.  Instead, he 
introduces a new element into the story: he asks his audience to imagine that he is the 
man’s “old friend,” who has been sought for advice, and who must help his friend 
mull over the situation. To this end, he imagines quoting to his friend, “This above all: 
to thine own self be true / And it must follow, as the night the day/ Thou canst not the 
be false to any man.”  In Mr. Ryder’s space, in which he knows he is the man he has 
described, the friends that he is addressing are counterparts to the “old friend” who 
advises the man.  In the audience’s space, however, he is the “old friend” counseling 
the imaginary man, since the identity of this man is unknown to them.  In this way, 
Mr. Ryder is both a counterpart to the man and to the man’s friend in different spaces, 
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both of which are available to the reader.  Mr. Ryder, in a sense, advises himselfon 
how to act, while also placing his friends in the position of advisors.
 Imagining himself speaking as the old friend, he concludes by pretending to 
ask the man “Shall you acknowledge her?”  He then asks his friends for their opinion: 
“And now, ladies and gentlemen, friends and companions, I ask you, what should he 
have done?”  What he is really asking for is their evaluation of two different possible 
outcomes: one scenario that ends with acknowledgement, the other with denial. He 
wants to know how they evaluate the spaces, and which one they endorse.  He 
pretends to put the evaluation fully in their hands, but in fact, he has carefully guided 
their evaluative stance all along.   
He has already given them a model for the type of advice an “old friend” 
would give in this situation, and the model suggests that acknowledgment is the 
preferable outcome. Furthermore, he quoted from Shakespeare, a writer whom the 
club members have traditionally valued, in order to point out that being true to oneself 
necessarily excludes the option of being false to someone else.  He reminds them of 
their own touted social standing when he addresses them as “ladies and gentlemen, 
friends and companions.”  Though Mr. Ryder has put the decision in their hands, he 
has carefully presented the options so that acknowledgement comes across as the only 
preferred and morally upstanding choice. His own evaluative stance toward the 
situation has been carefully communicated. The narrator notes that the situation 
described by Mr. Ryder seems ore than imaginary to his audience, but had “the 
nature of a personal appeal.”
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When his friends reply “He should have acknowledged her,” they confirm their 
own preference for acknowledgement.  Considering that this very club is based on 
exclusivity and the social ostracism of people they consider their racial inferiors, this 
preference for acknowledgment represents quite a moral and rhetorical feat for Mr. 
Ryder.  By sympathetically telling his friends the story of Liza Jane, bringing it closer 
to their own situation by describing a supposed counterfactual scenario, and then 
recasting the story with his own guiding evaluation offered through the voice of the 
“old friend,” Mr. Ryder leads his friends to make the choice he wants them to make.  
It is also important to note that the first person to respond to his question with 
“he should have acknowledged her” is Molly Dixon, whose response is then “echoed” 
by all the other guests. When she makes her response, she has “streaming eyes.”  As 
readers, we may assume that Molly is moved not just by the pathos of Mr. Ryder’s 
story, but by her awareness that her own future hangs in the balance as well.  When 
Mr. Ryder responds to his friends  “I thank you, one and all.  It is the answer I 
expected, for I knew your hearts,” we are reminded of his earlier pronouncement that 
he was sure the marriage proposal would result in “the answer he expected.”  In effect, 
the interaction that has taken place has been a rhetorical performance of orator to his 
audience, just as Mr. Ryder originally imagined the toast.  So too has it been a 
personal appeal to Mrs. Molly Dixon, which she has personally answered in turn. Mr. 
Ryder has seized the rhetorical situation to communicate not only to his audience, but 
to Molly Dixon, and to gain her approval of a “proposed” marriage she had not been 
anticipating.      
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When Mr. Ryder thanks his friends and brings Liza Jane into their company, 
her obvious difference from them has not diminished.  She is now thrust into the 
“scene of brilliant gayety,” though she herself is dressed in gray with the “white cap of 
an elderly woman.”  She has been led to the scene from an adjoining room – in other 
words, her place has not been at the party, but lying in wait on the periphery of the 
party, the station ormally reserved for servants.  Mr. Ryder announces “this is the 
woman, and I am the man, whose story I have told you.”  With this statement, Mr. 
Ryder compresses the aspects of identity that he carefully brought into alignment with 
his deliberative rhetoric.  Mr. Ryder and the man in his counterfactual scenario are 
now viewed by his audience as one and the same.  The imaginary wife and the 
“elderly woman” are also brought together in the person of the woman standing before 
them. When Mr. Ryder announces “Permit me to introduce you to the wife of my 
youth,” his statement echoes the introduction of a couple at the end of a marriage 
ceremony.  With their identities made known to the audience of Mr. Ryder’s friends, 
they have now been reunited as man and wife by this announcement.
With this carefully crafted performance, Mr. Ryder has managed to persuade 
his friends to drastically change their attitudes.  At the ball which was intended to 
maintain the highest standards of exclusion, Mr. Ryder and his group of friends have 
instead chosen to accept a person whose presence clearly violates their presumed 
standards.  Were it not for the marriage that she has doggedly fought to renew, Liza 
Jane would never be deemed a fit member of the “Blue Veins.”  At the end of the 
story, the potential for long-term happiness of Liza Jane, her husband, and the social 
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group is not made clear.  At the point of the ending, though, Mr. Ryder’s rhetoric 
succeeds in encouraging his friends to positively evaluate a scenario of 
acknowledgement, first in the abstract, and then in reality.  Like a true social leader, he 
has helped maintain the cohesion of the group, and has once again succeeded in 
aligning his friends’ opinions with his own.
The Reader’s Perspective
As readers, though, we are of course guided by the narrator and by our 
knowledge that the story is a work of literature with obvious symbolic import.  The 
narrator emphasizes the extent to which Liza Jane represents a “ bit of the old 
plantation” – her speech, her dress, and her appearance are all parts of her 
characterization that emphasize not just who she is, but what she symbolizes.  As 
readers, we also know that the narrator undercuts Mr. Ryder’s moral authority 
throughout the story.  Our appreciation of the ending, then, is enhanced by its role not 
just as a vehicle of social negotiation, but also as a vehicle of narrative meaning. We 
appreciate the transformative role it plays for the characters just as we appreciate the 
multifaceted role it plays within the narrative.  The reader’s task of evaluation is 
ultimately more complex than the task of evaluation dramatized by the characters in 
the story, for the reader has access to a greater number of narrative spaces with various 
levels of knowledge and evaluations, including the space of the ironic narrator.
For one, the reader is aware of the ball both as it is and as it could have been, a 
bit of knowledge that is shared with Mr. Ryder but not with his guests.  As events 
unfold, the ball may be appreciated in both its actual and counterfactual form.  
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Everything seems to proceed according to Mr. Ryder’s careful plan, and yet, this is not 
the ball that Mr. Ryder had originally planned, for the presence of Liza Jane has now 
connected Mr. Ryder to his long-lost past, a past that has put him in a tenuous 
position.  Where before the ball was to be a celebration of his successful social life, his 
Blue Vein friends, and his soon-to-be light skinned wife, the party now puts a 
spotlight on his connection to the blue-gummed Liza Jane.  If the ball was meant to 
focus on those among the excluding few, Liza Jane’s arrival has put the focus on the 
excluded, and provides a counterfactual irony to the events at the ball.
Foremost among these events is Mr. Ryder’s toast, which the reader can also 
imagine in contrast to the toast that might have been.  We know, and his guests 
assume, that Mr. Ryder had planned to propose to the woman in whose honor the ball 
is being held, Molly Dixon.  The toast he actually gives does result in a marriage – but 
rather than marking the beginning of a new life for Mr. Ryder, it marks the renewal of 
an old life he thought he had escaped, and a marriage to a woman with whom he now 
has very little in common.  In Mr. Ryder’s own racial terms, this marriage for him is a 
“backward step.”  He takes the step willingly, but does not take it alone – he coaxes 
his friends to evaluate his decision in a positive light before he actually acknowledges 
Liza Jane.
The reader has a more thorough understanding of the question “should he have 
acknowledged her?” that Ryder poses to his textual audience.  As Ryder describes the 
counterfactual scenario to his friends, the readers are aware that it matches the details 
of fictional reality. When he asks his audience whether the man should have 
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acknowledged his long-lost wife, the reader is in a position to answer the question as 
well, but with access to more spaces of textual meaning. The reader can also 
understand this as a probing question about Ryder’s own behavior. In their afternoon 
meeting, Ryder did not make himself known to his wife, but he could have done so, 
rather than keeping up appearances at the ball and turning their reunion into a 
rhetorical performance.  The question makes another counterfactual space available to 
the reader – the space in which Mr. Ryder acknowledged his wife at their first 
meeting.  The narrator and the implied author, in raising this question in Mr. Ryder’s 
own words, invite the reader to evaluate this counterfactual scenario for themselves, 
and to decide whether the counterfactual acknowledgement would have been 
preferable to his actual actions.            
Many readers have found Ryder’s eventual acknowledgement worthy of 
praise, despite his failure earlier in the afternoon. This story is commonly read as a 
metaphor for racial union, with the marriage to Liza Jane representing Mr. Ryder’s 
acceptance of his own identity and past and his willingness to suspend the distance he 
and his friends have maintained between themselves and African Americans of a 
darker complexion. Eric Sundquist writes that the story represents Charles Chesnutt’s 
own “meditation upon the complexities of his own acknowledgement of a past – not 
the literal past of his youth (although that is part of it as well) but rather the symbolic 
past of his race.  Liza Jane seems summoned up as though by conjure, a reminder of 
Ryder’s as well as Chesnutt’s obligation to confront and, as Ryder does, to embrace a 
painful past and the culture that is carried with it” (299). Earle Bryant’s reading of the 
169
story as a case of “metaphorical marriage” is in keeping with Sundquist’s views. 
Bryant notes that the title of the story alludes to the Old Testament book of Malachi, in 
which the prophet admonishes the Israelites for abandoning the Hebrew wives of their 
youth.  In this story, as in the Biblical story, the marriage is a metaphor for the 
embrace of identity, culture, and heritage (“Scriptural Allusion” 58-61).                    
In some respects, however, these readings overlook the narrative tone that is 
sustained throughout the text.  The reader, in the end, is not guided solely by Mr. 
Ryder’s rhetoric as are his friends, but by a multi-layered narrative with strongly 
ironic components.  Most notably, in the ending, ironic details infuse the rhetorical 
performance by which Mr. Ryder persuades his friends to accept the evaluative stance 
that he carefully introduces through the words of the “old friend.”  By having the 
friend quote Shakespeare, Ryder has re-aligned himself with the European literary 
history he abandoned when he failed to include the poem by Tennyson, and instead 
told Liza Jane’s story in her own dialect in the toast.  Not only does he quote from 
Hamlet, but he introduces the quote as “the words that we all know.” Presumably Liza 
Jane is not included in “we all.”  While he clearly reaches his audience carefully and 
well through this rhetorical choice, to the reader the choice is a reminder of his Euro-
centric exclusionary tendencies.  His full acceptance of Liza Jane – d of the identity 
she may metaphorically represent – is not without its ambiguity.
The use of the Shakespearian quote may even be a return to the subtly mocking 
portrayal of Mr. Ryder that was characteristic of the earlier part of the story.  Not only 
may the narrator be mocking Mr. Ryder for his reliance on whiteness to convince his 
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friends to accept blackness, but there is no sense that he, nor they, recognize the irony 
of their own situation.  Furthermore, the statement which Ryder quotes is actually 
made in the play by Polonius, the windbag buffoon of Hamlet.  The fact that Mr. 
Ryder draws wisdom from these words and uses them to put forth his evaluation 
leaves that evaluation open to the reader’s critical judgment.  The situation is similar 
to a point earlier in the text, when the narrator noted that despite Mr. Ryder’s love of 
poetry, “his pronunciation was sometimes faulty” (48).  In both of these cases, the 
narrator engages the reader in a mutual feeling of superiority over Mr. Ryder, a role 
not unlike the one Mr. Ryder and his friends assume toward their supposed inferiors.
There is also the question of whether Mr. Ryder’s turning the toast into his 
own rhetorical tour-de-force is fair to anyone but himself.  While he accomplishes his 
ends, and convinces his friends to proceed with a moral superiority that supercedes 
their presumed racial superiority, the outcome is ambiguous.  His wife, when brought 
into the “scene of brilliant gayety,” stood “startled and trembling.”  He has turned the 
acknowledgement into a public spectacle rather than a private reunion, and his wife 
does not seem to respond with a sense of vindication or happiness.  Rather, she seems 
more out of place now, when her marriage has been reaffirmed, than if she had been 
working at the ball as a cook.  While her quest has ended, the ending of the story does 
nothing to establish her happiness.     
We see then, that Mr. Ryder’s rhetorical performance allows the reader to 
appreciate the characters’ moral judgment, while also inviting the reader to make a 
more informed judgment about Mr. Ryder and the role of denial and 
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acknowledgement in his life.  In this way, the rhetorical nature of the evaluative 
situation extends to the reader, who has access to all narrative spaces and therefore an 
appreciation of basic events, and the symbolic interpretations possible through a fuller 
appreciation of the symbolic meanings, counterfactual scenarios, and ironic overtones 
of the narrative.  Like Mr. Ryder’s audience, the reader is invited to consider “Should 
he have acknowledged her?” In the more informed position, the reader is also invited 
to evaluate Mr. Ryder, the Blue Veins, and the meanings of the text in a fuller context.
Mr. Ryder’s acknowledgement is no clear-cut moral victory. Those who have 
read it as such have failed to see the complexities of evaluation throughout the story.  
Mr. Ryder attempts to guide his audience to the evaluation he wishes them to make, 
and the reader may be guided to come to the same conclusions.  But such a reading 
overlooks the contradictions and ambiguities of evaluation throughout the story.  
When considered in that fuller context, Mr. Ryder’s rhetorical tour-de-force is hardly 
an unequivocal affirmation of his marriage or alignment with his race.  The implied 
author invites the reader to consider evaluation as a rhetorical theme when he places 
the question “should he have acknowledged her” at the climax of the story – and 
access to multiple, contradictory spaces encourages the reader to answer the question 
for him or herself, rather than be guided by sentiment and rhetoric like Mr. Ryder’s 
direct audience.   
Conclusion to Chapter 5
Chesnutt’s 1899 story demonstrates a social negotiation that dramatizes racial 
relations twenty-five years after the end of the Civil War.   While Mr. Ryder and his 
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friends work to re-establish in their social lives racial categories that have become 
legally outdated, Liza Jane enters the picture as a woman both associated with slavery 
and with a very dark complexion; she thus stands as a direct representation of tw  
sources of stigma for the African-American characters who make up the “Blue Vein” 
social club. For “marriage” to her to be considered acceptable, the characters have to 
overcome their biases toward the wife and her situation, an evolution in their thinking 
accomplished by Mr. Ryder’s careful and deliberately evaluative rhetoric.  
Evaluative stance is an aspect of meaning construction in counterfactuals that 
is showcased particularly well by “The Wife of His Youth.”  We see that evaluative 
stance conveys a speaker’s point of view to his audience, and that the role of 
evaluation can take on a rhetorical dimension beyond the representative level of the 
story’s dialogue, but also on the level of narrative meaning conveyed to the reader. 
The “Wife of His Youth” depicts the successful use of evaluative stance to 
communicate an attitude persuasively.  The speaker convinces his friends to adopt his 
point of view toward the space of acknowledgement, and in the process maintains 
social cohesion in the face of a potentially divisive issue.  
The reader is in a position of overhearer, and can fully appreciate the 
evaluative situation presented by Mr. Ryder that works so effectively on his audience 
of friends.  At the same time, the reader has access to a broader spectrum of narrative 
spaces, including not only the space of the audience’s knowledge and perspective, but 
also that of Mr. Ryder and the narrator.  These spaces add components of irony and 
symbolic significance to the evaluative interpretation.  While the reader is still placed 
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in a position of evaluation, the reader’s task is complicated by these additional 
elements of meaning. As a result, the reader may evaluate Mr. Ryder and his rhetorical 
performance much differently than his immediate audience.  
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Conclusion
We have seen that counterfactual scenarios enter into our discourse in 
countless ways.  They make their way into political speeches, into ordinary 
conversations, into popular press articles, and into literary texts.  They come in a 
variety of forms, some simple and some highly elaborate.  The very simple forms may 
be easy to miss, and yet these simple forms also demonstrate the pervasiveness and 
hidden complexity of counterfactual scenarios.  Whether simple or elaborate, 
counterfactuals are creative elements of our discourse that can be communicated from 
speaker to listener, or from author to audience. They are, in other words, a dialogic 
phenomenon.  
Previous studies have focused on the functions of counterfactuals in 
establishing causal relationships, in expressing emotions like regret, in constituting our 
thinking about normal and abnormal events, and in structuring our mental 
representations of the unreal.  My study is unique in that it has focused exclusively on 
the rhetorical dimensions of counterfactual scenarios.  I have examined a single 
function, the expression of evaluative stance, to demonstrate one use of 
counterfactuality as a rhetorical tactic in a variety of dialogic settings.
It has become clear that counterfactual scenarios are more than just creative 
products of the imagination – they are useful in communicating our attitudes, and in 
guiding others to share those attitudes. We do this, quite simply, by indicating whether 
a counterfactual scenario is “too bad” or a “good thing” in relation to some other state 
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of affairs. Of course, there are a variety of ways to indicate these judgments, some 
very obvious, and others more subtle.  Some judgments may be highly personal –
intimately connected to deeply-felt emotions or to the life history of an individual.  
Others may be more abstract, representing moral judgments or rhetorical evaluations 
that reflect social or cultural norms and expectations. 
In any case, when a speaker describes a counterfactual and pairs it with an 
evaluation, a unique individual perspective is conveyed to a listener. The listener has 
the choice to corroborate, challenge, or reject the counterfactual or the evaluation that 
has been proposed.  In this respect, the development of a counterfactual scenario is not 
only a joint activity, but a collaborative activity in which the structure of the 
counterfactual can be supplemented, changed, or dismissed as discourse proceeds.  
This study has examined not only the way that listeners collaborate with speakers in 
conversations that involve counterfactuals, but also the way that readers assemble 
meaning and make judgments from the variety of counterfactual spaces presented in a 
literary text.
At a more general level, I hope this study has provided yet another piece of 
evidence for a promising new direction in the study of language and literature.   This 
has been a truly multidisciplinary endeavor, drawing in research from a variety of 
disciplines not heretofore brought together in a consideration of counterfactuals. 
Ultimately, though, my work has been guided by a cognitive paradigm.  Like other 
researchers in psychology, linguistics, and other cognitive sciences, I view 
counterfactuals as products of our mental lives that can be conveyed by language, 
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including the language of literature.  I have provided a cognitive rhetorical model for 
the study of counterfactuality in all types of discourse. 
Counterfactuals, in my view, express not only our emotions, not only our 
capacity for imagining the unreal, not only our ability to re-imagine the past, but our 
essentially dialogic minds.  We examine states of affairs by placing them in contrast 
with other imagined states of affairs.  We heighten the essential contrast by 
introducing an evaluation.  Effectively, counterfactuals allow us to place real and 
imagined scenarios in conversation with each other. They also play a very important 
role in the dialogue of people who converse face-to-face, in the interaction of speakers 
and audiences, and in the dialogic exchange between the speakers of a text and its 




1 For a thorough overview of psychological research on counterfactual thinking, see Roese and Olson’s 
introduction to What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking.    
2 Traditional philosophical accounts of counterfactuality and its forms include Goodman (1955) and 
Lewis (1973).
3 Work in the field of cognitive linguistics that describes the connection between counterfactuality and 
mental representations includes the research of Barbara Dancygier, Gilles Fauconnier, Todd Oakley, 
Eve Sweetser, and Mark Turner.
4 2002 Winter Olympics, short-track speedskating men’s 1500 meters. The gold medallist was 
American Apolo Anton Ohno, and the disqualified skater was South Korean Kim Dong Sung.  Sung 
was disqualified for cross-tracking.  
5 This quotation from Jefferson is recounted by a “Virginia lady,” according to the White House’s 
biography of James Monroe available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/jm5.html>.
6 On this point, I agree with Fauconnier and Turner (219), who dispute Roese and Olson’s assertion that 
“all counterfactual conditionals are causal assertions” (Social 11).
7 In linguistic studies of counterfactual conditionals, the “antecedent” is also the term used to refer to 
the protasis clause.  In referring to the “antecedent event” in this chapter, I do not refer exclusively to 
the form of the protasis, but to the perceived originating point of the counterfactual scenario.  This is the 
way the term is used by Neal Roese and James Olson, for example.  
8 Statement made by the tour guide on a tour of the Maryland Archaeological Conservation Laboratory 
at Jefferson Patterson Park and Museum in St. Leonard, Maryland. 
9 Friends season six, “The One That Could Have Been,” episode 225565.  This episode originally aired 
on Feb. 17th, 2000, on NBC. Refer to the NBC Friends episode guide for a synopsis, 
<http://www.nbc.com/Friends/episode_guide/135.html>.
10 For an example of the philosophical approach to counterfactual conditionals, see David Lewis’s book 
Counterfactuals. Lewis himself cites the work of Richard Montague and Robert Stalnaker, among 
others.
11 Cognitive linguistic analyses of conditional constructions include Charles Fillmore’s “Varieties of 
Conditional Sentences,” Eve Sweetser’s  From Etymology to Pragmatics, Barbara Dancygier’s 
“Interpreting Conditionals: Time, Knowledge, and Causation,” and Dancygier and Sweetser’s 
forthcoming book Conditional Space Building and Constructional Compositionality.
12 In their forthcoming book, Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser describe semantic differences 
between conditional expressions that include “then” and those that don’t include “then.”
13 Strictly speaking, the protasis describes conditions in the world not necessarily as the speaker views 
them, but as the speaker represents her views.  The perspective conveyed by a statement does not 
necessarily align with the actual views of the speaker. 
14 Helpful and extended discussions of the relationship between verb form, mental spaces, and epistemic 
distance can be found in Eve Sweetser’s book Fr m Etymology to Pragmatics, Michelle Cutrer’s 
dissertation, and Gilles Fauconnier’s book Mappings in Thought and Language.
15 For a discussion of the vital relation of disanalogy, see Fauconnier and Turner p. 99.
16 Weak expressions of evaluative stance have a rhetorical purpose as well.  The weaker the stance, and 
thus the weaker the sense of commitment on he part of the speaker, the easier it is for the speaker to 
retract it or to claim that no such evaluation was intended.
17 This statement would be acceptable in a situation in which the comment refers to a probability, not an 
evaluation, for example, “Given all that we know about their adaptability, the dinosaurs shouldn’t have 
become extinct.  The fact that they did leads us to suspect that an extraordinary event caused their 
demise.”
18 See, for example, Clark’s discussion of “joint activities” (29-58) and “joint commitment” (289-317) 
that emphasize the cooperative role of discourse participants.
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19 In Ernest Hemingway’s “The Snows of Kilimanjaro,” for example, certain elements of the text are 
separated from the main narrative and printed in italics.
20 A viewer might disagree with the evaluative stance of some aspects of the counterfactual space. For 
example, in George’s “counterfactual life,” his wife has become an “old maid” librarian, and appears 
truly desperate and unhappy. I find this part of the movie amusing, though it is clear that the point of the 
counterfactual scenario is to present a negatively valued alternative, which as a viewer I accept.
21 In her article “Actually, I Felt Sorry for the Lion,” Nina Baym argues that Margot Macomber has 
been unfairly vilified in readings of “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber.”  
22 Oliver Evans refers to Helen as “death-in-life” (154), while Robert Fleming compares her to a 
“feeding vampire” (80).
23 Specifically, the use of the verb “wish,” the past perfect v rb tense, and the negative expression 
“never.”
24 In his essay from French Connections, J. Gerald Kennedy provides an interesting account of the 
symbolic value of Paris to Hemingway and to Harry in this story.
25 The statement itself is ambiguous between two readings.  One reading of “if you wanted to shoot,” is 
that Harry did indeed want to shoot, a fact that Helen is acknowledging.  Another reading is that Helen 
is not sure whether Harry wanted to shoot, so that when she says “if you wanted to shoot,” she is 
presenting this as a possibility, not as a foregone conclusion.
26 In “Consuming Hemingway,” Lyall Bush provides an insightful analysis of the economically 
structured relationship between Helen and Harry, and of the commodification of Harry’s products, 
namely writing and sex.
27 Janet Landman, for example, mentions “the death on Mount Kilimanjaro of Hemingway’s fictional 
writer” (102).  
28 According to the 1860 Census (the last census before the Civil War), the population of slaves living 
in all states was approximately 4 million, while the population of free African Americans was 
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